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Environmentalism Unbound: Exploring New Pathways for Change. by Robert Gottlieb.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2001), xvii + 396 pp.

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Robert Gottlieb's new book, *Environmentalism Unbound*, takes us further down the path on which he started us in *Forcing the Spring* (1993). Like that book, *Environmentalism Unbound* is a combination of theory, cases, and appeal, and like that book it succeeds admirably in achieving certain goals yet falls short in achieving its most ambitious goal—creating a new progressive politics centered on a new kind of environmentalism. At the root of his project is demonstrating how “the mainstream environmentalism that had emerged by the 1970s functioned on the basis of the division between work, product, and environment, whether in terms of policy or the advocacy of consumer, occupational health, and environmental movements” (p. 43), and how to go about re-creating a whole environmental movement.

Gottlieb provides an excellent summary of environmental justice policy and politics in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g., People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, Executive Order 12898, Title VI actions, brownfields) and pollution prevention policy (e.g., Massachusetts Toxic Use Reduction Act, Pollution Prevention Act, voluntary greening of industry). In addition, he explores efforts to find a new, third way to control pollution, such as industrial ecology, extended producer responsibility, and design for the environment.

The three cases he selects to illustrate new pathways for an unbounded environmentalism are dry cleaning, janitors and commercial cleaning, and food systems. These case studies are uniformly excellent. He opens his discussion of the dry cleaning industry with a wise caveat during a time when many commentators and policy analysts are advocating more use of consensus based and voluntary approaches. “Voluntarism,” he writes, “as a substitution for public intervention, may in fact mask how industry, sectoral, institutional, and cultural influences can erect barriers against such change” (p. 101). These barriers are often most problematic for small businesses, a difficulty that “may be more reflective of their dependence upon manufacturers and suppliers in providing their products and shaping their processes or as subcontractors to larger businesses” (p. 103). Gottlieb proceeds to sketch the history of the development of the dry cleaning industry as a decentralized business that came to depend on the chlorine-based solvent perchloroethylene, or “perc”.

By the 1990s, however, perc was coming under increased scrutiny as a significant source of environmental risk for those who worked in the dry cleaning business, and for those who lived near such businesses. The perc issue was pushed to the top of the policy agenda by two old fashioned regulatory laws: the Clean Air Act and Superfund. It was provisions of these laws that provided the leverage to force the dry cleaners and chemical industry to consider a move away from perc. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments required that regulatory standards be established for 189 hazardous air pollutants. Perc was the first of these pollutants to be reviewed. Furthermore, it was discovered that perc was leaking into soil and groundwater—leading to major Superfund liability concerns for dry cleaners, landlords, and chemical companies. The rise of perc on the regulatory agenda presented an opportunity to shift to new, less toxic alternatives for cleaning. Gottlieb reports that a number of alternatives to solvent based dry cleaning

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were available (such as eco-clean and machine wet cleaning), and despite skepticism about these new approaches within industry, the EPA concluded that the dry cleaning industry needed to move away from perc and that financially viable alternatives for this shift existed. In the end, though, Gottlieb concludes that “the absence of any systematic government or industry programs to facilitate a transition represented a significant pollution prevention barrier” (p. 141).

Gottlieb’s connection between race, class, and ethnicity and environmental issues is strikingly clear in his second case: commercial cleaning services. Overall, nearly 1 million people are employed in this field, and these workers are among the lowest paid in the United States. The majority of janitors nationwide are women; there is a high percentage of African Americans working in public sector cleaning; and in certain areas, such as Los Angeles County, Latinos are the majority of private sector janitors. Furthermore, over the last few decades this sector has become increasingly concentrated and cost conscious, contributing to a deskilling of janitorial work. The issue of environmental risk related to cleaning products rose on the agenda due to concern with consumer exposure to household cleansers and indoor air pollution, not occupational exposures of janitors.

A major issue, as in the case of the dry cleaning example, was overcoming the barriers to change to environmentally preferable cleaning products. Governments played a significant role here. At the federal level, President Clinton’s Executive Order 12873, “Federal Acquisition, Recycling and Waste Prevention,” led to some limited changes in federal purchasing, but more impressive were state and local initiatives, like Massachusetts’s Toxics Use Reduction Act and Santa Monica’s (California) Sustainable Cities Program. The latter program established “environmental criteria for purchasing cleaning products and supplies” and instituted collaboration with the janitors in the selection and evaluation of these products. This program was very successful, and it was clear that the empowerment of the workers in the process was crucial to this success. Connecting janitors with cleaner products and helping to re-skill their work and restore their dignity was crucial to the transition to more environmentally sound cleaning.

The final case offers the greatest opportunity for a new environmentalism due to its tremendous reach and the potential to connect sets of previously disparate interests. Low-income urban residents identify food security (food access, food quality, and food price) as a major concern. By reframing food issues around community food security and examining these issues through complete food systems analysis, the significant environmental implications of existing and alternative food systems is clearly demonstrated. As he does in the other cases, Gottlieb offers a concise and informative historical sketch of the changes in the various sectors of the food system over the last half-century: the move toward industrial agricultural production and the decline in family farms; the move toward globalization of the food system; the rising importance of brokers, processors, and manufacturers in the food system (e.g., how McDonald’s Chicken McNuggets and french fries fundamentally changed the chicken and potato sectors of U.S. agriculture); and the significance of food retailers, ranging from supermarket chains to fast food companies, all seeking a standardized product. All of these trends, Gottlieb notes, have had “powerful implications in terms of the increasing disconnect between food and place and its related environmental, economic, and social justice implications” (p. 199). Accompanying this globalization and corporatization of U.S. agriculture were a series of related problems. Despite the abundance and at times overabundance of food, many continued to go hungry. The transition to a fast food, processed food culture meant that the nutrition of food had declined for most (e.g., nearly one-third of vegetable servings for teenagers today are made up of french fries and potato chips). Lastly, this changing food system has led to the rise of genetically modified crops.

A nascent effort to connect environmental, community development, sustainable agriculture, anti-hunger, and food system analysts was launched in the mid 1990s to influence the upcoming renewal of the Farm Bill. The efforts never fully gelled, in part due to the Republican victories of 1994, which put many of the coalition groups in a defensive posture. How might these various threads be connected? Organic and sustainable agriculture offer one option. Here Gottlieb focuses his criticism on the disconnect between organic agriculture and those who might not be able to afford such food. Oddly absent is any discussion of the increasing corporatization and globalization of organic agriculture, often removing its connection to place and seasonality. A further option focuses on growing food in the city, through community gardens and school gardens. Such gardens can connect urban dwellers with their food, greatly contributing to food security. Despite some positive developments, Gottlieb concludes that “the sum of the new food movements still remains less than their parts” (p. 271).

Gottlieb brings us great stories, helping us to see environmentalism where we hadn’t before and continuing to explore and to push the boundary between environmentalism and occupational safety and health, between environmentalism and a more just society. My main criticism of Gottlieb is his failure to engage mainstream environmental groups and the new conservation movement in any meaningful way. Such engagement is crucial for someone seeking to build a broader environmentalism at the core of a new progressive politics. As in *Forcing the Spring*, Gottlieb does little in *Environmentalism Unbound* to try to convince traditional environmentalists to follow

his new pathway.

Indeed, at times he seems dismissive of the accomplishments or views of his erstwhile allies. For instance, in response to the Republican victories in the 1994 elections, he suggests that “the opportunities presented by environmental justice and pollution prevention emerged as perhaps the only route for a renewed environmentalism” (p. 51). This is certainly news to those engaged in conservation politics, including mainstream groups that convinced the Clinton Administration to protect millions of acres via the Antiquities Act, and potentially millions of roadless acres in national forests through administrative action, or such non-mainstream groups as the Center for Biological Diversity, which used the Endangered Species Act and the courts to achieve significant successes in protecting species and habitat.

Most fundamentally, from the perspective of mainstream environmental groups, Gottlieb never clearly explains to these groups and their followers why they should broaden their vision and, more significantly, join in a new progressive politics. For instance, in his discussion of food politics he writes, “Mainstream environmental groups, while not opposing the initiative, remained aloof and never directly associated with the community food security campaign. The mainstream environmentalist position was focused on environmental impacts from the growing of the food, not what happened to the food itself” (p. 232). This passage is indicative of this fundamental problem—Gottlieb is quick to criticize mainstream environmental groups, but he never offers a full political analysis of the situation. What support did the food security groups give to environmental groups on other issues, such as non-point water pollution or the Endangered Species Act? In other words, how much did anti-hunger advocates care about how food was produced? More broadly, what is to be gained by mainstream environmental groups by joining a larger progressive political coalition? What is to be lost? What are the tradeoffs in a move from interest group politics to social movement politics? And how might this change happen, especially in a country that has moved to the right since 1980?

I think that Gottlieb downplays and underestimates the importance of mainstream groups in creating and defending the current regulatory framework, as problematic as it may be. These groups and this framework often open the policy process for others due to the leverage these laws provide (as described above in the perc case). Neither does he explore the real tensions that can sometimes exist between labor and environmentalists over issues like protecting endangered species or opposing mining or energy development.

Gottlieb also ignores a segment of the environmental movement that could be very open to his ideas, the new conservation movement. This movement is often just as critical of the mainstream environmental groups as he is, and like the anti-toxics groups he focuses on, these groups are often more confrontational than the mainstream groups. Why no discussion of the tree sitters or road blockers or legal monkey-wrenchers? In his preface, Gottlieb asks, “Can environmentalism become part of the new regionalism?” (p. xv). But parts of environmentalism, especially those associated with the new conservation movement, have been interested in varieties of regionalism for over a decade—bioregionalism, ecosystem management, ecoregions and biogeography, sense of place. A clear example of this opportunity to connect is the rise of the new group Wild Farm Alliance, which seeks to bridge the gap between stewardship farming and wildlands conservation. Similarly, at last winter’s Northeast Organic Farming Association-Vermont conference the theme was “farming as if nature mattered.” Why not connect these moves toward nature conservation to the larger food system alliance Gottlieb seeks to build?

Overall, Gottlieb continues to be the best guide to this arena of environmental policy, areas once considered on the fringe or not considered part of environmental policy at all. He offers an excellent and convincing case for a new kind of environmentalism when viewed from the progressive perspective. The central question is: What next? As noted above, Gottlieb needs to outline a rationale for why this new kind of environmentalism is necessary from the perspective of mainstream environmentalism. Furthermore, we need more ideas about what a future environmentalism would look like. Gottlieb rightfully argues that we need to be concerned with more than just the local; we need to be concerned with the global as well. He offers ideas such as a “global minimum wage, a baseline of environmental requirements, or global debt relief” (p. 277). After a book so tied to real cases and issues, these ideas strike me as vague and abstract. What of building on connections between consumers and producers, like Fair Trade coffee? Can this serve as a model that could be expanded? What of international community-to-community relationships?

One thing is clear. The importance of what Gottlieb discusses, the interconnections of global corporations, global food supplies, global justice, and global work conditions, all tied to local and global environmental conditions, has only been magnified by the events of September 11th. As environmentalism seeks to find its way in this new century, I’ll look forward to Robert Gottlieb’s next book to help us find that new direction.

Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China, by Judith Shapiro, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2001), xvii, 287 pp.

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In this engaging and informative book, Judith Shapiro takes a sharp, critical look at how development policies and practices under Mao influenced human relationships with the natural world, and considers some consequences of Maoist initiatives for the environment. Drawing on a variety of sources, both written and oral, she guides readers through an historical overview of major political and economic campaigns of the Maoist era, and their impact on human lives and the natural environment. This is a bold and challenging task, not least because such topics remain political sensitive today. Yet the perspective Shapiro offers is refreshing, while the problems she highlights are disturbing, with significant legacies.

The political climate of revolutionary China was pervaded by hostile struggle against class enemies, foreign imperialists, Western capitalists, Soviet revisionists, and numerous other antagonists. Under Mao and the communists, "the notion was propagated that China would pick itself up after its long history of humiliation by imperialist powers, become self-reliant in the face of international isolation, and regain strength in the world" (p.6). Militarization was to be a vehicle through which Mao would attempt to forge a 'New China.' His period of rule was marked by a protracted series of mass mobilization campaigns, based around the fear of perceived threats, external or internal. Even nature, Shapiro argues, was portrayed in a combative and militaristic rhetoric as an obstacle or enemy to overcome. While traditional philosophies had espoused 'Harmony between Heaven and Humans,' the slogan 'Humans Must Conquer Nature' came to epitomize attitudes and actions during the Mao years. This was an era when "human will was considered more powerful than objective scientific law" and political dogma held that "the earth could be miraculously transformed through ideologically motivated determination" (p.197). Shapiro suggests that Maoism rejected tradition as well as Western science, yet embraced the modernist conception of human:nature separation, creating a situation in which the human and environmental costs of living in opposition to nature were "transparent and extreme" (p.xii).

Focusing on "coercive state behavior" during the Mao years, Shapiro argues political campaigns of mass mobilization, class struggle, and political repression contributed to severe environmental damage. She contends that people participated, enthusiastically or reluctantly, because of the ideological hegemony and coercive power of Maoist authority. Indeed, the "hypothesis" Shapiro seeks to explore in this book is that "abuse of people and abuse of nature are often interrelated" (p.xiv). Her conclusions may be read as emphatic confirmations.

To support her thesis, Shapiro presents several "particularly telling" or "representative" cases that highlight the dynamics of "anthropogenic environmental degradation" in Maoist China. These are organized into four chapters, focusing on 'core themes:' political repression, utopian urgency, dogmatic uniformity, and state-orchestrated population relocations. Each chapter addresses development initiatives and their environmental consequences in the context of specific campaigns of mass mobilization, although political repression is a meta-theme that unites each case study.

First, Shapiro relates how the suppression of intellectual dissent following the Hundred Flowers movement stifled scientific critics, contributing to a series of policy actions with far-reaching environmental consequences, including China's current population pressures and controversial hydroprojects. Next, Shapiro addresses the impact of the Great Leap Forward, when collective mobilization was fuelled by fanatic idealism, and forests and birds fell to fantastical schemes to boost production in a 'war against nature' that was propagandized in explicitly military terms. The Cultural Revolution provides the context for her third chapter, which focuses on the struggle for grain and the rigid formalism manifest in the national emulation of the Dazhai agricultural model and in the destruction of the Dianchi wetlands near Kunming. The fourth chapter examines urgent war preparations in the late 1960s and early 1970s, particularly the construction of a new inland strategic base area or 'Third Front,' as well as the compulsory relocation of 'educated youth' and former Red Guards to help develop China's frontiers. Shapiro concludes by considering the legacies of the Maoist era in the commercialization of contemporary China, suggesting elements of traditional philosophy and liberal democracy may best contribute to sound environmental management.

Familiar with the impact of Maoist politics on Chinese society, Shapiro based her research for this particular book on a wide variety of source material. Some of this was collected during visits to China in 1998, 1999, and

2000, when she conducted interviews (many with former participants in these campaigns), and delivered a series of volunteer lectures on environmental philosophy and international environmental politics. Shapiro makes extensive use of secondary sources, official and popular, scholarly and literary, published and unpublished. These include newspapers and magazines, scholarly studies and unpublished doctoral dissertations, journalistic accounts and semi-fictionalized 'reportage literature,' autobiographies and memoirs, as well as a number of "insightful and factual" Chinese-language works (often claiming 'inside' knowledge of the leadership) that appeared in the 1990s. She also makes extensive reference to Mao's own writings and speeches, as well as to statements attributed to various Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders and officials.

Shapiro's first chapter, "Population, Dams, and Political Repression," concerns the 1957 Anti-Rightist campaign, and the suppression of intellectual dissent following the Hundred Flowers movement. Recounting the development of party-state policies toward intellectuals, Shapiro presents two enlightening case studies of "environmental disasters and the scientists who tried to avert them." Focusing on Ma Yinchu and Huang Wanli, prominent scholars with doctoral degrees from American universities, Shapiro seeks to illustrate how "knowledge based on wishful thinking was given primacy over the tested understanding of scientists" (p.60). Her account of these two men, who questioned the appropriateness of development plans favored by Mao, offers insight on two controversial issues facing China today: birth planning policies and grand hydroprojects.

