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This site maintained by: Aomar Boum. Site last updated on October, 2001. |
Journal
of Political Ecology:
Case Studies in History and Society |
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VOLUME 6 (1999) Nationalism,
Localism, and the Role of Intervention: A View of Rural Mexico edited by Daniel
Nugent, foreword by William C. Roseberry. Durham, NC: Duke University
Press (1998), xxii, 384 pp.
Reviewed by David Stea, Southwest Texas State University. The Mexican Revolution of 1910-1917 (or 1910-1920,
according to those researchers who claim the Revolution really ended when
Francisco "Pancho" Villa signed a peace treaty with the Mexican
government in Sabinas in 1920) is a source of endless fascination. Eclipsed
in notoriety by the carnage and publicity of World War I and by the subsequent
and better-known Russian revolution, it nevertheless represents an incredibly
complex multi-dimensional struggle: of a people with two successive dictatorships,
one long-lived (Porfrio Diaz) and the other of short duration (Victoriano
Huerta); of exploited against exploiter; of a nation with and against
itself, moving toward nationhood. Outside forces invariably enter
into revolutions, and the primary outside force, in this case, was, and
still is, the United States, whose intervention in the Revolution was
only piecemeal. The new edition of the 1988 book edited by the late
Daniel Nugent - scholar, journalist, and playwright - is about this, but
it is about a great deal more:
The centerpiece is the great Revolution (or, from
another perspective, the Revolution of 1910-1911 followed by the civil
war of 1913-1917/1920). From here, however, it moves backward and
forward in time, from the localized roots of revolution in the French
occupation of the 1860s (Alonso's chapter) or even the Caste Wars of the
1840s (Joseph's contribution) to contemporary resistance movements (Kearney
and Gilly). The "rural revolt" of the title includes not
just peasants but indigenous peoples of both the north and south. Unlike
accounts that concentrate on the roles of "great men", Nugent's
book speaks not just of the Revolution of Diaz and Huerta, Villa and Zapata,
Carranza and Obregon, but that of local peasant communities, and the continuing
struggle of Mixteca and Mayans of Oaxaca, Chiapas, and the Yucatan. It
is the last that brings the book into the present, not just in the 73-page
-largely contemporary chapter on Chiapas that concludes the book, but
also in Kearney's much briefer chapter on Mixtec political consciousness. In
these, "subaltern politics" are writ large. What, however, are "subaltern politics"? The
word "subaltern" is used rarely in discourse within North America,
but Nugent's use of the term ties the localism of particular peasant action
in defined areas of Mexico to the globalism of peasant movements everywhere. What
Guha (1988) refers to as "subaltern politics" are the politics
of the ordinary people: "While elite mobilization is vertical, subaltern
or popular mobilization is horizontal" (Nugent, 1998, p. 19) Elite
and subaltern politics are both concerned with domains of power. The
difference may lie in the murky distinction between state and nation (Womack,
1986), and in the relation of domination to subordination, especially
as played out through the interaction of "ruling" and "subaltern"
classes in Mexico. In the military expression of subaltern political
consciousness in the Revolution, it is notable that two of the largest
and best-remembered military units, Villas's Division of the North and
Zapata's Liberation Army of the South, were truly people's armed forces
ö although, as Katz indicates in this volume, it was in the north,
bordering on the U. S., that peasant guerrilla units, paid in money instead
of land, were transformed into regular armies. Intervention Dimensions of U.S. intervention on a national scale
are well-known. To a large extent these revolve around the two Wilsons,
Henry Lane Wilson, Ambassador to Mexico under President Taft, and President
Woodrow Wilson, who "took office on March 4, 1913, scarcely two weeks
after the assassination of Madero, and·immediately started a new
policy toward Mexico." (Aguilar Camin and Meyer, 1993, 44). It
might be said, more directly, that President Wilson was left to clean
up the mess that Ambassador Wilson had left behind. While there is
some disagreement about the precise extent of U.S. influence, there seems
to be consensus that then-President Taft, under Ambassador Wilson's influence,
and deterred only by Secretary of State Knox, was disposed to any action
short of invasion that would result in the removal of Mexican President
Madero and the installation of insurgent General Victoriano Huerta. Immediately
following the assassination of President Madero and Vice-President Pino
Suarez in February, 1913, the office of the Presidency of the Republic
devolved upon Secretary of Foreign Relations Pablo Lascurain, who submitted
his resignation 56 minutes after taking office, setting a new record for
brevity of government. The president, vice-president, and secretary
of foreign relations having been disposed of, the secretary of interior,
Victoriano Huerta, was next in line ö the third president in a single
day (Aguilar Camin and Meyer, 1993). As with so-called "diplomatic" interventions
in Mexico, the 20th century military interventions of the United States
