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This site maintained by: Aomar Boum. Site last updated on October, 2001. |
Journal
of Political Ecology:
Case Studies in History and Society |
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VOLUME 6 (1999)
Critical Masses:
Citizens, Nuclear Weapons Production, and Environmental Destruction in
the United States and Russia, by Russell J. Dalton, Paula Garb,
Nicholas P. Lovrich, John C. Pierce and John M. Whitely. Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press, 1999. 457 pp.
Review by Michael D. Mehta, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, K7L 3N6. With
the end of the Cold War came a collective, global sigh of relief. No
longer would the world's two superpowers target each other with a combined
nuclear arsenal sufficient to destroy the earth several times over. However,
the decades of preparing for nuclear conflict have left the United States
and Russia with a daunting task; namely, dismantling the weapons of mass
destruction and managing the environmental and human health risks posed
by radioactive waste and weapons-grade plutonium. Critical Masses
explores how citizens of both countries perceive the risks associated
with nuclear weapons production and waste disposal, and how they mobilized
political action to address their local concerns. Dalton
et al. do an exemplary job of comparing how citizens near the Hanford
Nuclear Reservation in the State of Washington and the Mayak facility
in the Southern Urals are responding to the legacy left by the Cold War. By
providing us with historical background on the two regions, and survey
results of environmental perceptions and their links to socio-demographic
variables like age, sex and level of education, the authors give us the
opportunity to see how an established democracy compares with a newly
emerging democratic state in a concrete way. Intrinsic
to their analysis are certain widely held assumptions about how democracies
should function. First, in a democratic society, it is presumed that
public understanding is necessary for "good" government. This
springs from a fundamental democratic principle that governmental policies,
if they are to be viewed as legitimate, must be responsive to the will
of the citizens governed by such policies. Ultimately, the "consent
of the governed" is essential when peoples' health and safety are
endangered by activities of the state, as the management of nuclear waste
from weapons programs demonstrates. Second,
a crisis of legitimacy may stem from political movements that insert new
values into political life. As people are attracted to new ideals
of environmental quality, world peace, or a nuclear-free society, this
crisis becomes a reaction to the "scientization of politics"
-- an alienation from politics which has been reduced to arcane technical
questions and expert decision-making. The concept of a "public"
out there somewhere waiting to be heard from implies that those who actually
make decisions do so without wide-scale support, and that such decisions
are in the interest of an elite keen on maintaining control over ever
scarcer resources. In a democracy, public opinion needs to be considered
as a reflection of the "will of the people." Unfortunately,
the role of public opinion in shaping environmental policy often plays
a peripheral function in technical debates that tend to accord greater
weight to "expert" scientific opinion. In political terms, the
increasing concern for environmental values has meant the search for political
formulations that reflect the recognition of limits and the desirability
of defending a plurality of interests. Third,
although not directly linked to the erosion of democracy in post-industrial
societies, reliance on technically-oriented approaches to risk assumes
that liberal individualistically-oriented policy-making cannot deal with
modern, communal risks. Furthermore, such an approach assumes that
the production and distribution of risks is independent from economic
and political forces whose actors may prefer to avoid input from the public
in the form of consultation. This is where technocratic decision-making
shines brightest. If public participation distracts regulators from
making the "right" choices using the tools of science and scientific
modes of thinking, then too much public consultation is dangerous. Conversely,
by embracing technical definitions of issues, the language of political
debate may become specialized and jargon-laden. Dependence on scientific
experts, whose judgments are necessarily influenced by their moral beliefs
and social aspirations, may replace rule by a technocratic elite for democratic
process. Fourth,
the links between state and economy are particularly complex in the case
of nuclear weapons programs and civilian nuclear power. Since scientists
are the source of basic information on nuclear issues, technical expertise
may define the language of political debate. The ability to enforce initiatives
is supported by federal legislation, secrecy, the maintenance of positivist-oriented
ideology, and the links between regulating to protect health and environment
and the promotion of the nuclear industry. However, in the United
States, regulation of hazardous technology has a distinctly democratic
flavor. Several nuclear power plants, including some almost completely
built, have been closed or not allowed to operate due to political opposition
stemming from a style of regulation which seriously takes public opinion
into account. In some cases, public opposition to nuclear power has
been so extreme that the granting of operating licenses was stalled for
several years. Inevitably, utility companies either abandoned these
unlicensed facilities or suffered bankruptcy due to long delays and extensive
capital investment and mounting interest charges. This set of dynamics
applies to the disposal of nuclear waste from weapons programs, but with
some differences that we will consider shortly. The authors'
treatment of these issues is thorough but could use a better anchoring
in the field of risk perception, communication and management. By
exploring how individuals perceive various indicators of environmental
quality, the authors' constructively examine some of Ronald Inglehart's
work on postmaterialism and of environmental sociologists on the New Environmental
Paradigm and Dominant Social Paradigm. This provides us with an opportunity
to consider how the disintegration of state authority is linked to governmental
responses to specific issues arising from nuclear weapons disposal. However,
without a more integrated approach, like that provided by the field of
risk analysis, the conclusions of such a work become two-fold in nature:
they examine environmental attitudes and their relationship to theoretically
inspired concepts like postmaterialism; and then assume that certain constellations
of attitudes are linked to particular kinds of political activities. Without
integration, debates on the management of technically complex issues become
mired in technocracy. What is subsequently lacking is a framework for
public participation that is sensitive to the social, economic, environmental
and international dimensions of nuclear weapons disposal. An example
not covered in the book that ties together these dimensions comes from
a proposal to export plutonium to Canada. In an effort to revive
a moribund nuclear industry, Ontario Hydro and Atomic Energy Canada Limited
have offered to dispose of plutonium from dismantled warheads from the
United States and Russia. A fuel known as MOX (mixed oxide) is made
from this plutonium and burned in nuclear reactors. Claiming the
suitability of the CANDU design for this purpose, Ontario Hydro is hoping
to breathe new life into its Bruce Nuclear Generating Station with a large
MOX contract. The transportation, security, and human health risks
from this activity have not yet been assessed. Further, no public
consultation on the social acceptability of this option has been undertaken.