Ma Yinchu is perhaps best remembered for his outspoken opposition to Mao's views on population policy, which ascribed to Soviet dogma that contradictions between production and population no longer existed under socialism. Born 1882, Ma had pursued graduate studies in economics at Yale and Columbia under sponsorship of the Qing imperial government, before returning to China in 1916. Hired by Cai Yuanpei to chair the economics department at Beijing University, Ma subsequently served for a time in Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government (and later, after criticizing Kuomintang corruption, in its prison camps). Following the communist victory in the civil war, Ma was appointed in 1951 as President of Beijing University, and to the standing committee of the National People's Congress. It was in this capacity that he delivered his 1957 report, 'New Demography,' warning that unchecked population growth might slow economic development.

Shapiro recounts the debate over development strategy following the PRC's first national census, conducted in 1953, as part of the First Five Year Plan. The census count, Shapiro reports, was higher than expected, and raised concerns of some authorities. Ma Yinchu's essay, published in the People's Daily, advocated frequent census checks, family planning programs, public education campaigns, later marriages, rewards for small families, and encouraged use of contraceptives (Ma opposed abortion). But his position dissented from Mao's assertion that there were no population problems under socialism, and that China's population was a source of its strength. Shapiro characterizes Ma Yinchu as a man of integrity who was committed to "plain speaking in an age of slogans" (p.38), and who symbolized the freedom of thought and democracy at the university he headed. Criticism of Ma, and pressure on him to retract his report, mounted in the months that followed, and intensified during the Great Leap Forward, when the slogan 'Strength Lies in Numbers' (ren dou liliang da) represented the party line on population policy. Ma steadfastly held to his opinions, but in 1960 he was obliged to resign as Beijing University President, and was effectively 'silenced' and banished from public life until his political 'rehabilitation' in 1979, three years after Mao's death.

Shapiro then turns to the case of hydro-engineer Huang Wanli, who vocally opposed plans to dam the Yellow River at Sanmenxia. Noting that political authority and water control have an intimate relationship in Chinese history and legends, Shapiro suggests that Mao's sensitivity to the traditional adage, 'When a great man emerges, the Yellow River will run clear,' was a contributing factor in his support for this controversial project. Huang Wanli had opposed the dam, arguing that its design did not fully consider potential sedimentation problems. Huang published an allegorical tale in a Qinghua University journal, criticizing those who simply said whatever party-state authorities wanted to hear, and which praised Ma Yinchu's wisdom and integrity. Huang's story drew the ire of Mao Zedong, and in 1957 he was harshly criticized in a People's Daily editorial that Shapiro contends signaled the beginning of the Anti-Rightist campaign (Huang was indeed labeled as a 'rightist'; during the subsequent Cultural Revolution, even his children were pressured to denounce him).

Shapiro uses the case of Huang Wanli to suggest, as the latter did, that China's real problem was a lack of free speech. As she shows, many of Huang's unheeded concerns were ultimately justified. The Sanmenxia project inundated more than one million mu of land (one mu roughly equals one-sixth of an acre) and forced the relocation of over 300,000 people. Yet within a few years heavy silting problems arose, threatening the dam, fouling the reservoir, and obliging authorities to remove the power generators to another site. Huang's case was an example to other potential critics, symbolizing the subordination of technical expertise to political 'truths.' Shapiro notes that China built more than 80,000 dams since 1949, yet by 1980 nearly 3000 had collapsed, causing destruction and

death, while over ten million relocatees continue to live in impoverished circumstances.

Chapter 2, “Deforestation, Famine, and Utopian Urgency,” explores how Mao’s Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) mobilized the population in a veritable “attack” on nature. The Leap was arguably the most extreme expression of Mao’s peculiar materialist philosophy, which put great emphasis on the transformative power of thought and ideas. Shapiro briefly recounts the ascendancy of Mao’s more radical approach in the party leadership’s ‘Two Line Struggle’ over the pace of collectivization. Faced with a lack of ‘sophisticated technology,’ correct thinking was to tap the enormous energy of mass labor in grand efforts to transform the material world. In a sharp break with the traditional paradigm of ‘Heavens and Humans in Harmony’ (tian ren heyi), the triumphal rhetoric of the Leap espoused that ‘Humans Must Conquer Nature’ (ren ding sheng tian). Slogans such as ‘Greater, Faster, Better, More Economical’ and ‘Great Courage Brings Forth Great Yields’ came to symbolize the heady ideological spirit of the times, as elevated production targets were surpassed by fantastical production claims, sometimes supported (as she illustrates) by deceptively staged photographs.

Without diverging into theoretical analysis, Shapiro examines the ‘language of urgency’ in the ‘compressed time’ of mass mobilization political campaigns, or “orchestrated competitions designed to achieve targets established by superiors,” compliance with which was often enforced through fear (p.71). She argues that Mao’s war against nature was epitomized in the militaristic attitudes and practices of the Great Leap Forward, when elements of nature were “casualties in the crossfire of other battles and targets of direct attack” (p.75). The rural people’s commune system was to affect the ‘militarization, combatization, and disciplinization’ of the countryside for Mao’s vision of socialist transformation. Mao, who was later characterized by his former personal secretary as a military strategist who felt annoyed and constrained by scientific thinking, told the directors of cooperative organizations in 1958 that nature should be given serious attention tactically, but viewed with contempt strategically.

The Spring of 1958 saw the first ‘battles’ in this war against nature, with campaigns to construct new irrigation networks (including the famed Red Flag Canal). Then, during the ‘Iron and Steel’ campaign, roughly ten percent of China’s forest cover was felled in the course of a few months to fuel ‘backyard blast furnaces’ in what became the first of ‘three great cuttings’ (the others coming during the Cultural Revolution and then following decollectivization). The subsequent campaign to ‘Eliminate the Four Pests’ (rats, sparrows, flies, mosquitoes) portrayed nature as an enemy. Even ‘child soldiers’ were recruited in a “simultaneous, highly coordinated, and compulsory mass slaughter of sparrows [that] was a singularly foolish episode of wasteful mobilization of human energy in an effort to alter the natural world” (pp.88-89). Many of the Leap’s consequences that Shapiro deals with are fairly well known: notably, its ecological disruption - from deforestation, erosion, and land degradation -to insect infestation, crop failure, and three years of famine (the death toll from which she puts at 35-50 million). But her work leads one to suspect that even the Leap’s lauded accomplishments had costs and consequences not yet fully understood or appreciated.

Chapter 3, “Grainfields in Lakes and Dogmatic Uniformity,” examines some of the “excess” and waste generated by development schemes during the Cultural Revolution, focusing largely on the national emulation of the Dazhai model in agriculture and the filling of the Dianchi wetlands in Yunnan province. Here Shapiro recounts the political struggle over the meaning of ‘Take Grain as the Key Link,’ which emerged as dominant party-state policy in the wake of the Great Leap famine, and the renewed emphasis on ‘self-reliance’ that followed the withdrawal of Soviet aid. During the early 1960s, a series of administrative and economic reforms (largely attributed to Deng Xiaoping) helped to stabilize the national economy and to boost production of staple food crops. By the mid-1960s, however, Mao had begun to reassert his influence through the factional struggles over the course of the ‘Socialist Education’ movement. Having played a less dominant leadership role in the years of post-famine recovery, Mao was to make a dramatic re-emergence on the public stage with a 1966 swim in the Yangzi River, a symbolic expression of the power he was to project during the ensuing Cultural Revolution.

In this context, Shapiro recounts how the People’s Daily in 1964 heralded a new campaign to ‘Study Dazhai,’ urging the nation to follow the heroic determination, revolutionary will, and egalitarian spirit of a rural production brigade that had overcome disasters through self-reliance and literally ‘change[d] the face of rivers and mountains.’ She notes that models are attractive standard teaching tools, as they facilitate uniformity, centralization, regimentation, coordination, and mobilization (while suppressing spontaneity, individualism, and alternatives). Although initially promoted as an embodiment of the spirit of self-reliance, hard work, and close relations between the party and the people, the Dazhai model later came to be used by Mao as a “universal political paradigm for revolutionary rigor and fervor” (p.96). One of its laborers was commemorated on a postage stamp, while its party secretary was elevated to the CCP’s Central Committee.

While it was revealed after Mao’s death that Dazhai had, in fact, been the recipient of secret state assistance, during Mao’s later years the self-reliant rhetoric and imagery associated with the ‘Dazhai model’ came to symbolize the spirit of egalitarian collectivism. Shapiro argues that mechanical applications of the Dazhai model in situations

with inappropriate local ecological conditions was an expression of “dogmatic uniformity,” or an attempt to ‘cut everything with one slice of the knife’ (yi dao qie).

Here Shapiro considers the links between power and ideology, and the consequences of uncritical adherence to dogma. During this period, great emphasis was placed on the study of Chairman Mao’s works (particularly his ‘Old Three Articles:’ a 1939 tribute to Dr. Norman Bethume; the 1944 essay ‘Serve the People;’ and his 1945 adaptation of a traditional parable of the ‘Foolish Old Man Who Moved the Mountains’). While Mao had used the parable of the ‘Foolish Old Man’ to symbolize the Chinese people’s determined struggle against the twin ‘mountains’ of feudalism and imperialism, Shapiro suggests that many took the story literally. In emulation of the famous grain-producing terraces of Dazhai, other villages constructed terraces on slopes that were inappropriately steep; in some locales, she reports, gullies were cut into -- or hills created on -- flat plains so that terraces could be built. Such expressions of dogmatism, literalism, and formalism led to agonizing physical labor and enormous suffering, in a time when hardship was considered “a badge of advanced political thought” (p.104). They also contributed to serious environmental degradation, as non-grain crops were destroyed, fruit trees were uprooted, and wetlands were filled in, leading to increased erosion, flooding, desertification, ecosystem imbalance and micro-climate changes.

Shapiro endeavors to show how the Dazhai spirit of the ‘Foolish Old Man’ was also evident in land reclamation efforts to ‘Get Grain from Mountain Tops, [and] Get Grain from Lakes.’ For her purposes, she focuses on efforts to fill the Haigeng wetlands along the north shore of Dianchi, China’s sixth largest freshwater lake. Situated near the tropics at roughly 1800 meters elevation, this 300 square kilometer body of surface water plays a role in moderating the climate of the nearby capital of Yunnan province, Kunming, popularly known as the ‘City of Perpetual Spring.’ On New Year’s Day 1970, a ‘people’s war against nature’ began an ‘attack’ on the lake with a military-style campaign to build dikes, drain water, fill earth and convert roughly 25 square kilometers of wetlands into grain fields as quickly as possible. Shapiro recounts how, in this campaign, political and class struggles were merged with a struggle against the natural world. By harnessing Mao Zedong Thought as a vehicle for transformation, people would remold themselves by remolding nature. “These transformations were ritually melded,” she argues, “so that the external/material and internal/spiritual symbolized and acted as proxies for one another” (p.119).

Shapiro cites a 1988 Chinese study that estimates more than 3800 workers were required to wrestle each mu of reclaimed land from Dianchi. The soil, however, proved too soft, moist, and cool for grain, and each mu produced an average of only 45 kilograms a year, a “dismal performance” (p.131). Within ten years, more than eighty percent of the reclaimed land had been taken out of cultivation. The destruction of the Haigeng wetlands (now the site of Kunming’s ‘Nationalities Village’ tourist attraction) was just one contributing factor to the ecosystem imbalance that has afflicted Dianchi in recent decades. Although Shapiro offers little follow-up coverage, triumphant claims that its ‘blue seas...have been turned into green land’ (p.124) may seem ironically prophetic for those familiar with Dianchi’s current problems with pollution, algae blooms, and eutrophication.

Chapter 4, “War Preparations and Forcible Relocations,” looks at development projects during the late 1960s and early 1970s, a period of great political tension in China’s domestic and international relations. By 1969, the PLA had been mobilized to suppress factionalist violence between Cultural Revolution ‘Red Guard’ groups, and a large-scale campaign was soon underway to relocate many urban youth to rural areas. Administrative functions were assumed by ‘revolutionary committees’ dominated by military governance, Shapiro notes, while green clothing and army caps became the “fashion.” Internationally, China faced growing isolation as its relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated following the withdrawal of Soviet aid in 1960, with thousands of ‘incidents’ occurring along the Sino-Soviet border over the next decade (p.144). In 1964, the U.S. began bombing North Vietnam, whose war effort China had supported, raising concerns about further escalation of that conflict to the south. By 1969, there were armed clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops on the border in Heilongjiang province in the northeast, as well as in Xinjiang to the northwest, and the People’s Daily warned that a surprise attack could come at any time. Mao told the country to prepare urgently for war.

During this period, Shapiro argues, the ‘battlefront’ in Mao’s war on nature shifted to the mountains of southwest China, the deserts of Xinjiang in the far west, the grasslands of Inner Mongolia in the north, and the ‘Great Northern Wilderness’ in Heilongjiang province of northeastern China, on the Siberian frontier. Shapiro focuses on two major campaigns in the war preparation movement. The first is the rapid effort to construct a ‘Third Line’ or ‘Third Front:’ a new strategic industrial base area amid the shelter and concealment of China’s rugged mountainous interior. She then turns to consider the role of ‘educated youth’ (zhiqing) in state-sponsored development projects on the country’s frontiers. Both campaigns involved the large-scale transfer of human resources to ‘remote’ regions of the country in an effort to ‘open wastelands’ and secure frontier areas. Nevertheless,

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Shapiro contends, "Nature and people alike were victims of these relocations" (p.142).

Under the slogan, 'Prepare for War, Prepare for Famine, for the Sake of the People,' the 'Third Front' development campaign brought roads and railways to the mountains, opening mines and harvesting timber for hundreds of new factories. Shapiro notes that between 1964-71, some 380 factories were relocated to such inland regions (constituting 20% of all large factories in 'Third Front' zones). Her focus is on the industrial complex at Panzhihua, formerly the small village of Dukou, at the confluence of the Yalong and Jinsha (Yangzi) rivers. Situated in the rugged Liangshan region of southwest China on the Sichuan-Yunnan border, and near the large railway depot and the satellite-launching center at Xichang, Panzhihua was the Y3.74 billion "centerpiece" of Mao's 'Third Front' effort (p.148). Shapiro claims it was the *raison d'être* of Chengdu-Kunming railway, often hailed as a remarkable feat of engineering and construction. Built under PLA supervision, the 1000-kilometer line was completed in 1970, at the cost of Y3.3 billion, and runs through some of China's most rugged terrain, featuring 999 bridges and 427 tunnels (which cover roughly one-third its length).

In the 1930s, tremendous amounts of mineral wealth were discovered in this region, including coal and iron ores (as well as 93% of China's titanium reserves, believed to be the largest in the world). As the 'Third Front' campaign got underway in 1965, the sudden influx of over 80,000 workers created an 'immigrant city;' by 1971 Panzhihua had a population of nearly 215,000. Today, an English language investment brochure proclaims it "'a picture of man conquering nature'" (p.148). Shapiro notes, however, that its human and environmental costs have been great. Mortality rates among workers were as high as 16% in 1965, and averaged 5.42% over the period 1965-70 (p.152). Throughout the 1970s, infectious diseases were rampant in the area, as the air and water were fouled with industrial and human wastes. Over 400 factories (more than fifty with heavy industrial output) have been built along this stretch of the Jinsha River in the Upper Yangzi watershed, upstream from human settlement. Air emissions are regularly trapped in the valley by prevailing wind patterns and temperature inversions. Moreover, many pollution control devices were never installed, for what Shapiro claims were political reasons (p.154). When monitoring did begin in 1975, particulate emissions at the steel mill and sintering plant were found to be 200-300 times the levels of national recommendations, and an official medical investigation in 1984 found three percent of workers suffered from lung diseases. Furthermore, timber harvesting at elevations of up to 1700 meters contributed to extensive deforestation and erosion problems in the upper Yangzi watershed, which has been a factor in the heavy downstream flooding of recent years. Although she confines her discussion largely to the case of Panzhihua, Shapiro concludes that 'Third Front' factories in general were "impractical and inefficient," and that this plan to develop China's interior was as a whole "premature," coming with an "unnecessarily high price" (p.158).

Shapiro turns next to the massive state-orchestrated migration of 'educated youth' to rural areas during the late 1960s and early 1970s. She characterizes this as a blatantly coercive attempt to reorder society, by breaking family bonds, manipulating residency status, and controlling physical movement. Following slogans such as 'The Farther from the Father and Mother, the Nearer to Chairman Mao's Heart;' more than 20 million urban teenagers were 'sent down' or relocated to rural areas. Most joined agricultural production teams in villages, though over two million were assigned to quasi-military units of the 'Production Construction Army Corps,' participating in development projects in frontier areas. The Corps were responsible for 'opening wasteland,' defending border areas, and contributing to production. They were to be "shock troops" in battles to create new arable land, and were expected to sustain themselves through their own efforts, although they also drew a small salary from the state. During the military alert in the winter of 1969-70, many 'educated youth' in the Corps were also mobilized to reinforce PLA troops along the Soviet border.