are well-documented, including the U.S. occupation of Veracruz in 1914
and General Pershing's 1916 "Punitive Expedition" into Chihuahua,
in response to General Villa's raid upon Columbus, New Mexico. However,
the extent of more subtle U.S. economic influence, in the various sub-regions
of Mexico, and especially rural areas, is much in debate. Exploring
this aspect of U.S.-Mexico relations is one task taken on by Nugent's
book. Because the emphasis of the book is upon rural peasantry and
rural mobilization, little mention is made of some important pre-Revolutionary
connections between Mexico and the U.S.A. Pre-Revolutionary opposition
to Diaz, for example, was largely divided between the followers of Madero
and the supporters of the Flores Magon brothers and their Partido Liberal
Mexicano (also known as the magonistas, referring to one of the two
strongly nationalist and anti-U.S. political parties, formed just prior
to the Revolution). The PLM was headquartered in Los Angeles, California,
where none other than "Mother" Jones, by request of Manuel Calero,
then Mexican Minister of Justice, tried to get the brothers to return
to Mexico in late 1911 (Langham, 1981). The Flores Magons and magonismo
are allotted just one paragraph in Nugent's book. Baja California, is
mentioned in the context of Mixtec political action, with nothing said
about possible impacts upon mainland Mexico of U.S. (and British) attempts
to turn the peninsula, whose peasant population was negligible at the
turn of the century, into a virtual economic colony (or by William Walker's
"filibuster" invasion of La Paz in 1853) (Pinera, 1995). Beyond these understandable omissions or condensations,
however, considerable attention is given to U.S. intervention, and to
the difficulty of discerning direct links between such intervention and
peasant rebellions, particularly in the Revolutionary period:
Geography does make a difference. In general,
in an era of relatively poor transportation, U.S. intervention appears
to have been greater in areas near the long border: the U.S. supplied
arms to Villa's Division del Norte prior to his 1914 defeat in Celaya
and, later, allowed Carranza's forces to cross U.S. territory to engage
Villa. These actions, favored by political geography, were certainly
not incidental to the conduct and outcome of the struggle. The perceived extent of U.S. influence is a function
of the area studied, as well as one's perspective. Among writers
in this book, Knight sees private sector U.S. influence outweighing that
of the official public sector before 1940. In fact, some U.S. landholdings
and economic interests were relatively modest in scale, but others were
much larger. In certain areas, U.S. influence was mediated, rather
than direct. In contrast to the situation in the north of the Republic,
for example, North Americans owned no heniquen plantations in Yucatan. Joseph's
chapter reminds us that a principal ö albeit indirect - agent of
change in the political economy of the peninsula after 1902, mediated
through regional elites, was the alliance between Cyrus McCormick's International
Harvester Corporation and the Yucatecan exporting house of Molina y Cia. Collaborating
U.S. corporate interests and local planter factions successfully resisted
the Revolution until a year after Huerta's surrender to Constitutionalist
armies in August, 1914. Yucatan, which for centuries had seen itself
apart from the rest of Mexico, had witnessed several earlier secessionist
struggles - but the prime consumer of its prime product, henequen, was
the United States. In 1915, with arrival of the Revolution seemingly
inevitable, the planters alliance, in order to maintain the traditional,
socially exploitative plantation culture, initiated a final, abortive,
separatist revolt. Knight presents "yanquifobia" as
confined to urban upper and educated middle classes at the turn of the
century. More general anti-U.S. sentiment came in with the Revolution
ö but by no means everywhere. As Alonso indicates, within two
months after General Pershing's "Punitive Expedition" entered
Chihuahua, for example:
Thus, while Pershing failed to capture Villa, he helped
destroy the Villa movement. Why did the peasants, the base of Villa's support,
turn against him? Initially, Villa, an offspring of hacienda
peons was a much more sympathetic figure to Mexico's peasants than hacienda-bred
Carranza, and won their loyalty. The key the peasants' defection
seems to rest in Villa's failure to carry out agrarian reform. The
Wilson administration had earlier enable Villa to buy his arms in the
U.S. and, most critically, to sell his goods there. Katz suggests
Localism and Nationalism Beyond the first three chapters, the contributions
to Nugent's book are predominantly regional: given the relative weight
of U.S. intervention in the north, it is reasonable that five focus on
either Chihuahua (Osorio, Lloyd, Koreck, Alonso, and Katz), or Villa's
exploits in the north. Of the remainder, one treats Yucatan (Joseph)
and the last, Chiapas. A chapter on the Mixtec appears halfway through
the book, contrasting the passive resistance of Mixtecs in their native
Oaxaca with the active resistance of the Mixtecs who have migrated northward. Further, Morelos and Zapata's movement are barely
mentioned. This may be due to the popular wisdom that the Revolution
in Morelos, in being village- rather than hacienda-based, was unrelated
to U.S. interests. In contrast, Hart's (2000) findings indicate that