The MOX
option is being marketed as an international responsibility on the part
of Canada to help achieve the objectives of disarmament. By converting
nuclear swords into electric ploughshares, an estimated 250 tonnes of
plutonium from American and Russian warheads can be burned in Canadian
nuclear reactors over the next 25 years. The social acceptability
of this option for Canadians is unclear. With many of Canada's 21
nuclear reactors reaching the end of their engineered life span, handling
large amounts of plutonium will require between 8 and 10 new reactors. No
new reactors have been ordered in Canada in over 20 years and the Canadian
public overwhelmingly opposes new plant construction. Additionally,
the issue of nuclear waste disposal is still unresolved in Canada. Recently
a proposal for a deep geologic vault in the Canadian Shield to dispose
of high-level radioactive waste failed to garner public support. How
can Canadians be expected to embrace the responsibility of disposing of
used reactor fuel from MOX projects when the issue of waste disposal has
not been adequately addressed? Economically
the use of MOX in reactors is questionable. The use of MOX as a fuel
perpetuates the myth that plutonium is a commodity. Not only would
reactors need considerable refurbishment to handle this new fuel mixture
but an entire infrastructure for fuel fabrication and reprocessing is
required. This is where the greatest weakness in the MOX argument
lies. When MOX is burned in a nuclear reactor, new plutonium is produced. Expensive
and hazardous reprocessing of fuel is needed to extract the remaining
plutonium for another cycle through the reactor. Eventually the fuel mixture
becomes economically unfeasible and the highly radioactive waste needs
to be safely disposed. Instead of running through this cycle with
MOX, it makes more sense to vitrify plutonium for disposal. Vitrification
involves encasing plutonium in glass and burying it in safe repositories. Plutonium
can be combined with high-level radioactive waste prior to vitrification
so as contaminate the plutonium, thus making it unapproachable for future
recovery. The MOX option keeps plutonium around for several centuries
and may not help in efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons.
The environmental
impacts of the MOX option also need to be considered. Supporters
of civilian nuclear power claim that electricity produced by nuclear is
"clean and green" and does not contribute to atmospheric levels
of carbon dioxide. If we use a life-cycle approach to analyze this
claim we discover that the mining of uranium and the fabrication of fuel
produces considerable environmental impacts. However, compared to
the use of fossil fuels for the production of electricity nuclear is cleaner. This
of course is not a fair comparison unless we also factor in the environmental
impacts of the full nuclear cycle including waste disposal and reactor
decommissioning. Solving existing environmental problems while creating
new ones is not desirable. Clearly, instead of increasing nuclear
capacity, with or without the MOX option, efforts should be made to curb
energy consumption and develop and improve the efficiency of renewable
energy options. Finally,
the international dimensions of the MOX option are complex. If we
consider the resources required to convert plutonium to MOX and the systems
needed for safe transportation and handling, plutonium has a negative
economic value. Since Russia does not favor the immobilization of
plutonium, MOX fabrication will be expensive. The costs of ensuring
a more secure world may be higher than necessary if the MOX option is
pursued. Perhaps the MOX option is nothing more than a bailout of
the civilian nuclear industry and a transfer of capital to Russia for
the sale of plutonium. Clearly, more work needs to be done on this
new wrinkle to the story of nuclear weapons disposal. In conclusion, Critical Masses is an excellent book that should be required reading for those interested in nuclear policy, environmental issues, and social movements. Although I would have preferred to see the material integrated into a risk analysis framework and more on some of the international dynamics like the issue of MOX, the book handles an extremely complex task with alacrity and grace. |