While Shapiro notes that the Corps achieved some successes in their efforts to expand arable land, she highlights the ecological consequences of their activities, such as the destruction of wetlands, forests, and grasslands. In particular, she focuses on the role of 200,000-300,000 'educated youth' in the establishment of rubber plantations in Xishuangbanna, at the southern border of Yunnan province, the 'Last Green Place on the Tropic of Cancer.' China, she remarks, has the greatest biodiversity of any country in the Northern Hemisphere; half of which is found in Yunnan, with the highest concentration in the region of Xishuangbanna. Sheltered from northern winds by tall mountain ranges, this frontier region lies open to warm humid southern monsoons. Now a popular resort and tourist destination, Xishuangbanna is famed for its tropical and sub-tropical plant and animal life, including numerous endemic and rare species. Its climate, however, also made it a potential site for rubber cultivation, and an unsuccessful attempt had been made to introduce the crop in the late 1940s. In 1953, new experimental rubber plantations were established by the PLA, as part of a broader effort to secure the southwestern frontier.

In the 1960s and 1970s, amid China's growing international isolation and tensions, rubber cultivation accelerated into a campaign under the Yunnan Army Corps, as rubber was regarded as a strategic material to be used in national defense and in support of the war effort in Vietnam. Amid militaristic rhetoric and imagery of endless 'attacks' and 'battles' against nature, traditional farming practices, and indigenous beliefs, 'educated youth' labored

to introduce rubber trees at zones of more extreme latitude, altitude, and temperature. Shapiro contends that many of the young people involved in such compulsory, heavy, military-style labor efforts suffered physically and emotionally, some falling victim to depression or suicide (p.180). Despite allegations of abuse and accidents under army leaders, the effort did not wind down until the mid-1970s, following the downfall of PLA marshal Lin Biao (with whom the rubber campaign was closely linked), Nixon's visit to China, and a great freeze in 1974-75 that killed many rubber trees. In the late 1970s, it was the disgruntled and disillusioned 'educated youth' working in Xishuangbanna whom, she maintains, initiated what became the 'Return to the Cities' national protest movement (p.186).

To China's credit, Shapiro concedes, Yunnan today produces the world's highest and northernmost rubber. But the costs, she maintains, have been high. By 1974, the project had opened more than 250,000 mu to rubber cultivation, producing nearly 18,000 tons of rubber, yet posted a net loss of Y34.5 million (p.185). It also contributed to protracted deforestation, as Xishuangbanna had lost more than half its forest cover by 1981. As a consequence, there has been widespread loss of soil and moisture, as well as of wildlife. The silt content of the Mekong River, which flows through the region, has risen, while fog and relative humidity have fallen. Nevertheless, Shapiro notes that although high production costs have made Yunnan rubber less competitive on international markets, during the post-Mao reform era cultivation has expanded even further, more than doubling. By 1996, mono-cultivation of rubber was taking place on nearly 6% of land in Xishuangbanna (p.183).

In her fifth and final chapter, Shapiro considers some of the legacies of the Maoist era. While she is sharply critical of the Chinese Communist Party's environmental record under Mao, she also sees little in China's present state of affairs to reassure her about the future. Shapiro contends that the Maoist assault on traditional values facilitated current trends of materialistic exploitation. For years, the Chinese people "lack[ed] the freedom to behave responsibly toward the natural world" (p.195). The passing of the Maoist paradigm left an ideological vacuum, she argues, fostering a crisis of values characterized by a deep sense of cynicism and betrayal. While many of the extreme policies of the Maoist era now have been attenuated, the war against nature has "continued in altered form after the death of Mao, as the market replaced ideological mobilization as a driving force for the transformation of nature" (p.11). Overexploitation of natural resources, she suggests, grows out of a protracted poverty that has also contributed to ignorance and indifference, as well as to desperation and greed (pp.206-7). Shapiro warns that rapid commercialization and marketization have had their own environmental consequences, contending that China's environmentally related health problems, if fully accounted for, would negate the country's impressive record of economic growth in recent decades (p.xii).

While Mao manifest an "ambition to transform the country," his war on nature "interfered with deep cultural traditions" and showed "disrespect for scientific principles," leading to a "self-destructive rush toward ecosystem collapse and failure" (p.195). Under communism, people had no "vital relation" with nature (p.191), and "no one had real responsibility" for public resources (p.206). Although economic growth and performance improved under the reforms, Shapiro contends that "in a country whose bankrupt leadership's fragile authority rested on improved living standards and shallow nationalism, materialism and greed came to dominate private and public life" (p.204). In this vein, she sees the Three Gorges Dam, likened by critics to "a last-gasp monument to Communist Party" (p.205), as another example of the 'Foolish Old Man' mentality, a Maoist mega-project embodying the spirit of mastery over nature, but which also suppresses human freedoms. She notes that President Jiang Zemin's speech at the cofferdam ceremony praised the project as a reaffirmation that "Man Must Conquer Nature." For her part, Shapiro attributes it largely to the sake of 'face.'

Here her critique hints also at cultural factors, suggesting that continuing environmental degradation in China is linked not only to political sensibilities and the lingering influence of Maoist views of nature, but also to values of short-term personal gain, a utilitarian approach to social interaction and exchange, a difficulty empathizing with strangers, and a deep mistrust of government campaigns and sloganeering (p.204). Her discourse analysis is less extensive in her treatment of the post-Mao era, and she leaves many of these issues unexplored. But she does recommend that China needs to foster a capacity for empathy (p.203), in relations with humans as well as with nature. In her view, it would also benefit from a new "Daoist sense of humility" (p.214), that sees humans as part of nature rather than opposed to it. "While humility, accommodation, creativity, individuality, rule of law, moderation, measure, respect for difference, flexibility, and localism are surely not sufficient in themselves to point humans toward a better-integrated relationship with the organic and inorganic 'other,' surely they are worth emphasizing" (p.202). She ends with a call for China to develop a "more just and tolerant approach" toward the natural world and in human relations (p.215), suggesting one may lead to the other.

Shapiro's book is not without its own political undertones, and may be read as a sharp critique not only of China's environmental record, but also of authoritarian governance in general. Most environmental problems, she

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reminds us, are ultimately social, political, and cultural problems. The “heuristic usefulness of the Maoist case,” she argues, lies in “the blatancy of Maoism’s coercive aspects, the ambition of its utopian idealism, and the transparency of the link between human political repression and the effort to conquer nature by portraying and treating it as an enemy” (p.201). The ‘lessons’ she draws lead her to conclude that sound environmental behavior requires key elements of liberal democracy, although not necessarily that particular form of government. She notes the absence, in all these extreme examples of environmental degradation from the Maoist era, of local self-governance and flexible accommodation to local circumstances, and of government accountability and transparency. Shapiro suggests that sustainable development strategies and effective environmental management practices in China will depend on “political participation, public deliberation and oversight, intellectual freedom, respect for regional variation and local wisdom, and land tenure systems that give people an understanding of their responsibility for the land and of a shared future with it” (p.18).

Shapiro, however, does not show how the presence of these characteristics would facilitate or guarantee the sound policies and practices she seeks to encourage. Nor does she consider the myriad of environmental problems that beset societies in which such elements of ‘liberal democracy’ are well developed. It is one thing to observe massive environmental degradation in the absence of such socio-cultural characteristics, but the absence of comparative analysis renders her conclusions disappointingly presumptuous and suggestively polemical.

As Shapiro acknowledges, this book is not intended to be a detailed or comprehensive study of attitudes, values, or ideas regarding the environment. Nor is it an environmental history, in a strict sense of the term. Yet it does serve to highlight some environmental consequences of human action, particularly in the context of state-orchestrated mass political campaigns. Her assessment of the Maoist era is a gloomy one, and casts shadows over China’s current course of development. One gets little sense of where development initiatives of the Maoist era achieved success, which contributes to a greater sense of concern about the future. In this regard, Shapiro’s thesis would have been strengthened with more significant theoretical development, and by more extensive use of comparative material, suggestions of which appear almost cursorily in her concluding reflections. Rather surprisingly, she draws little on the scientific literature of environmental studies in China, a growing corpus of research that offers substantive quantitative data relevant to her (often rather vague) environmental impact assessments. Furthermore, researchers are advised to read the endnotes carefully, as not all citations appear in the bibliography.

Written in a clear style and focused around a central thesis, Shapiro’s book will be of interest to general audiences, and will undoubtedly draw the attention of students and scholars in various disciplines. As her narrative offers extensive citations to Mao’s speeches and writings, along with judicious reference to prominent rhetorical slogans of the Maoist era, this book may well serve as a companion text to courses on China. Structured around four core thematic issues, it may also be a suitable text for courses dealing with the environmental consequences of human actions, particularly in the context of the modernist project of revolutionary nation-states

Shady Practices: Agroforestry and Gender Politics in The Gambia, by Richard A. Schroeder. Berkeley: University of California Press (1999), 212 pp.

Reviewed by Peter Hamilton, Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California, Davis

It is one thing to concede that women as well as men can and do “play” the game of development, that they, too, act on the basis of motives that are narrow and mean at least as often as they aspire to enlightenment, and that they sometimes win the struggles over land, labor, and livelihoods initiated by development interventions. It is quite another to argue that the structural determinants operating within Gambian social systems no longer have any force, or that the development interventions designed to incorporate women into environmental management have not produced deleterious effects in many areas (p. 135).

The Gambia has witnessed a series of unique and fascinating transformations in the last three decades of exposure to the forces of international “development”. Its story could not be told without discussing issues of gender, climatology, sociology, ecology, economics and international development – fertile ground for the field of

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Political Ecology. Richard A. Schroeder, a student of Michael Watts at Berkeley, is well up to the task. Using a personal, hands-on methodology consisting largely of personal interviews and surveys, he gives us a nuanced and complex image of changing gender politics in The Gambia that refuses to idealize, oversimplify or otherwise dehumanize its subjects. His formidable Mandinka language skills give us access to a world inaccessible to typical statistics-heavy development reporting. In addition to relevant numbers, we are privy to an analysis of common Mandinka metaphors and puns that are simultaneously enjoyable, telling, and refreshingly humanizing. Schroeder introduces us to the field of African development work by critiquing a photograph on page 5 that could come straight from a World Bank brochure – the ubiquitous shot of a nameless, placeless brown woman carrying a heavy load of firewood on her head. By analyzing development efforts from the perspective of those affected, through their language, their metaphors and their resistance, Schroeder takes a step toward naming, contextualizing and ultimately re-humanizing the African citizen.

At the end of the book, though satisfied with Schroeder's analysis of the Gambian garden boom, one is left wondering what to do next. The author has supplied an admirable and nuanced multi-level political-ecological analysis of his region of study. Perhaps it is too much to ask for prescriptions for future development efforts as well. However, I believe that Shady Practices would benefit from a list of concrete conclusions and recommendations that are at least intelligible to, and at best implementable by, relevant policymakers and development workers.

The phenomenon of the woman-run cash crop vegetable garden is distinctive to the region under study (The Gambia's north bank, near the town of Kerewan). Shady Practices chronicles the rise of the garden economy beginning in the early 1970s (Ch. 2), its effects on gender politics and the division of labor (Ch. 3 and 4), the threat to the gardens posed by new agroforestry initiatives (Ch. 5), and women's often-successful resistance to those threats (Ch. 6).

Schroeder attacks the question of the garden boom by cleverly describing the gauntlet women needed to run in order to create a functioning female cash-crop system. Women faced the dubious task of squeezing money from low-lying areas where water was close to the surface. These areas generally were titled to men, and used for rice and fruit cultivation as well as livestock grazing (animals which would later pose a serious threat to the gardens).

... Women first had to secure usufruct rights from male landholders and then leverage funds from developers for fencing materials and well construction. Finally, and most critically, gardeners somehow had to regain control over their own labor in the face of a wide range of competing demands... (p. 3)

Furthermore, women needed to secure the right to market their produce, a task generally reserved for men (previously, women had been responsible for the rice crop, destined solely for home consumption.) He describes how each obstacle was overcome (either directly through human agency, or via an exogenous political-ecological shift) and how new obstacles arose as "sometimes fickle policies" of development agencies began to emphasize environmental protection over garden production.

Schroeder's work can be called political ecology because he manages to tie local and global factors and levels of analysis together into a coherent political-ecological narrative. He demonstrates how shifts in global development philosophies can alter the set of options available to competing stakeholders on the ground, resulting in allocative shifts that may be difficult or impossible for well-meaning but geographically and culturally remote policymakers to predict or appreciate. Furthermore, he links the political to the environmental by showing us a pattern of historically shifting first-world based definitions of what constitutes "the environment," or at least which "environments" are worth "saving." The following is a partial but representative list of factors considered by Schroeder's analysis:

- Human agency in the form of collective action and hard work by Gambian women; and efforts by men to re-capture the women's labor force.

- Pervasive and severe mid-80s droughts; and the international focus they brought to African development

- World Bank structural adjustment policies

- Gambian river geography; micro-ecology

- International development philosophy: "Women In Development," and the later emphasis on agroforestry

- Availability of new imported varieties of vegetables, and hybridized seed

- International market forces; demand for vegetable and fruit exports

In 1975, the United Nations held a conference in Mexico City focusing on women in development. They proclaimed an "international decade for women," which helped to give rise to a number of gender-specific development programs aimed at alleviating what were perceived to be disproportionate burdens of poverty on women. The concept of "maternal altruism" was tightly interwoven into the development philosophies of emerging programs of "Women in Development" (WID). Maternal altruism is the conclusion of a bundle of empirical evidence suggesting that women across all races and cultures devote more energy toward preserving the well being

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of the family than do men. Thus, the thinking goes: to improve the well being of children, it is more effective to help women than men. At ground level, this led to “the expectation that women will deny themselves and shoulder additional burdens in the interests of family well-being” (p.10). As the WID movement accelerated, the emerging Gambian garden economy was thus seen as important and worthy of support. Development agencies rushed in with subsidies for fencing materials, new non-native vegetable crops previously unseen in the region (particularly cabbage), hybrid seed, and concrete for permanent wells.

In parallel, various strands of development literature have tended to naturalize women as somehow “closer” to the earth – somehow genetically predisposed towards stewardship of the earth. The growing environment-development movement thus extended maternal altruism to include environmental altruism. As the environment took center stage in development theory, women were seen by development agencies as the “key” to improving third world environments. This shift in thinking from women as saviors of the family to women as saviors of the planet had profound and damaging implications for the Mandinka gardeners.

At the same time that developers focused on funding for Mandinka women’s gardens, severe drought conditions were emerging throughout the continent in the 1980s, creating a crisis situation in most of Africa, including Senegal. Though the Gambia was not among the worst effected regions, food production “declined significantly between 1970 and 1990” due to a shorter rainy season (p.31). Climatic change resulted in an earlier rice harvest, which freed women’s labor for more vegetable gardening, and allowed them to plant during an earlier season when conditions were more favorable to vegetable cultivation, and ripe vegetables fetched a higher market price. In contrast, male income-earning activity was hampered significantly, as male agricultural production of coarse grains and groundnuts was entirely rain-fed. As rains failed, hand-irrigated woman’s garden plots became the locus of economic activity as production increased and marketization became more widespread. The fact that men “rarely draw water from wells for any reason” (p. 34) is stated and dropped, with an unfulfilled promise of a discussion in a later chapter. At the same time, severe World Bank structural adjustment policies increased the price of agricultural inputs, effectively reducing the value of male labor even as production decreased due to climatic shifts. Thus, the burden of economic support fell increasingly on women’s gardens – one of the few agricultural sectors to become more productive during the years of drought and fiscal “reform.”

The increased economic independence and power won by women through the garden boom generated a fascinating set of social disruptions in The Gambia. It is here that Schroeder truly shines. He gives us a complex account of the lived realities of Gambian men and women, changing household finances, and an analysis of the language and metaphors used to describe their shifting relations. Chapter 3 is titled “Gone to Their Second Husbands,” from the typical response of gardeners’ husbands to a query on the whereabouts of his absentee wife. The metaphor of garden as second husband is a fascinating one, and Schroeder illustrates a number of interpretations. Most obviously, gardening represented a severe and increasing time demand on women. More time with the garden meant less time attending to the traditional responsibilities of a Mandinka wife. This led to jealousy, projected on the garden as a second husband on which the wife lavishes her time. Gambian husbands frequently take a (typically younger) second wife, sometimes to the dismay of their first wife, who might feel jealous and neglected. “Gone to her second husband” turns this gendered complaint on its ear. Second is the metaphor of financial support – as male productive capacity declined, women relied upon their “second husbands” instead of their first for their financial needs, a source of shame and frustration for their husbands.