at least half these Morelos villagers were hacienda employees, that Morelos
was Mexico's largest sugar producer at the beginning of the twentieth
century, and that the U.S. Platt Amendment - by giving favorable treatment
to Cuban sugar - closed the doors to the primary export outlet for that
region of Mexico. The resulting unemployment among hacienda workers,
then, unlocked long-standing resistance to the plantations and brought
the first Zapatista revolution to Morelos. Thus, considerable localism is represented in Nugent's
book, which, given the state of Mexico in 1910, seems reasonable. It
is argued that Mexico had failed to form a true national identity a century
after the War of Independence. Turner (1968), Knight (1986), and
Alonso in the Nugent volume seem agreed that at a grassroots level Mexico
in 1910 was more of a community and regional mosaic than a nation:
Thus, "subaltern politics", in the Mexican
case, appear intimately tied to the relationship between localism and
nationalism. This seems to have been particularly true of the north,
far from Mexico's capital and close to the U.S. border. Villa's nationalist
ideology is unquestionable; the issue is how much of it was shared by
his supporters. But, if the anti-imperialism of Villa that inflamed
the 1916 raid on Columbus was not contagious among the peasants of the
north, neither were they anti-nationalist:
Peasants and Indigenas, Rural and Urban, Then
and Now In 1910, Mexico's only form of (relatively) rapid
communication was by rail, and that primarily with coastal ports and the
U.S.: Don Porfirio's rail network was radial, designed for importing and
exporting rather than internal communication, and it served the armies
of Villa, Carranza, and Obregon very well. The network also served
growth rather than development: at the turn of the century, Mexico was
less than 15% urbanized, and peasants of rural areas, isolated as many
were except on market days, lived in a different world. The rural-urban
distinction was real, and stark. It still is, in many areas. North
Americans have an understandable tendency to forget that the U.S. and
Mexico are within a tenth of a percentage point of each other in degree
of urbanization: about 75 %. The difference lies not in that one
country is urbanized and the other rural: it is in what the rural people
do. In the U.S. hardly any are engaged in subsistence agriculture;
the bulk of their activities are the same as those of urbanites. In
Mexico, rural people are still largely agrarian in both economy and culture.
Like the U.S., Mexico, home to 40% of the total indigenous population of the Western Hemisphere, denies its pluralism in the pursuit of unity. In its love-hate relationship with its indigenous population, Mexico has discovered that even more effective than "blaming the victim" is having the victims blame each other: peasants vs. indigenes. As Alonso indicates, the Constitution of 1917, one of the most revolutionary documents of this century, while explicitly including rural peasants, gave no recognition to rural Indians. In contrast with the mestizo peasants of the north, the indigenous peoples of Chiapas and Oaxaca, the people treated by Kearney and Gilly in Nugent's book, were those least touched by either the Revolution or U.S. intervention between 1910 and 1920. It took the better part of two decades for the land reforms of the Constitution of 1917 to reach much of Mexico, and some areas were not reached at all. In the interim, microecnomic U.S. intervention became macro: relatively untouched by micro-scale U.S. intervention nearly a century ago, indigenas are now being impacted by U.S. macroeconomics. It is these areas, especially in Chiapas (Hilbert, 1997; Stea, Elguea, and Perez-Bustillo, 1997), that are now prime sites of rural revolt in Mexico, of subaltern politics, and of U.S. intervention in the rural domain. Concluding Remarks Eleven writers have contributed to this expanded edition of Nugent's1988 book. The book is divided into four sections, the last of which includes but one chapter: "Popular nationalism and anti-imperialism in the Mexican countryside", "Class, ethnicity, and space in Mexican rural revolts", "U.S. intervention and popular ideology", and "Resistance and persistence." In the absence of introductions to these sections, the rationale for the division is less than transparent, since there is considerable overlap in subjects and treatments. But this is a relatively minor flaw, since the book
is, in other respects, a densely-worded treasure trove of information,
representing a new view on a subject with a long history. Certainly,
researchers in this field will find the listing of 36 archives and primary
sources and 27 pages of bibliography quite useful. This book, providing
interpretations of thorny subject matter by such experts as Alonso, Hart,
Katz, Knight, and others, is well worth the time of a wide range of readers,
and should be accorded a hearty welcome. References Cited: Aguilar Camin, Hector, and Lorenzo Meyer.
Alonso, Ana Maria,
Guha, Ranajit, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivack (eds.).
Gilly, Alfonso.
Hart, Paul. Personal communication, 2000. Hilbert, Sarah.
Katz, Frederich.
Knight, A.
Langham, Thomas C.
Nugent, Daniel.
Pineda, David.
Stea, David, Silvia Elguea, and Camilo Perez Bustillo.
Turner, Frederick C.
Womack, John.
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