While husbands frequently voiced frustration about the gardens (which were openly mocked in the 70’s, before they became so profitable), their own reduced purchasing power forced many husbands to borrow money (often at usurious interest rates) from their comparatively wealthy wives to fulfill household obligations. Interestingly, many times this money was used to buy grain that was cooked by the woman and eaten by the entire family. This money (and its interest) frequently went uncollected by the wives, possibly in a sort of unwritten exchange for greater freedom from traditional duties. Husbands also complained that women were spending time in gardens where profits would go to them personally, rather than on their rice plots, which would go to the family as a whole.

Chapter 5 deals with the complex systems of land tenure in the Gambia, and the arrival of a new set of development priorities emphasizing environmental conservation and agroforestry. Traditionally, Mandinka landholdings are divided into two categories: upland areas (boraa banko, “land of the beard”) owned and cultivated by men with groundnuts and coarse grains, and low-lying swampland (kono banko, “land of the [pregnant] belly”) controlled by women, used to cultivate rice. These latter lands are passed down directly from mother to daughter or daughter-in-law. To facilitate vegetable production, women needed to acquire more arable land. They requested and were given usufruct land grants from senior men who owned land lying in between women’s swampland and the men’s groundnut fields, which was unsuitable for rice or groundnut production but ideal for vegetable production once fenced, fertilized and irrigated.

With the help of development monies, these lands were developed into productive gardens, somewhat surreptitiously, and often in violation of implicit or explicit contracts with male landholders. Fences protected them from grazing livestock, fertilizers improved the soil, and hand irrigation made them viable even in the dry season. As the gardens became more profitable, and development support for women more powerful, male landowners began to lose control over the plots. Schroeder gives us a detailed history of struggle for control of one such plot between the male landowner and the women gardeners, initially over control of development aid supplies and tree ownership rights. In 1984, this struggle rose to the level of the state, as the landholder called in the police to prevent women from fencing his land. A few women were arrested, and large women's demonstrations ensued. The state's courts upheld the rights of women to fence the land, but declared that trees could not be planted on the land without the male landowner's permission. This legal backdrop sets the stage for the beginning of a new threat to the garden economy: that of agroforestry. According to the state law, only the landowner could plant trees on his property. Thus, the landowner could benefit from the irrigation and improved soils provided by the women, and take the harvest from the trees all to himself even as they began to shade out the vegetable production below. Interestingly, women had traditionally used trees as an alternate source of food and income, and even as a means of ("somewhat surreptitiously") extending property rights. However, as gardens became more profitable and extensive, less profitable trees competed with gardens for light. During the 1980s garden boom, trees were cut down to allow more light for gardens.

With the 1984 court case giving male landowners rights to fruit harvests on their lands, and free labor from women to provide irrigation and protection from livestock, tree planting became a mechanism for men to regain control over their land. Even though per-hectare profits were much higher for gardens than for orchards, new development initiatives embraced agroforestry as a way of reversing trends of deforestation and promoting biodiversity. Landholding men found that they could leverage these development initiatives in their favor just as women had leveraged prior initiatives towards gardening. NGOs made new, higher-profit mango trees available, which were used by developers to encourage male landholders into agroforestry. A gendered battle ensued between gardens and orchards. Clearly, agroforestry development initiatives greatly favored male landholders over women gardeners.

The gendered effects of agroforestry escaped the development institutions entirely. Using their conception of women as natural environmental stewards willing to take on labor for the common good, they foisted the task of caring for and irrigating newly planted trees on women, without worrying about mechanisms to ensure payment for services rendered. Ironically, women were expected to aid and abet the downfall of their own gardens via unpaid orchard labor that would benefit the very landlords they had been struggling with for years. Of course, Mandinka women did not passively accept these damaging agroforestry initiatives. Whenever possible, trees were "trimmed" to extinction, burned, chopped down, girdled or otherwise sabotaged or neglected to ensure enough light for productive gardening. The success of these tactics of resistance varied from site to site, depending on the landowner's vigilance and the tenacity of the women gardeners. Results varied from total enclosure of the garden plots by orchards, forcing women to relocate and essentially begin their gardens anew; to binding agreements formally granting women rights to do as they pleased with the land.

Schroeder concludes by criticizing the tendency for development institutions to become advocates for specific development itineraries under all circumstances. In the Gambia, this was clearly illustrated by the shift from "gardens are good" to "orchards are good" that occurred in the 1990's. Furthermore, he notes the "conceptual slippage" that occurs in the transition from academic theory of gender and development and the policies implemented by NGOs and their effects on women at ground level. In the Gambia, calls to improve the environment were taken up by NGOs and manipulated by landowners, resulting in a threat to hard-won gardening rights, and an attempt to capture women's labor to further economic goals of male landowners. However, it is also false to portray Mandinka women as "hapless victims" of circumstance. Clearly, they are capable of "playing the development game" as well as men are, and the force of their agency and resistance is substantial and effective. This suggests to Schroeder that development agencies must "come to grips with the prospect that the uncritical application of their ideas may have serious, if unintended, negative consequences" (p. 134).

So what are we left with? Schroeder quotes his mentor Michael Watts, "rights over resources such as land or crops are inseparable from, indeed are isomorphic with, rights over people" (p. 129), and later states, "critical questions of power and justice remain unresolved" (p. 135). *Shady Practices* is an effective critique of top-down development planning, a cautionary tale about the vast complexity of people's lived experiences, and the difficulty or impossibility of predicting the effects of development policy at ground level. Yet it seems quite clear that the advent of the garden economy was greatly aided by development policy, and that the gains in the garden economy have greatly improved the lived experiences of Mandinka women. If, then, some good can and has been done in the

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field of “development,” the question is how to maximize the (currently rather slight) chances of this happening. And how do we resolve these “critical questions of power and justice?” While Schroeder effectively critiques elements of existing development orthodoxy, he does not illuminate for us ways with which we might begin to answer these difficult questions. While this book’s goal is not to formulate a coherent development framework, it would be more helpful to development workers and policymakers if it suggested some concrete changes that might, at least in the Gambian case, move us closer to resolution for some of these critical issues.

Environmentalism Unbound: Exploring New Pathways for Change. by Robert Gottlieb. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2001), xvii + 396 pp.

Reviewed by Christopher McGrory Klyza, Director, Program in Environmental Studies, Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT

Robert Gottlieb’s new book, *Environmentalism Unbound*, takes us further down the path on which he started us in *Forcing the Spring* (1993). Like that book, *Environmentalism Unbound* is a combination of theory, cases, and appeal, and like that book it succeeds admirably in achieving certain goals yet falls short in achieving its most ambitious goal—creating a new progressive politics centered on a new kind of environmentalism. At the root of his project is demonstrating how “the mainstream environmentalism that had emerged by the 1970s functioned on the basis of the division between work, product, and environment, whether in terms of policy or the advocacy of consumer, occupational health, and environmental movements” (p. 43), and how to go about re-creating a whole environmental movement.

Gottlieb provides an excellent summary of environmental justice policy and politics in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g., People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, Executive Order 12898, Title VI actions, brownfields) and pollution prevention policy (e.g., Massachusetts Toxic Use Reduction Act, Pollution Prevention Act, voluntary greening of industry). In addition, he explores efforts to find a new, third way to control pollution, such as industrial ecology, extended producer responsibility, and design for the environment.

The three cases he selects to illustrate new pathways for an unbounded environmentalism are dry cleaning, janitors and commercial cleaning, and food systems. These case studies are uniformly excellent. He opens his discussion of the dry cleaning industry with a wise caveat during a time when many commentators and policy analysts are advocating more use of consensus based and voluntary approaches. “Voluntarism,” he writes, “as a substitution for public intervention, may in fact mask how industry, sectoral, institutional, and cultural influences can erect barriers against such change” (p. 101). These barriers are often most problematic for small businesses, a difficulty that “may be more reflective of their dependence upon manufacturers and suppliers in providing their products and shaping their processes or as subcontractors to larger businesses” (p. 103). Gottlieb proceeds to sketch the history of the development of the dry cleaning industry as a decentralized business that came to depend on the chlorine-based solvent perchloroethylene, or “perc”.

By the 1990s, however, perc was coming under increased scrutiny as a significant source of environmental risk for those who worked in the dry cleaning business, and for those who lived near such businesses. The perc issue was pushed to the top of the policy agenda by two old fashioned regulatory laws: the Clean Air Act and Superfund. It was provisions of these laws that provided the leverage to force the dry cleaners and chemical industry to consider a move away from perc. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments required that regulatory standards be established for 189 hazardous air pollutants. Perc was the first of these pollutants to be reviewed. Furthermore, it was discovered that perc was leaking into soil and groundwater—leading to major Superfund liability concerns for dry cleaners, landlords, and chemical companies. The rise of perc on the regulatory agenda presented an opportunity to shift to new, less toxic alternatives for cleaning. Gottlieb reports that a number of alternatives to solvent based dry cleaning were available (such as eco-clean and machine wet cleaning), and despite skepticism about these new approaches within industry, the EPA concluded that the dry cleaning industry needed to move away from perc and that financially viable alternatives for this shift existed. In the end, though, Gottlieb concludes that “the absence of any systematic government or industry programs to facilitate a transition represented a significant pollution prevention barrier” (p. 141).

Gottlieb’s connection between race, class, and ethnicity and environmental issues is strikingly clear in his second case: commercial cleaning services. Overall, nearly 1 million people are employed in this field, and these

workers are among the lowest paid in the United States. The majority of janitors nationwide are women; there is a high percentage of African Americans working in public sector cleaning; and in certain areas, such as Los Angeles County, Latinos are the majority of private sector janitors. Furthermore, over the last few decades this sector has become increasingly concentrated and cost conscious, contributing to a deskilling of janitorial work. The issue of environmental risk related to cleaning products rose on the agenda due to concern with consumer exposure to household cleansers and indoor air pollution, not occupational exposures of janitors.

A major issue, as in the case of the dry cleaning example, was overcoming the barriers to change to environmentally preferable cleaning products. Governments played a significant role here. At the federal level, President Clinton's Executive Order 12873, "Federal Acquisition, Recycling and Waste Prevention," led to some limited changes in federal purchasing, but more impressive were state and local initiatives, like Massachusetts's Toxics Use Reduction Act and Santa Monica's (California) Sustainable Cities Program. The latter program established "environmental criteria for purchasing cleaning products and supplies" and instituted collaboration with the janitors in the selection and evaluation of these products. This program was very successful, and it was clear that the empowerment of the workers in the process was crucial to this success. Connecting janitors with cleaner products and helping to re-skill their work and restore their dignity was crucial to the transition to more environmentally sound cleaning.

The final case offers the greatest opportunity for a new environmentalism due to its tremendous reach and the potential to connect sets of previously disparate interests. Low-income urban residents identify food security (food access, food quality, and food price) as a major concern. By reframing food issues around community food security and examining these issues through complete food systems analysis, the significant environmental implications of existing and alternative food systems is clearly demonstrated. As he does in the other cases, Gottlieb offers a concise and informative historical sketch of the changes in the various sectors of the food system over the last half-century: the move toward industrial agricultural production and the decline in family farms; the move toward globalization of the food system; the rising importance of brokers, processors, and manufacturers in the food system (e.g., how McDonald's Chicken McNuggets and french fries fundamentally changed the chicken and potato sectors of U.S. agriculture); and the significance of food retailers, ranging from supermarket chains to fast food companies, all seeking a standardized product. All of these trends, Gottlieb notes, have had "powerful implications in terms of the increasing disconnect between food and place and its related environmental, economic, and social justice implications" (p. 199). Accompanying this globalization and corporatization of U.S. agriculture were a series of related problems. Despite the abundance and at times overabundance of food, many continued to go hungry. The transition to a fast food, processed food culture meant that the nutrition of food had declined for most (e.g., nearly one-third of vegetable servings for teenagers today are made up of french fries and potato chips). Lastly, this changing food system has led to the rise of genetically modified crops.

A nascent effort to connect environmental, community development, sustainable agriculture, anti-hunger, and food system analysts was launched in the mid 1990s to influence the upcoming renewal of the Farm Bill. The efforts never fully gelled, in part due to the Republican victories of 1994, which put many of the coalition groups in a defensive posture. How might these various threads be connected? Organic and sustainable agriculture offer one option. Here Gottlieb focuses his criticism on the disconnect between organic agriculture and those who might not be able to afford such food. Oddly absent is any discussion of the increasing corporatization and globalization of organic agriculture, often removing its connection to place and seasonality. A further option focuses on growing food in the city, through community gardens and school gardens. Such gardens can connect urban dwellers with their food, greatly contributing to food security. Despite some positive developments, Gottlieb concludes that "the sum of the new food movements still remains less than their parts" (p. 271).

Gottlieb brings us great stories, helping us to see environmentalism where we hadn't before and continuing to explore and to push the boundary between environmentalism and occupational safety and health, between environmentalism and a more just society. My main criticism of Gottlieb is his failure to engage mainstream environmental groups and the new conservation movement in any meaningful way. Such engagement is crucial for someone seeking to build a broader environmentalism at the core of a new progressive politics. As in *Forcing the Spring*, Gottlieb does little in *Environmentalism Unbound* to try to convince traditional environmentalists to follow his new pathway.

Indeed, at times he seems dismissive of the accomplishments or views of his erstwhile allies. For instance, in response to the Republican victories in the 1994 elections, he suggests that "the opportunities presented by environmental justice and pollution prevention emerged as perhaps the only route for a renewed environmentalism" (p. 51). This is certainly news to those engaged in conservation politics, including mainstream groups that convinced the Clinton Administration to protect millions of acres via the Antiquities Act, and potentially millions of roadless

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acres in national forests through administrative action, or such non-mainstream groups as the Center for Biological Diversity, which used the Endangered Species Act and the courts to achieve significant successes in protecting species and habitat.

Most fundamentally, from the perspective of mainstream environmental groups, Gottlieb never clearly explains to these groups and their followers why they should broaden their vision and, more significantly, join in a new progressive politics. For instance, in his discussion of food politics he writes, “Mainstream environmental groups, while not opposing the initiative, remained aloof and never directly associated with the community food security campaign. The mainstream environmentalist position was focused on environmental impacts from the growing of the food, not what happened to the food itself” (p. 232). This passage is indicative of this fundamental problem—Gottlieb is quick to criticize mainstream environmental groups, but he never offers a full political analysis of the situation. What support did the food security groups give to environmental groups on other issues, such as non-point water pollution or the Endangered Species Act? In other words, how much did anti-hunger advocates care about how food was produced? More broadly, what is to be gained by mainstream environmental groups by joining a larger progressive political coalition? What is to be lost? What are the tradeoffs in a move from interest group politics to social movement politics? And how might this change happen, especially in a country that has moved to the right since 1980?

I think that Gottlieb downplays and underestimates the importance of mainstream groups in creating and defending the current regulatory framework, as problematic as it may be. These groups and this framework often open the policy process for others due to the leverage these laws provide (as described above in the perc case). Neither does he explore the real tensions that can sometimes exist between labor and environmentalists over issues like protecting endangered species or opposing mining or energy development.

Gottlieb also ignores a segment of the environmental movement that could be very open to his ideas, the new conservation movement. This movement is often just as critical of the mainstream environmental groups as he is, and like the anti-toxics groups he focuses on, these groups are often more confrontational than the mainstream groups. Why no discussion of the tree sitters or road blockers or legal monkey-wrenchers? In his preface, Gottlieb asks, “Can environmentalism become part of the new regionalism?” (p. xv). But parts of environmentalism, especially those associated with the new conservation movement, have been interested in varieties of regionalism for over a decade—bioregionalism, ecosystem management, ecoregions and biogeography, sense of place. A clear example of this opportunity to connect is the rise of the new group Wild Farm Alliance, which seeks to bridge the gap between stewardship farming and wildlands conservation. Similarly, at last winter’s Northeast Organic Farming Association-Vermont conference the theme was “farming as if nature mattered.” Why not connect these moves toward nature conservation to the larger food system alliance Gottlieb seeks to build?

Overall, Gottlieb continues to be the best guide to this arena of environmental policy, areas once considered on the fringe or not considered part of environmental policy at all. He offers an excellent and convincing case for a new kind of environmentalism when viewed from the progressive perspective. The central question is: What next? As noted above, Gottlieb needs to outline a rationale for why this new kind of environmentalism is necessary from the perspective of mainstream environmentalism. Furthermore, we need more ideas about what a future environmentalism would look like. Gottlieb rightfully argues that we need to be concerned with more than just the local; we need to be concerned with the global as well. He offers ideas such as a “global minimum wage, a baseline of environmental requirements, or global debt relief” (p. 277). After a book so tied to real cases and issues, these ideas strike me as vague and abstract. What of building on connections between consumers and producers, like Fair Trade coffee? Can this serve as a model that could be expanded? What of international community-to-community relationships?

One thing is clear. The importance of what Gottlieb discusses, the interconnections of global corporations, global food supplies, global justice, and global work conditions, all tied to local and global environmental conditions, has only been magnified by the events of September 11th. As environmentalism seeks to find its way in this new century, I’ll look forward to Robert Gottlieb’s next book to help us find that new direction

Trees At Risk: Reclaiming an Urban Forest, by Evelyn Herwitz. Worcester, MA: Chandler House Press, Inc (2001), iv, 200 pp.

Reviewed by Brent Evans and Carolyn Chipman Evans, Cibolo Nature Center, Boerne, TX

Evelyn Herwitz has contributed a major historical work with a strong environmental message in *Trees At Risk: Reclaiming an Urban Forest*. The City of Worcester, MA serves as the focal point for this evolving story of grassroots negligence and activism. The author is adept at uncovering the societal and industrial forces that carved a city out of the wilderness, and sometimes molded a little of the wilderness back into the city.

An ambitious work, the book is a 200-page treasure with 16 pages of color photos, and numerous illustrations throughout. Nature lovers will also appreciate the occasional botanical information and illustrations of native trees.

Trees At Risk is both a hopeful blueprint and a cautionary tale of what cities can do to protect and promote their urban forests, and what can happen if they do not. Ms. Herwitz is a skilled historian, but also a masterful wordsmith. For example:

On a chill December afternoon when the hardwoods stand barren, their fallen leaves but sodden dregs of autumn's gold, Worcester's hues are clay and stone. Viewed from Mount St. James, once home to native Nipmucs, now to the College of the Holy Cross, the muted city melds with the dun-colored woodlands of surrounding hills - its red-brick factory buildings and cement offices crowding the valley floor, a glass-and-steel bank tower mirroring winter's slate sky, white and frown and beige three-deckers climbing rocky hillsides, the charcoal-gray swath of I-290 snaking over streets.

Come spring, though, there is green. First, a fine misting of chartreuse as the weeping willows unfurl their buds, then a wash of emerald as the sugar and Norway maples, the ashes, oaks and ginkgoes spread their leaves, until Worcester's swarthy face is softened by a sylvan veil. A city of aging factories and dreams of renewal, of ethnic pride and paternalism, of grit, ingenuity and determination, Worcester is also a city of trees.

Her work reaches far beyond Worcester though, in its lessons and implications. She looks at the national picture of demising urban forests. Statistics abound: "the average life of a city tree is only 32 years - 13 if planted downtown - far short of the 150-year average life span of trees in rural settings." What's more, city tree planting and maintenance budgets have been slashed nationwide, and urban parks are also at risk.

The story of the threat to Worcester's trees is the story of the relationship between Americans and nature - at times exploitative, at times romantic, and occasionally reverent. She gives a clear history of the local native landscape, and its gradual civilization. And, throughout the work she provides wonderful snippets of historical significance, like the quote from Genesis that English settlers liked to use to justify their taking of Native land: "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it." But, the settlers proved far more accomplished at subduing than replenishing, as have their offspring, even to this day.

The sad history of the wasting of trees, deforestation, and industrial transformation are detailed, as are early conservation efforts in the mid-eighteenth century, and the first use of public funds for tree planting, a century later. She follows the trend of the romantic ideal of pastoral land in rural cemetery design, through to the "Greening of Worcester" in 1885 with the planting of 500 trees by the Worcester Grange.

The book traces the urban parks movement, and the inevitable growing demand for green space as the city expanded. Then, it chronicles the turn of the century, and the theme of "Wilderness Squandered." As the Worcester case study continues, Ms. Herwitz examined politics, the railroad, the Hurricane of '38, the Great Depression, ethnic politics and public parks, the Chestnut Blight, and Dutch Elm Disease.

As the 20th century gathered momentum, the early precursors to land use controls and planned communities are seen and followed up to current times. As budget cuts and benign neglect took hold, a legacy was being squandered, and the trend was national. "A 1991 survey of urban tree care programs in 20 major American cities by the national conservation group American Forests revealed that nearly three-fourths of those communities had cut back funding for street trees, despite the fact that they had collectively planted only about one tree for every four needed just to maintain their current tree census."

Thus, the powerful story of an urban forest, lost and found again and again, teaches us to open our eyes in our own hometowns. The author then calls us to action, using global numbers that we have almost grown numb to:

- In the past 50 years, global deforestation and exponential acceleration of fossil fuel consumption and methane gas production have raised the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere to about 25 to 30 % above levels that have prevailed for the past 160,000 years, and could double by the 21st century.

- The arctic ice cap has thinned by 42%.

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- The world's coral reefs have thinned by 27%.
- Rainforests could disappear in 25 - 30 years.
- Air pollution, acid rain.

It all adds up, or maybe we should say, it all subtracts, down, down, down.

But, she also provides us with hope. She points to good stewardship in Milwaukee, and other positive examples around the country. And, she discusses modern economic forces that are driven by the pressure of population growth and basic human nature. These economic forces are then seen as possible sources of support for the future of our urban forests.

Our suggestion is that our cities do in fact have the economic and technological resources to grow magnificent urban forests, but they lack the political will. Further, we would say that political will, rooted in the minds and hearts of the public, can be won through education. There is an old Chinese proverb: "Think one year ahead - plant rice; think ten years ahead - plant trees; think one-hundred years ahead - educate people."

And, we would finally suggest that North America's 1200+ nature centers are good places to look to. Nature centers teach environmental values, and are vital members of their communities. While school districts may be slow to advocate for social action or conservation, nature centers are busily doing just that.

The education of all citizens, not just the young and not-yet-enfranchised, but the adults, the property owners, the industrial leaders, and our civic representatives - all need education. However, sending them facts and figures, and even sending them this wonderful book, will probably not do the trick.

They spend the vast majority of their lives indoors. They need contact with nature. If you want to educate someone about the value of trees, take them to an arboretum, or a nature center, or a fabulous old urban park. Once inspired, *Trees At Risk* can help any community organizer understand what mistakes to avoid, what social forces are in play, and just how much truly is at risk.

Evelyn Herwitz deserves the thanks of all the tree-huggers, tree-lovers, and even those not yet educated and inspired. As a boy, Brent's one great and often expressed fear of growing up was that he might someday no longer want to climb trees. Well, he's 54, and still climbing (every now and then)!

Negotiating Nature: Culture, Power and Environmental Argument, Hornborg, A. and Gisli Palsson, eds. Lund, Sweden: Lund University Press (2000), 225 pp.

Reviewed by Leif John Fosse, World Wide Fund for Nature, Oslo, Norway.

This collection of essays emerged out of a social science initiative of the Nordic Council of Ministers' Nordic Environmental Research Programme, and examines the cultural dimensions of environmental policy negotiations. Whereas much environmental social science research tends to focus on the institutional, legal, economic or sociological aspects of such negotiations, the aim of these authors, ten anthropologists and ethnologists from Sweden, Norway and Iceland, is to highlight their symbolic, experiential, and ideological aspects. In other words, they seek to identify the metaphors, symbols or aesthetic ideals that implicitly frame discourses on the environment.

This review, in turn, is written by an environmental anthropologist practitioner, rather than researcher. Therefore, any failure to place the contributions in the proper context of ongoing academic discourses and exchanges on the environment may be due to the perspective of the reviewer rather than a failure of the individual authors or editors. The editors' introduction provides a good overview of the contributors' main arguments and I draw extensively on their observations in this review.

The volume's subject matter is approached through a diverse set of concerns with the phenomenology of tourism, landscape conservation, environmental activism, and the practical management of fisheries and reindeer pastures. The perspectives are too disparate; by the editors' own admission, to represent a uniform statement on how to apply culture theory to environmental issues. There is, however, a common preoccupation with how cultural perceptions of nature are generated. A concluding commentary by Tim Ingold places the individual contributions in a wider perspective in a succinct overview of anthropological approaches to the environment.

The first five contributions are concerned with how cultural perceptions of nature are generated at the experiential and phenomenological level. Löfgren discusses the way cultural ideals about the kinds of nature found

worthy of protection vary in historical time, geographical space and social context, depending on the technology used for transportation and representing the landscape.

Svensson, in turn, observes that the tourist industry is founded on the commoditization of landscape experiences. Noting how nature is increasingly marketed as an “experience,” she claims that the tourist industry’s appeals to the picturesque, sublime and panoramic also underlie environmental or heritage protection policies.

Saltzman notes a similar romanticism in the landscape ideals of urban administrators and the environmental and heritage conservation policies of the EU, which are at odds with the rationalized farming practices of today’s rural populations. Guided by these romantic ideals we thus find

Swedish bureaucrats praising the past knowledge and experience of old Öland farmers, while ignoring the rationality of their technologically and scientifically informed, contemporary descendants. When farming methods change while landscape ideals do not, contradictions are inevitable.

While there is no denying aesthetics and romantic notions of nature have formed an important part of the origin of environmental practices and policies, Svensson’s observation, in particular, may not be entirely up to date. Protection of landscapes today forms part of the wider field of conservation, concerned with broad-based management of ecosystems and natural resources, and involving a wide array of actors and interests ranging from indigenous peoples, peasants and farmers, to business people and technocrats. Today, conservation is often informed by development research and practices, and is likely to stress the economic function and utility value of biodiversity rather than aesthetics and romantic values. These may, however, form part of the individual environmentalist’s motivation, even for the confrontational environmental activists studied by Kapstad.

Kapstad investigates the importance of bodily experience in the everyday cultural practices and confrontations with authority of environmental activists. As a liminal experience, action operates on the edge of what is civilized and structured, and transgresses the relation between subject and object. This allows access to a state where I am the action, and the action is me, where doing is everything. But their engagement, as Ingold observes in his concluding commentary, is in fact not with the global environment for which they campaign, but with the local authorities and symbols of power. Deep green ecologists have the opposite problem, Hornborg observes in his contribution: The environment they want to save is so lofty and all encompassing that it is impossible to relate to it in a practical, embodied way.

Moving on to the cognitive and conceptual, Jensen looks into how the notion of biodiversity has come to occupy centre stage in environmental discourse by filling multiple functions. In the Swedish forestry debate, the concept has apparently facilitated constructive communication between foresters, scientists and environmentalists, by suggesting scientific precision and a moral measure of natural values at the same time. The concept of biodiversity, she finds, summarises all the values which environmental groups had previously been unable to formulate. Indeed, it forms part of a wider cultural re-evaluation of the fundamental premises of modernity, which has until recently been identified with uniformity.

Diversity is now commonly perceived as crucial to the survival of ecosystems as well as human cultures. The Convention of Biodiversity, an important outcome of the 1992 Rio conference, states that nature has intrinsic value, but places humans firmly within that nature. Here biodiversity is viewed as a democratic right of future generations as well as a prerequisite for the survival of future generations. The corresponding term “cultural diversity,” we may note, has provided an important common ground for environmentalists and indigenous peoples.

Hornborg looks into the correspondence between how humans in different cultural contexts relate to nature and how they relate to each other through exchange. Whereas social metaphors for human-environmental relations in pre-modern contexts have been couched in terms of reciprocal gift giving, modern economists use terms such as ecosystem services, natural capital, environmental costs and debts. These projections of principles of social exchange onto human-environmental relations correspond, in turn, to different cultural perceptions of the human person, whether engaged and infused with the natural environment or its detached observer.

Hornborg notes the ways in which personhood, nature and exchange are conceptualized in terms of concentric, spatial models; which in his view permit formal comparisons between pre-modern Algonquians of northeastern North America, modern economists, and the post-modern deep ecology movement. This argument may, however, rest on a stereotyped view of the sociability of the Algonquians.

Helgason, O’Jinsson and Pálsson in their substantial contribution trace some of the moral and existential consequences of the commoditization and bureaucratization of Icelandic fishing. In order to tackle the problem of over-fishing the Icelandic government in 1983 introduced a management system based on individual transferable quotas (ITQs) – a market approach to managing natural resources and a radical departure from the largely unmanaged fisheries of previous times. The fisheries soon took on the characteristics of factory production, in that the fishermen have become passive workers while the owners and exchangers of fishing rights are perceived as the

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creative agents of economic value. Fisheries ecologists and economists have assumed the modernist role of engineers, manipulating the configuration of variables in a predictable system to achieve the desired outcome.

The ITQ reform was originally presented as a temporary measure, but soon developed into a system of property rights, and the ITQs become market commodities. The stated objectives of policy makers had gradually shifted from the original emphasis on the protection of fishing stocks to the economic goal of efficient production. According to the authors, the ITQ system has violated some tacit moral tenets of the fishermen's world view, such as egalitarianism and personal autonomy. In the share system that preceded the ITQs, the fishing enterprise was perceived to be a joint venture, with an explicit economic recognition that the efforts of the skipper and the crew were essential in the creation of value.

In the new production discourse, however, the efforts of fishermen are taken for granted, and exchange with ITQs have replaced the act of fishing as the source of economic value. The commoditization of fishing rights has displaced the locus of agency associated with the fishing enterprise from the skipper and his crew on the fishing vessel to ecological specialists and business managers on dry land. In their argument to reclaim the role of individual skills and agency in the fisheries as a production process, I find it puzzling that the authors do not draw on F. Barth, who makes a similar argument in his classic study of role play and impression management on a Norwegian fishing vessel (1966).

But does the new system of management solve the underlying problem of over fishing? The ecological benefits of privatisation are a key justification for the ITQ system. This sort of argument is usually informed by G. Hardin's "tragedy of the commons" (1968): it is rational for a herder on a common pasture to add extra animals to the pasture although this will collectively result in overgrazing. Arguing against this, the authors find that the institution of private property cannot on its own be expected to maintain or improve the condition of the marine habitat, contrary to the tacit assumption of mainstream fisheries economics.

Beach's chapter on Saami reindeer herders follows this discussion nicely by focussing on the repercussions of regulatory mechanisms implemented to remedy the problem of overgrazing by reindeer in northern Sweden. International conventions prescribe new forms of natural resource management and EU membership provides the Saami reindeer herders with new subsidies and regional aid. As Beach points out, however, the Saami must also deal with rational herd management measures prescribed by the authorities

Compensation payments from hydroelectric companies that have flooded grazing lands and from the Chernobyl disaster add considerably to Saami funds which, according to the Reindeer Herding Act, can only be spent on the herding enterprise. This stimulates the increased purchase of high-tech gear and the use of helicopters and transport trucks to carry the reindeer between ranges or abattoirs. According to Beach, these technologies impair rather than enhance fine-tuned pastoral skills among the herders, and the reindeer lose knowledge of migration routes and useful routines. A dilemma for the Saami herders is that the more they utilize modern, high-tech gear and methods promoted by the state, the less their livelihood is regarded by the rest of the society as being an expression of Saami culture and a livelihood rightfully granted special resource rights.

Beach's argument is well made and the dilemma observed applies to the Norwegian context as well. Here too, reindeer herding is so closely associated with Saami identity in the wider community that it has become an imperative to that identity. Saami activists have successfully utilized reindeer pastoralism as a metonym for their livelihood, identity and way of life in their struggle to be recognised as an indigenous people with special resource rights. However, their success in this regard, makes negotiation of identity and claims of indigenity difficult for non-reindeer herding Saami.

Several of the book's chapters focus on the tensions and transformations that appear in the discursive interchange between local life-worlds and abstract authority. Environmental discourse is an arena both for the assertion of local autonomy and for the exercise of centralized power. The denigration of practical knowledge noted in several contexts, is here seen as a by-product of high modernism. The proper response to the modernist agenda, according to the editors, is not romantic adherence to the past, or fetishization of traditional knowledge, but a management framework democratic enough to allow for a realistic adaptation to the complexities and contingencies of the world – in sum a communitarian ethic of "muddling through".

Some of the contributors tend to get so carried away in their deconstructionist zeal that one is left to wonder whether environmental problems exist at all. The eloquent concluding commentary by Tim Ingold goes a long way in correcting this impression. The concept of nature may be culturally constructed, he admits, in the sense that its meaning is continually subject to negotiation in the multiple contexts of ordinary discourse. But which elements of the world this concept is supposed to denote, are culturally constructed as well? "Nature" is certainly not a given pre-existing stage for existence, but is continually negotiated. But this is a life process that involves more than just the world's human inhabitants.

In a fascinating argument verging on pantheism, Ingold holds that if the concept of construction is to be

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useful, we have to include the natural, physical world in it, as this shapes the human life-world as much as it is shaped by it. Human beings, Ingold muses, are to be found around the edges of nature, not at its core. He proposes the term “anthropocircumferentialism” to denote this position, which may not gain currency for the mere unutterability of it.

On a final note, we may observe that the English of some of the Nordic authors is patchy in places, indicating the proofreading may not have been entirely up to standard.

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Social Change in Melanesia: Development and History, by Paul Sillitoe New York: Cambridge University Press (2000), xx, 264 pp.

Reviewed by Jerry Jacka, Department of Anthropology, University of Oregon Eugene, OR

This book is a companion volume to Sillitoe’s 1998 book, *Introduction to the Anthropology of Melanesia*. It is intended for as a general introduction to Melanesian studies. The first book deals with “traditional” Melanesian social life, while this latter book looks at the changes that have come via “modernization.” Those researchers who disdain the use of such terms and the obvious dichotomies produced by publishing the two different books, may find serious fault with Sillitoe’s approach. Despite this, I think that the latter volume is a good book for the number of topics it brings up in attempting to cover the range of issues relevant to Melanesians today. I deal with the topics in greater detail below, but give a brief listing of them here (in the order they are addressed in the book): land tenure, community development, business and entrepreneurship, formation of class, mining, forestry, migration and urbanization, cargo cults, missionization, state formation, tourism, and custom and identity.

One of the strengths of the book is that each of the chapters that addresses the topics above uses a particular culture group or region to illustrate the ways that these processes of modernity articulate in that particular area. At the same time, though, some Melanesianists may be disappointed by the bulk of the examples coming from Papua New Guinea at the expense of the other Melanesian countries. West Papua, rather anachronistically called “Irian Jaya” throughout the book despite the name being changed in 1999, receives only passing mention. Only one chapter is devoted to the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu each, while Fiji and New Caledonia are only briefly alluded to from time to time. However, the particular case studies presented in each chapter could also be used by instructors to make comparisons and contrasts of the areas where they did their respective research to their students.

In general, this is a good book, but it has some faults that I found hard to overlook. The greatest of these is that at times Sillitoe slips into language that makes social change seem teleological or evolutionary. He sometimes mentions certain groups as “moving back towards their cultural roots” (p. 107) or as being at a certain “stage” (passim). But then a few pages later he will note that there is no unidirectionality to change. Some readers may find this confusing and take refuge in a more comfortable mode of thinking of change as coming in stages where the West is modern and the Rest are working towards that goal. Most of the seeds of confusion are sown in the fourth chapter of the book, entitled *Technological Change and Economic Growth*.

Sillitoe uses modernization theory as developed by W. W. Rostow (e.g., 1960) to talk about models of economic growth in Melanesia. Readers are subjected to discussions of “economic take-off” supported by two nearly incomprehensible graphs that attempt to show the relationships between labor and output in tribal versus capitalist economies. By the end of the chapter I was unsure as to whether he was critiquing modernization theory or defending it. But then he opens the next chapter by writing that sweeping universal economic theories are quite limited in real-life contexts. As a result, there is a danger that introductory-level readers may come away with an incomplete understanding of the issues surrounding economic change.

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Another problem with the book is the model of social change that is presented. Sillitoe notes that there are three aspects to social change: technological innovation, social consequences, and indigenous rationalizations. While these in themselves are not problematic, what is troublesome about how Sillitoe deploys them, is that he argues that one leads directly to the other. In other words, technology changes society which changes ideology. Nowhere in the book is there a more dialectical approach to understanding the relationships among technology, social process, and ideology. Fortunately, this model is only present in the beginning of the book, and is not overtly reinforced in the latter chapters.

A final complaint I had with this book was the recommended reading list at the end of each chapter. This in itself was a good idea, but I felt that many of the readings could have reflected more recent writings on Melanesia in addition to the older classic ethnographies and monographs. Introductory level students are probably not going to want to tackle an entire book and especially one that was written in the 1970s if they want to read more about Melanesia today. Consequently, there should have been an inclusion of journal articles written in the 1990s. As it is now, the bulk of the recommended readings are books published primarily from the 1960s to 1980s. Additionally, there are numerous government (Melanesian) sources listed that may be difficult to obtain without the use of an interlibrary loan system.

I need to stress that in spite of all the criticisms I have just made, I would still recommend this book as an introduction to New Guinea, Melanesia, or Oceania. In the beginning of the book, Sillitoe juxtaposes a typical chronological account of the arrival of Europeans in Melanesia with an account that he collected from the Wola people he has worked among in Southern Highlands Province, Papua New Guinea. These two chapters do an excellent job of problematizing the way that histories get written and whose version of history becomes official. The fourth chapter begins with a discussion of technological change looking at the impact of steel tools among the Siane, who formerly had an economy based on stone tool technology. This chapter then moves into some of the problematic material mentioned above on modernization theory. The fifth chapter tackles the issue of land rights and community for the Tolai people of New Britain. Modern planners' and development agencies' attempts to nucleate communally held lands is a key focus of this chapter. Surprisingly, the protests of the mid-1990s led by students at the University of Papua New Guinea over land registration were not covered in this chapter.

The sixth chapter looks at big men and entrepreneurship. The area of coverage is the eastern highlands of Papua New Guinea. Sillitoe uses Finney's (1973) analysis of highlanders, especially "big men," as predisposed for success in capitalist markets. This is the only chapter that raises gender issues, a topical area lacking throughout the rest of the book's coverage of contemporary issues. The seventh chapter examines the development of social stratification and inequality in the central highlands of Papua New Guinea. Unfortunately, much of this chapter felt like an echo of the previous chapter as many of the examples referred to highlands big men. The next two chapters deal with the exploitation of natural resources, specifically mining and forestry. The mining chapter focuses on the Bougainville people, while the forestry chapter looks at the West Sepik area. All of the current issues relating to resource development are dealt with in these two chapters: issues of ownership, insurrections by disappointed locals, compensation, local knowledge of resources, environmental destruction, and the interplay of multinational corporations, the state, and local peoples. With the on-going development of the extractive resources industry, there is much in these chapters to compare and contrast with other areas of Melanesia.

Chapter 10 is on migration and urbanization in Papua New Guinea. The paradoxes of people living in tribal societies in their home villages, and in urban settings with their incipient class-like nature, is wonderfully detailed. The chapter also explores the processes of labor migration and the development of the wantok system in an ethnically pluralized society. The next chapter looks at the general development of cargo cults in Melanesia and uses as its case study, the John Frum movement in Vanuatu. Sillitoe does an excellent job in presenting the history of research on cargo cults and ties them to the millennial politics that the John Frum movement engendered in Vanuatu. Chapter 12 examines missionization and the missions' role in promoting social change in Melanesia. Many of the examples from this chapter are about the Methodist missionary George Brown and document his interactions with people in the Duke of York Islands and the rest of the Bismarck Archipelago. At the same time, Sillitoe ably details the role that other Pacific Islanders played in spreading Christian religion and the indigenous spread of Christianity, too. The remainder of the chapter looks at the role of the missions in establishing health and education services in the areas around which they operated, and the development of a Melanesian spirituality. The following chapter describes the problems of nation-state development in the region, although most of the examples are specific to Papua New Guinea. Corruption, elections, and law and order issues highlight this chapter. The final chapter in the book explores the relationship between custom and identity. The Kwaio of the Solomon Islands are the focus of the chapter.

Throughout all of these chapters, Sillitoe offers an insightful analysis of many of the tensions facing the people of Melanesia. Rapid technological and economic developments and incredible social transformations pose

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numerous challenges for Melanesians and Sillitoe relates the often creative means that the people use to meet these challenges. The book is a wonderful resource for instructors wishing to give beginning students of Melanesia insights into the complex issues that permeate this region.

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The Rise of the Agricultural Welfare State, Adam D. Sheingate. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2001), xii, 279 pp.

Reviewed by Andrew D. McNitt, Department of Political Science; Eastern Illinois University

As strange as it may seem, agricultural policy has long been a topic of concern to students of interest group politics. Adam Sheingate's book, *The Rise of the Agricultural Welfare State*, is one of the latest and most complete efforts in this area. Professor Sheingate examines the development of agricultural policy in the United States, Japan and France (the Common Market's leading agricultural producer). He focuses on the development of government programs designed to support farm income through a combination of restrictions on production, marketing agreements and subsidies, which he calls the "agricultural welfare state."

Sheingate argues that differences in the political and governmental systems of these countries influenced the extent to which the agricultural welfare state has become a permanent feature of public policy. Specifically, in Japan and France a single dominant agricultural interest group was able to monopolize the relationship between farmers and their respective agricultural ministries.

In Japan, the *Nokyo*, an association of agricultural cooperatives that not only processes and markets food, but also provides credit and carries out a number of government funded development projects, is the dominant organization. In France the FNSEA (Federation National des syndicats d'Exploitants de Agriculteurs) is in a similar, but weaker position. In both countries these agricultural interest groups proved critically important in domestic politics because of the over representation of rural areas in the national parliaments and the more closed nature of policy making in a parliamentary (as opposed to a presidential) system. In both Japan and the France the close relationship between the dominant agricultural interest group and the agricultural ministry lead to the emergence of a neo-corporatist policymaking subsystem as government functions were turned over to the respective interest groups. In the United States, on the other hand, the Farm Bureau tried, but failed to establish itself as the dominant agricultural interest group. Conflicts over agricultural policy in the 1950s between the Republican party and the Farm Bureau on one side and the Democratic party and the National Farmers Union on the other lead to a rupture of the ties between the agricultural extension service and the Farm Bureau. This combined with the greater permeability of the American political system and the lack of policy agreement between the president and Congress over agricultural policy promoted a more pluralistic policy making subsystem. In the 1960s, a system where large number of separate commodity groups replaced the general farm organizations as the principal representatives of agricultural interests, and in the 1970s, consumer and environmental interests intervened.

The consequences of these national differences in the agricultural policymaking, according to Sheingate, was that when it became economically beneficial for the larger community to cut agricultural subsidies in these three countries in the 1990s, that it was the US which was the most successful in reducing the size of the agricultural welfare state. The US was more successful because the very permeability of the policymaking system, which had earlier allowed agricultural interests to successfully petition for subsidies, also allowed urban, environmental and

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consumer interests to involve themselves in agricultural policy making to a greater extent than was possible in either Japan or France.

Sheingate's interpretation of agricultural policy stands in sharp contrast to that of earlier authors (e.g., McConnell 1966, and Lowi 1979), who viewed agricultural politics as a prime example of private interests colonizing a public agency and dominating policymaking. This difference, however, may be more apparent than real. Scholarly generalizations are all effected by the sample of reality upon which they are based. Those scholars who saw agricultural policy as colonized by private interests in general were looking at an earlier point of time, while Sheingate had the advantage of writing after the passage of the 1996 Farm Bill, which implemented a number of program reductions. The 1996 Farm Bill, however, has not been a success. Agricultural prices declined at just the point subsidies were supposed to fade out and Congress responded with "emergency aid." While Sheingate is aware of this problem, its continuation leaves the extent to which the US is able to reduce agricultural subsidies open to question. The lack of a deficit and the unusually close partisan divisions in both houses of Congress raise important questions about the extent to which urban interests will be either able or willing to resist calls for a return to the agricultural welfare state.

The *Decline of the Agricultural Welfare State* is an excellent book for students of agricultural policy. It is valuable because it covers an unusually long period of time, from the nineteenth century through the end of the twentieth century. In addition, the comparative perspective is extremely useful for those who are trying to understand policy making in a field where international trade so extremely important. Nonetheless, there are some limitations.

First, the author focuses upon the relationship between agricultural producers and the government, when the interests of processors, traders and suppliers are increasingly important. While Sheingate is aware of this change, he along with most of the other students of this area, have not examined the political influence of this now numerically larger segment of the food system. The problem is one of perspective, students of political parties and interest groups usually do not examine the political activities of corporations when the corporations act independently. While an understandable form of academic specialization, this perspective limits our understanding of the entire political process. More attention needs to be paid to the role of actors such as Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland and Monsanto.

The author also does not consider the impact of American trade embargoes upon the agricultural policy making. The Nixon and Carter embargoes, although imposed for different reasons, had important implications. At the domestic level, they provide very clear examples of the willingness of the American government to intervene in the free market in a manner that reduced farm income. As such they are examples of the ability of urban interests to triumph over agricultural interests in ways that supports Sheingate's thesis, but are inconsistent with the moral implications that are included in the notion of an agricultural welfare state.

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Saqqaq: An Inuit Hunting Community in the Modern World. by Jens Dahl. Toronto: University of Toronto Press (2000), viii, 277 pp.

Reviewed by Gísli Pálsson, University of Iceland.

Inuit studies have flourished in recent years. There are annual conferences on Inuit issues, interdisciplinary and social scientific, and, moreover, there are regular anthropological workshops on hunter-gatherers, including Inuit. As a result, an extensive ethnography has been emerging which documents Inuit society in the current age,

relations with the colonial past, and the problems posed by the future. Jens Dahl's work on the hunting community of Saqqaq in Western Greenland is a welcome addition to this literature, written by a Danish anthropologist who has not only been engaged in fieldwork in Greenland on and off for two decades, practically since the introduction of Home Rule, but who has also been active in ethnopolitics through the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) in Copenhagen.

Dahl's book is divided into nine chapters focusing on the Saqqaq community, beluga hunting, fishing, sealing, territoriality, division of labor, the Inuit hunting mode of production, national policy, and, finally, the imagined community of modern Greenlanders. Dahl observes that Greenland differs from many other colonial contexts: those who negotiated Home Rule on behalf of Greenlanders "spoke on behalf of all Greenlanders including ethnic Danes living in Greenland. This process is therefore significantly different from land claims processes in, for example, the Northwest Territories in Canada, which have been raised on the basis of ethnic rights" (p. 19). This is not a community study in the old-fashioned sense of the term. Rather, Dahl situates his community in both historical time and sociopolitical space. Eager to dissociate himself from "an approach that transforms community studies into sheer symbolic affairs" (p. 209), Dahl emphasizes a "human-ecological approach that incorporates economic, political, and ideological factors."

Much of the book discusses the contrasts and relations between the activities of beluga whaling, sealing and fishing. "Whereas beluga hunting epitomizes the collectivity of the community," Dahl emphasizes, "the exchange of seal meat is the most fundamental of all interpersonal exchanges" (p. 134). More than any other activity, however, commercial fishing draws the community into a wider network of economic relations, modifying in the process the nature and significance of the household and the division of labor between men and women. The thrust of Dahl's argument relates to what he calls the "seven pillars of the hunting mode of production": the centrality of the household unit, individual control of the hunting process, collective networks of exchange, open access to hunting grounds, the cultural role of the hunter as provider, and flexible adaptation to changing circumstances.

There are some grounds for arguing that nowadays, and for much of recent history, there is only one mode of production, the capitalist one. Practically all production is somehow involved in the world economy. Some production systems, however, can not be described either as capitalist systems or as peasant households. In the anthropological literature they are often referred to as "simple commodity production." Such systems have often been associated with agriculture, but they can also be found in whale hunting and fishing. The simple commodity producer shares the characteristics of the peasant in one important respect. In both cases family members pool their resources, capital and labor. By pooling available resources the producer safeguards him- or herself against the vulnerability of the enterprise. Market conditions fluctuate, the productivity of fishing differs from one season to another, and the need for labor varies with season and fishing gear. The extent to which the simple commodity producer is able to draw upon the labor of the family, however, varies with its composition and stage in the development cycle, as Chayanov, Sahlins and many other have pointed out. Inuit hunting, in Dahl's description, is best regarded as simple commodity production. Here production is partly geared for the market, but what motivates the producers is not primarily profit but rather social responsibilities, local commitments, and kinship relations. As Dahl puts it, "it is not the cash motivation, but the significance of meat and the role of the hunter as provider that explain why people go sealing" (p. 215). While in some ways simple commodity production resembles industrial capitalist production, and may therefore be regarded as quasi-capitalistic, it also has much in common with household production.

There are good reasons why one should bother to construct and refine concepts of modes of production. For one thing, some kind of conceptual umbrella is needed to appreciate the different ways in which humans relate to and appropriate animals. Classificatory schemes are often central for resource management and environmental rhetoric, especially with respect to sea mammals. A case in point is the notion of "subsistence" production employed by the International Whaling Commission, for whom whaling and sealing are the privileged activities of "indigenous" hunters who do not produce for markets and are, therefore, only minimally involved in the world economy. Such a notion, a notion challenged by Dahl's book, is highly romantic in that it presents indigenous hunters as lay ecologists, as being closer to nature than the rest of humanity. While it may represent charitable motives, it has much in common with the ethnocentric discourse of the colonial past. Humans, whatever their mode of production or subsistence, are simultaneously part of nature and society.

One of the central themes of the book is that of "tradition." Interestingly, "while Greenlanders themselves used 'tradition' in defense of their right to self-determination, Greenpeace (and others) used 'tradition' to attack the modern Greenlandic version of sealing and whaling" (p. 5). The idea of hunter-gatherers as lay ecologists or "noble savages" operating outside, or on the margin of, society in a world of their own has often appeared in recent debates on animal rights. While animal rights activists like to think of themselves as the spokespersons for indigenous

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hunters, they often misconstrue the hunters' thinking and way of life. Dahl has much to offer on this score, emphasizing that Inuit hunting is part of the modern way of life, embedded in a larger context, the Saqqaq community, Greenland, and the Danish state. Animal rights activists share the hunters' respect for animals and their concern with environmental problems, but in many other respects the two groups are likely to disagree. Trapped in objectivist Western discourse on science and the Other, animal rights activists make a fundamental distinction between "them" (indigenous hunters) and "us" (Euro-Americans), between nature and society, and between animals and humans.

This contrasts sharply with the ways in which hunters themselves often represent their relations with society and the animate world. Thus, Inuit tend to think of themselves as being in communion with nature, animals, and fellow humans. In their view, there is no fundamental distinction between nature and society, animals are regarded as social persons, and to kill them is a sign of responsibility and not a criminal act, at least as long as certain technical and ritual conditions are met. The environmentalist view may express charitable and humanitarian motives. However, it is not an objective account of the real world but an ethnocentric statement grounded in the historical realities of particular groups of Euro-Americans.

Overall, this is quite a useful book, covering a range of ethnographic issues in plain language devoid of unnecessary jargon. Not only will it be useful in courses on hunter-gatherer society, Inuit culture, and colonial and post-colonial history, it should be valuable as well for specialists in economic and ecological anthropology. As to the weaknesses and omissions of Dahl's account, I would have liked to see more on ethnographic comparison, Inuit conceptions of human-animal interaction, gender relations, and activities performed by Saqqaq women. Also, given the emphasis on "tradition" in both Inuit and observers' accounts, a more thorough discussion of "traditional knowledge," an issue only briefly addressed (p. 228-9), should have been provided. Moreover, while Dahl provides perceptive observations of the hunting mode of production, some reference to recent critical engagements with Sahlins's thesis of the "original affluent society" would have been in order.

Where We Live, Work and Play: The Environmental Justice Movement and the Struggle for a New Environmentalism, by Patrick Novotny. London: Praeger (2000), 115 pp.

Reviewed by Diane-Michele Prindeville, Department of Government, New Mexico State University.

This book speaks to several different audiences in a variety of disciplines including political science, sociology, environmental studies, and communication. It introduces the reader to the diverse issues driving the work of the environmental justice movement and its grassroots supporters. Novotny recounts the history of the movement in the US, describing its goals, leaders, and proponents, while relating in detail the struggles of some of the original environmental justice organizations. The book is accessible to a general readership while still being appropriate for use by specialists and seasoned scholars interested in theory building. For example, Novotny employs "framing" as a model for explaining the success of the movement in mobilizing working-class people and communities of color. He presents this concept in terms accessible to a variety of audiences, and, as the following passage indicates, his writing style is suitable for academics while being rich and clear.

Framing is the way that the leaders in a movement assign meaning to and interpret problems in such a way as to mobilize participants. Framing is...a dynamic process by which a movement and its struggle for social change is connected with a larger set of cultural values, beliefs, and practices. ...[I]t encompasses the culture and even the language that is used in a movement. (Novotny, 2000: xviii)

The author uses the theoretical perspective of framing to explain the successful politicization of the environment, as well as the mobilization of diverse groups of supporters by movement leaders. He makes his argument by presenting the reader with case studies of four groups active in the environmental justice movement: the Gulf Coast Tenants Organization, the Labor/Community Strategy Center, the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Local 4-620 ~ all in Louisiana, and the SouthWest Organizing Project in New Mexico. Novotny effectively

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illustrates how, in each case, the leadership of these environmental justice organizations has strategically re-conceptualized local notions of “environment” in terms that directly link the community’s current political struggle for economic and racial equity with that of the historic civil rights movement. Group leaders broaden narrow definitions of the environment to incorporate issues such as neighborhood housing conditions, workplace safety, community health, and access to public services. In contrast to the larger, national environmental organizations, this grassroots movement defines the environment not as a pristine and distant wilderness but as the local urban neighborhood “where we live, work, and play.” As Novotny points out, “the environment...is a cultural formation, an expression of social relations.” (2000: 86). Furthermore, “Nature and ideology are inextricably bound; as such, the idea of exactly what and where nature is located is fraught with ideology” (2000: 88).

While the book appeals to academics, it is potentially useful to activists who wish to learn from the organizations whose experiences are recounted here in the form of case studies. Through these case studies, Novotny describes various strategies, some more successful than others, for mobilizing community members, building coalitions, organizing protests, working the media, and influencing policy outcomes. His concluding chapter is both fresh and sharp. Rather than simply summarizing the contents of the book here, the author ends with a critical analysis of the role of the mainstream environmental movement, the media, advertisers, and corporate interests in perpetuating environmental, social, and economic injustices. As he moves the reader forward to action, Novotny reveals himself to be an activist scholar. The final paragraph of the book sums up his message.

The crucial work of the environmental justice movement is to define language itself as the site of political struggle, where individuals can fight to reclaim their own definition of what constitutes the environment and struggle to reconfigure the scientific, legal, and technical definitions of the environment in a more accessible language. Language itself is a site of political struggle, a part of activism no less important than the protest at a chemical facility, an information table at an Earth Day rally, or the demonstrations at a hazardous waste site by communities that for too long have not been part of the postwar environmental movement (2000: 94).

Shady Practices, Agroforestry and Gender Politics in The Gambia, by Richard A. Schroeder. Berkeley: University of California Press (1999), xxxiv, 172 pp.

Reviewed by Barbara P. Thomas-Slayter, International Development Program, Clark University, Worcester, MA

Richard Schroeder’s *Shady Practices* offers a fascinating and timely analysis of ecology and gendered politics in The Gambia, weaving together an amazing story of men and women caught up in struggles over livelihood strategies, land use, resource tenure and domestic relations and obligations. The cast of characters includes not only the villagers of The Gambia’s North Bank community of Kerewan, but also national level agencies and their economic objectives, and international donors with their changing, even contradictory, policies and programs for achieving sustainable development and environments. Schroeder effectively situates this story in the broad context of environment and development theoretical perspectives drawing from the varied frameworks connecting gender, environment and development. He aligns himself most closely with the perspectives of “feminist political ecology” and “feminist environmentalism.” These viewpoints focus on the material conditions women face in sustaining viable livelihoods and environments and regard gender, along with class, caste, race, culture and ethnicity, as a critical variable in shaping resource access and control.

Schroeder’s story opens in 1986 with his employment by the Gambian field office of the US-based non-governmental organization, Save the Children Federation. It continues in 1989 and 1991, when he returns to Kerewan with foundation support for dissertation research to carry out a systematic investigation of the emergence of market gardening by women in this Mandinka community and a subsequent introduction of agroforestry practices - with international donor support - which has threatened to undermine the horticultural livelihood strategy. During these periods of field research, his research methods included: a) systematic surveys to obtain basic demographic

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and economic data from 700 households, b) detailed yield and marketing data from 100 gardeners, c) a structured data collection exercise focusing on production practices in the gardens. In addition, Dr. Schroeder carried out numerous semi-structured and informal interviews, which were facilitated by his strong skills in the Mandinka language, and gathered documentary and oral histories. A follow up visit (1995) allowed him to re-interview the original market data sample to confirm findings.

Two decades of drought, beginning in the 1970s, prompted hundreds of women's groups in The Gambia to intensify fruit and vegetable production in low-lying communal garden projects. Historically, according to the gender division of labor in this region, men have grown groundnuts (peanuts) and the coarse grains (millet, sorghum, and maize) on upland fields during the rainy season. Their domination of groundnut production, the country's main source of foreign exchange, translated into control over most of the cash income generated through agriculture. Women have grown rice and vegetables in swamps and low-lying areas with the bulk of their produce strictly for home consumption.

The rapid commercialization of vegetable production took place during this period of low rainfall and was permitted partly by the adoption of rice seed varieties that can be harvested as much as two months earlier than the cultivars grown previously, thus freeing women to take up other responsibilities. Instead of producing solely to meet household food needs, they now devote a greater proportion of their labor to irrigated cash crops grown during the dry season. The establishment of weekly border markets and construction of a series of feeder roads transformed the economic geography of the North Bank in the early 1980s, thereby linking this new Gambian vegetable growing area to the large Senegalese market to the north. Many women gardeners began to earn more money from their crop sales than their husbands did from groundnuts. With these cash incomes, women have taken on major new household financial responsibilities including food and clothing, responsibilities borne either solely or primarily by men prior to the garden boom.

Originally, economic necessity motivated women to expand their gardens. In the 1980s, government deregulation of staple food prices under structural adjustment requirements increased the budgetary squeeze on rural households. Low groundnut prices caused many male household heads to default on some of their traditional financial obligations to their families. A government retrenchment program and the deregulation of fertilizer prices exacerbated the rural economic situation further. Women felt pressure to generate increased cash incomes. At the same time, external funding began to flow into the region as international donors began to emphasize, first, women's agricultural projects and, later, environmental stabilization programming.

In the early 1980s, several women growers' organizations lobbied for material support to expand two existing garden sites. Representatives of the growers' groups, extension agents from the civil service, and the volunteer met several times over a period of months to put together plans for the construction of several wells and to expand the area to accommodate nearly 500 women. Funding was provided by an outside donor, and the project was jointly administered by the volunteer and government extension agents. The Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for surveying and allocating individual land parcels.

These arrangements were implemented and later challenged by one of the sites' landholders, leading to protest, detention, demonstration, government intervention concerning the dispute between the landholder and growers, and eventually to a court case. In the final ruling on the case, nearly all of the substantive claims by the growers were upheld. The sole exception involved allegations made by the landholder that vegetable growers had planted dozens of fruit trees within the perimeter without authorization. His insistence that they be removed won the court's backing, and women were ordered to remove all trees at his request.

Within a day or two of the decision, the landowner visited the garden and ordered several dozen trees removed. Then, in an action that foreshadowed the coming conflict in Kerewan's gardens, he immediately replanted several dozen of his own trees within the perimeter. By locating seedlings directly on top of garden beds already allocated to vegetable growers, his expectation was that water delivered by growers to the vegetable crop would support his trees until the ensuing rainy season.

This case led other landholders to reappraise their management of low-lying land resources. Whereas they may have initially resisted tree planting by women on the grounds that it reduced future land use options, the prospect of "capturing" a female labor force to water trees, manure plots and guard against livestock incursions within the fenced perimeters encouraged them to undertake orchard production on the garden sites themselves. Seeing the orchards as a potential breakthrough in the attempt to reforest the river basin, international development agencies quickly offered financial and technical support. These agencies included governments and NGOs from North America and Europe, as well as the United Nations.

Schroeder observes that the effort to introduce monocrop mango orchards owned by male landholders replaces the gardeners' own more complex agroforestry systems. The landholders' actions threaten to 1) reduce the diversity of crops grown on low-lying land; 2) reduce the income generated per land unit in absolute terms; 3)

restrict women's cash incomes in relative terms; and 4) confine the seasonal distribution of income drawn from the plots to the period of the mango harvest. Each of these factors has serious negative implications for family food security and the livelihoods of women gardeners in this region.

Schroeder demonstrates that in The Gambia's North Bank Division, drought-related ecological changes since the 1970s have led to competition between male and female crop production systems over low-lying land and groundwater resources. Dozens of lucrative communal market gardens controlled by women have been threatened by largely male-dominated fruit orchards established in the same locations as a means to "stabilize" land resources. In an attempt to promote environmental stabilization through tree planting, international donors had encouraged male landholders to take advantage of the female labor power invested in the irrigation of garden plots by planting orchards on the same locations. Shade canopy eventually undermines gardeners' objectives as plants no longer get sufficient sun, and destroys the gardeners' usufruct rights by restoring the plots to male control assured by the presence of male-owned trees. In many villages, funding for orchard projects now effectively replaces the food security and equity-oriented women in development (WID) emphasis of the previous decade.

By planting orchards (and woodlots) directly on top of gardens that function as women's income-generating projects, male landholders reap a double benefit: first, from the subsidy paid by development agencies to install infrastructure, such as wells and fences, and, second, from unpaid female labor, which the men "capture" to water their trees. It is clear that the political ecology of this flourishing horticultural district has become gendered! Schroeder's return to this region in 1995 revealed a continuing and complex struggle involving resistance, negotiation, compromise, victories and losses in a dynamic and unresolved land use conflict between women's garden groups and male land owners.

This comparison of the garden/orchards confirmed that trees can be used as a means for claiming both material and symbolic control over garden lands. Tree planting on garden beds, moreover, is a mechanism for landholders to alienate surplus female labor as well as subsidies embodied in concrete-lined wells and permanent wire fences. At the same time, shade effects from tree planting threaten to undermine the productivity of gardeners, who now play key roles in providing for the subsistence needs of their families. This situation has brought about considerable resistance on the part of vegetable growers, who have demonstrated both individually and collectively their willingness to contest anything that they perceive as a threat to their newfound livelihoods. Donor agencies and the state have used landholders' leverage over vegetable growers to meet their own objectives of environmental stabilization via tree planting. This implies, Schroeder reminds the reader, that in some cases developers at all levels have staked their very legitimacy on the continued mobilization of unpaid female labor. They have also failed to recognize the critical factor motivating women to undertake land improvements in the first place, namely the preservation of livelihoods.

In sum, the dramatic emergence of a female cash crop system in rural Gambia resulted from the convergence of several ecological, social and economic forces simultaneously requiring women to assume unprecedented financial responsibilities within their families and communities. Gender is thus a key factor in understanding The Gambia's recent ecological politics. Schroeder has a keen grasp of the ways in which local dynamics intersect with wider national and international processes. He offers the reader a carefully documented micro-history and ethnographic research of the region, drawing on his extensive field experience and in-depth knowledge of the area. He embeds his analysis in a conceptual framework drawn from the disciplines of geography, environment, gender and development studies. This intriguing work is relevant to those focusing on African development, environmental change, agroforestry, gender politics the intersection of local power relations and international processes, and aid donor policies. For both scholar and practitioner in these arenas, this case study is "a must."

Disputes and Arguments Amongst Nomads: A Caste Council in India,
by Robert M. Hayden. New Delhi: Oxford University Press (1999), xiv, 177 pp.

**Reviewed by S. George Vincentnathan, Department of Criminal Justice, Aurora
University, Aurora, IL.**

Hayden's *Disputes and Arguments Amongst Nomads* is a revised version of his 1981 anthropology dissertation. The book focuses on disputes and dispute settlement in the context of the social structure and culture of

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the Tirumal Nandiwallas, a nomadic caste in Maharashtra State in India. Disputes are processed by a community council of elders known as the panchayat. This is a traditional institution, not to be confused with the legislated and government initiated nyaya panchayats at the local community levels, which often do not function well (Baxi and Galanter 1979; Moore 1985).

Hayden's fieldwork was carried out in 1975 and 1979. When he revisited the area in 1992, he found that the Tirumal Nandiwallas had given up nomadic life and were settled, and their panchayat no longer met. The book, however, is written in the ethnographic present and I follow suit. This brief book is a valuable contribution to the body of ethnographies on informal dispute processing.

Nandiwallas, meaning those who work with bulls, are non-pastoral nomads serving the settled people in neighboring villages. They are engaged in such activities as doing tricks with bulls, fortune telling, providing entertainment and music, and begging. The women often sell sewing needles, and provide folk medicine, and sometimes engage in prostitution. Some men have become involved in bull trading and money-lending, as the entertainment needs of the villagers are increasingly served by modern forms of entertainment.

The Nandiwallas, considered to be a middle-level caste, have their own intra-caste hierarchy. The Patil putta (subcaste), at the top, are the panchayat elders, headmen, and priests. The others in rank order are: the Chougale, assistants to the Patils; the Komti tradesmen and money lenders; and the Daundiwallas, servants of the panchayat and executors of punishment. Higher sub-caste ranking corresponds with higher economic standing. It is believed that these divisions arose as a consequence of violation of caste rules and other wrong-doings by the process of excommunication and suspension from regular everyday roles. The higher sub-castes follow stricter purity rules, consider those below them as polluting, and expect deference from them. Each sub-caste is an endogamous group. Some of the settled Nandiwalla groups do not follow the sub-caste rules. Unlike many Nandiwalla groups that have a Patil as village priest, the Tirumal Nandiwallas in this study have had a Brahmin as their guru, or spiritual advisor. The Tirumal Nandiwallas, split into small groups, move around specified territories and carry out their occupational roles. They return during the monsoon season (June through August) to Wadapuri in Poona District, which they consider their home village. At that time they conduct religious celebrations and marriages, and hold panchayat sessions to settle disputes.

Panchayat specifically means a council of five, but may include more than five elders, who authoritatively direct the villagers and help to resolve their disputes. Adult men congregate in front of the elders and participate in the deliberation of cases. Women are not included, unless they are connected with a case; this is also the practice among the Tirumal Nandiwallas. Panchayats decide administrative matters of collective concern, such as collecting money for festivals and other projects. Most also settle disputes. In multi-caste villages the village panchayat used to settle inter-caste disputes and problems involving the whole village. However, these are not as common as caste panchayats, especially in modern times, as egalitarian notions and politics run counter to traditional caste hierarchy (Cohn 1965; Vincentnathan 1996).

Most problems and disputes are settled within the caste by caste elders, or by elders constituting the caste panchayat. The Tirumal Nandiwallas have a caste panchayat, which receives disputes, deliberates on them in public, and settles them, using public opinions. As elsewhere, their panchayat usually meets near a temple. The meaning behind this practice, which is missed in the book, is that truth and justice (nyayam) should prevail in the presence of god. The Tirumal Nandiwallas panchayat meets in Wadapuri when the Patil headman through the Daundiwallas announces it to the community and convenes it. The headman sits away from others surrounded by "speakers," many of whom are Patils. The position of the headman is highly respected, as he is the head of the caste, the community, and the panchayat. Cases are presented by the headman and the "speakers" argue the case. Those assembled also join in. The Brahmin guru, if present, can provide interpretations and make decisions, which are respected and often become binding. He helps to resolve very difficult cases.

A review of the cases would reveal that most of them are minor and trivial, as in many communities, including the communities I investigated. When I presented my findings to an American audience, they could not believe that such trivial private matters could be given such public attention. Among the Tirumal Nandiwallas, the cases referred to the panchayat are for violation of caste rules of association, transaction, marriage, funerals, and religious practices. Cases of cursing, illicit sexual conduct, false accusations, wife battering, violations of panchayat rules, stealing, and fighting with a knife are also brought before the panchayat. A generalization that could have been made by Hayden from the bulk of his cases is that they were probably taken seriously for two reasons. First, the Nandiwallas feared that they might offend the deities if they violated caste rules. Without the deities' benevolence their health, wealth, and happiness could be jeopardized. Monsoons may fail, diseases may erupt, and people would be in serious economic distress. Second, they feared that if these issues were not settled quickly, they could deteriorate the community, leading to eruption of major disputes and conflicts. A desire for collective well-being makes caste rule violations public issues, which are dealt with collectively for the purification of the community.

Similar to the villages I studied, the panchayat discussions in Hayden's community become loud, tense, factional, political, and driven by status and power contests. Complex and confusing decisions are made that are oriented toward creating a balance within the context of the community beliefs and the community's hierarchical social order. It should be added, however, in caste panchayats there is greater equality and open discussion, and intra-caste hierarchy often blurs in heated and tense discussions. Such openness cannot be found in the traditional village panchayats, such as the ones I studied in Tamilnadu. As Hayden (pp. 101-107) notes, panchayat discussions are not purely case-based and case-based linear processing, as in modern courts. Instead cases are viewed from multi-sided perspectives. The nature of historical relationships of the disputants, their statuses, the requirements of religion, the need for reestablishment of relationships, and implications for peace in the community are all considered (see Nader 1969). Opinions, views, evidence, and hearsay information are admitted, without strict rules of order. Sanctions are often fines and excommunication. In the latter case, most are not totally out-casted, which happens for only rare, serious cases. Most are excommunicated temporarily with fines, and are later restored to normal relationships by the panchayat's readmission of them. The excommunicated may be isolated and others required to avoid normal relationships with them. When they are readmitted, the guru does a pollution removal ceremony.

Studies on panchayats show that in general during panchayat sessions, established norms are articulated, used, and reinforced, and sometimes contested. Exceptions are made and rules are modified in relation to new situations posed by the changing social order and changing times. For the Tirumal Nandiwallas the Brahmin guru helped direct these changes.

Disputes with outsiders are not handled in the panchayat, but are privately settled. In general, as the Tirumal Nandiwallas are not well-regarded or trusted by the settled people in the villages, who have a greater power-base, they often settle disputes with villagers in a resigning, accommodating manner, giving greater concessions. They have learned to "lump it" and live with it.

The Tirumal Nandiwallas are more religious, caste-bound, and ritualistic than nomads in general, and other Nandiwalla groups in particular. Hayden (p. 161) observes that this is because of having a Brahmin guru as their advisor, while other Nandiwallas have ones appointed from among themselves. It seems to me that having a Brahmin guru may be their attempt at sanskritization to raising their caste status (Srinivas 1989). There is perhaps also an economic motivation on the part of the guru behind this religiosity. In addition to the guru's fee collected from everyone, two-thirds of the fines collected for ritual and normative infractions are given to the guru. This is a sizable, decent income, which the guru wanted, and for which he continued to provide service. The guru's economic interest, combined with his religious and ritual services, may have contributed to the greater religious focus, the strengthening of the sub-caste hierarchy, and community integration. It is commonly said that such economic interests of the Brahmins are responsible for the development of new deities, temples, and forms of worship, and this in turn helps integrate the community. As Durkheim (1915) might say, by having the deity represent the community and its concerns, and worshipping it, the community solidifies itself. The rest of the panchayat fines collected are shared among all the Nandiwallas, which is at least a small incentive for many to participate in the panchayat sessions and become involved in collective life. However, fines imposed on the Daundiwallas (the lowest sub-caste) are not collectively shared because they are the "impure" caste, one of many measures taken to separate pollution from purity and maintain hierarchical holism. But with the decline of support for religion-based, hierarchical divisions, and declining involvement of the guru, their community and the panchayat disintegrated.

Hayden notes that the democratic values surging up are disturbing to the functioning of the panchayat. He (p. 5) also notes, "It seems that the nomadic adaptation, which prevented recourse to state institutions, was the key feature in the preservation of these panchayats, for when these groups ceased being nomads their panchayats died." I wonder whether giving up nomadic life and becoming settled would necessarily involve the dissolution of the panchayat, considering the fact that settled people usually have well-developed panchayats. They also prefer to settle disputes peacefully among themselves, rather than taking them to the official system, which could cost money and time, and could cause shame. Furthermore, official outcomes are often unpredictable. Hayden, however, gives no other explanations for the disintegration of the group and the demise of the panchayat, except their becoming settled and the decline of the caste hierarchy and development of democratic ideals. In my view, an important reason for the disappearance of their panchayat might be their absorption into new and respectable (at least not demeaning) occupations that economic development has provided, especially in cities and towns. When the author revisited the research area in 1992, it is unclear whether he was able to locate the people, as they had apparently given up nomadic life, and had become settled elsewhere, but we are not told where. A good, brief explanation could have been given for the changes that have occurred. There is a lot of information available from other studies that could have suggested reasons for these changes, including findings my own recent publications (Vincentnathan 1992,

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1996; Vincentnathan and Vincentnathan 1994). Changes and improvements in the economy have especially diminished dependence on caste hierarchy; increased involvement of people in new occupations; reduced interaction with caste members; and dispersed people away from their home villages. I would suggest that as the frequent interactive relationships that the traditional occupations provided declined, and the new occupations promoted separation, individualism, and alienation from each other, the community withered away and so did its panchayat.

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Questioning Geopolitics: Political Projects in a Changing World System, Edited by Georgi M. Deruglian and Scott L. Greer. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers (2000), 264 pp.

Reviewed by Douglas Keare, Lincoln Institute, Cambridge, MA.

This collection of essays aims to find regularity and predictability in a changing world geopolitical system and, frankly, falls far short of its mark. There are at least three features of this particular book that “put me off”: its too liberal reliance on jargon; its apparent preoccupation with a “contemporary global crisis” that I was not aware existed; and its underdeveloped editorial organization. The problem of having to try to deal with a jargon with which, as an economist, I was totally unfamiliar – and the overuse of arcane words (the more arcane the better, apparently) – is a minor quibble. My other two concerns are not, for they affect the question of whether this is in fact a book, as opposed to a printing between covers of thirteen essentially unrelated essays.

There is a sense running through the book – which was written well before 11 September 2001 – that we were somehow in the throes of a “contemporary global crisis.” This would, I think have been news of a rather surprising sort to the majority of the world’s population who, at the time didn’t even know if we were in or moving into a first recession in over a decade. To be sure, a motley group of protesters had been doing their level best to disrupt meetings having to do with the international economy for the past couple of years, most people were vaguely aware of potentially escalating threats from terrorists, and we confronted the familiar set of problems; but a global crisis? What were the authors and/or editors thinking about? And how broad a coterie of political scientists and other social scientists concerned with geopolitics and world-systems shared their opinion(s)?

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I have not encountered an even remotely satisfying answer to these questions in the book or in my ruminations about it; and perhaps the failure is mine. There is a sense in a couple only of the papers that the contributors are referring to the “chute” of the East Asian economies in mid-1997 (not 1998). But this can’t be a crisis – not to mention a global one. The countries themselves are not even concerned enough that they have attacked twenty percent of the agenda of bad policies and practices that will continue to plague them; and the countries, taken together, are not at all important enough economically to have a determining effect, in any direction, on the course of the international economy. What is a quite important issue emanating from an Asian economy is that Japan, so recently a major engine of growth and universal candidate to become the “hegemon” of the 21st Century (two factors mentioned by the authors), has been stuck in the economic doldrums for over a decade, but has taken few corrective actions and shows no signs of getting out any time soon. This is a serious proposition – if not exactly a crisis – for world-systems and world welfare. But, as Japan is a (very highly) developed country, the authors do not exhibit concern.

Beyond this, it is difficult to imagine the considerations that gave rise to this extremely loosely integrated book. Its section titles provide clues (“Restructuring World Power,” “Redefining World Culture,” “From National States to Regional Networks”), although they are not supported in the progression of their papers. And these clues are pretty much obliterated by reading the Introduction, which, besides being besotted with the concept of hegemony, is devoted to this and a couple of other themes/concepts that are scarcely picked up by the component papers. The introductory essay does offer rough guidance on its final page, but, until I had ploughed through the first two papers of Part I to little avail (“Globalizing Capital and Political Agency in the 21st Century,” by Stephen Gill, and “Stateness and System in the Global Structure of Trade: A Network Approach to Assessing Nation Status,” by Michael Alan Sacks, Marc Ventrisca, and Brian Uzzi), I did not return to the Introduction and Table of Contents to see if I had missed the roadmap or hints thereof.

I found that I had missed the hints, and that the book’s papers should have been rearranged to go from the general to the more particular cases. This would have given a logical sequence to the principal themes of the component papers, though it doesn’t seem to sustain the intended structuring of the first two Sections. The present introduction would have to have been largely reconceived to served to introduce this flow of ideas; and perhaps its authors could have, in addition, constructed a paper to rebut in some measure the principal argument of the last paper in the book’s first section, Collins and Waller’s “Predictions of Geopolitical Theory and the Modern World-System. And in a final organizational suggestion, the book would have benefited from a concluding chapter, on which more below.

I am oversimplifying, though one must do so within the constraints of a Review, to point out that, thus reorganized and depending principally on the papers of Collins and Waller (fortunately not Wallerstein, who apparently sowed the main seeds of the book’s confusion a generation hence), Chirot (“Why Must There Be a Last Cycle? The Prognosis for the World Capitalist System and a Prescription for Its Diagnosis”) and Chen (“The Geoeconomic Reconfiguration of the State: The Asian-Pacific Transborder Subregions in the World System”), the principal messages of the book are as follows:

- (1) “The notion of world-system hegemon (should) be deconstructed” (Collins and Waller, p. 59).
- (2) The term “modernization” should be resurrected from the disrepute into which it was thrown by readers of Wallerstein some 25 years ago (Chirot, p. 69).

And,

- (3) In order to understand better how regional networks (trade and other) may interact and perhaps conflict with globalization, it is vital to look at the role of transborder regions.

So much for world-system theory.

Facetiousness aside, it really does seem that the search for regularity and predictability in the changes in world geopolitical systems – at least as this has been described in the Introduction and component papers – has gone off the tracks, maybe even from the start. A particular clue to this is in the discussion(s) of long economic cycles or waves (Kondratiev cycles) in Derluigian and Goldfrank (p. 7) Chirot (p. 81) and elsewhere. This becomes particularly clear when Chirot observes, in error, that “the only noted recent economic historian to have taken long cycles seriously is Walt Rostow” Has he never heard of W. Arthur Lewis, the Nobel laureate? More to the point, though economists do indeed take cycles seriously – inventory (or business) cycles and, yes, long cycles too – they do not, apart from infrequent exceptions, such as Rostow, do so deterministically. Perhaps this is a caution world-systems analysts should take to heart in seeking to restructure their study of world power relationships.

I wonder, too, whether a bit of a change of heart – or at least perspective – might not also serve them well. It might be too much to hope, but, in addition to the restructuring of this book suggested above, I would very much like to have seen at the end a couple of papers devoted to alternatives to the approach taken by Thomas L. Friedman

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to much the same set of issues examined in this set of papers in *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (Farrar, Strauss, Giroux 2000). While I freely admit to preferring an evolutionary approach, à la Friedman, to addressing the principal problem behind the concerns of the authors in this book – that today’s democratic processes are woefully too slow in recognizing and dealing with the socio-economic and other “injustices” prevailing in a “globalizing” market economy – I don’t insist upon being gratified on this point. Still it seems that those persuaded that only revolutionary approaches will do the trick, might do well to set a conscientious effort such as Friedman” as their counterfactual, rather than the caricatures they habitually use as, apparently in this case.

People and Forests: Communities, Institutions, and Governance, edited by Clark C. Gibson, Margaret A. McKean, and Elinor Ostrom. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2000), xxiv, 274 pp.

Reviewed by Stacy Rosenberg, Environmental Science, Studies, and Policy Program/ Department of Geography, University of Oregon.

This edited volume investigates the significant relationship between forest users, local institutions, and forest conditions. The International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) research program provides the framework for the empirical studies included in this volume, and the systematic and micro-level analysis utilized by the IFRI protocol produces valuable comparative data on the important role that local-level institutions play in forest use and condition. Each chapter draws on the principles and interdisciplinary approach of the IFRI program, and uses case studies from India, Uganda, Nepal, Ecuador, and Bolivia. The integration of social and biophysical science research methods is an effective approach to understanding the complex relationship between forest users, local institutions, and forest conditions. Each chapter is well written and provides a thorough description of institutional, socioeconomic and biophysical factors that influence human incentives and behavior that have consequential impact on local forest conditions. This volume provides a sophisticated overview of the successful attributes of common property regimes, with a focus on local-level forest management. It summarizes and further expands earlier common property research efforts, and contributes significantly to the common property literature.

In Chapter One, Clark C. Gibson, Margaret A. McKean, and Elinor Ostrom emphasize the critical role that local communities play in forest management. Case studies are highlighted and the benefits of micro-level, comparative analyses are discussed. Margaret A. McKean in Chapter Two defines relevant terms utilized in common property literature in a very concise and clear manner. Her description of common pool resources, common property regimes, and the distinction between goods, rights, and owners is a valuable contribution to this volume. The overview of common property regimes and the attributes of successful regimes are comprehensive and provide a strong foundation for the case studies that follow this chapter.

Arun Agrawal argues in Chapter Three that forest council size is an important factor in determining the success of collective action to protect forest resources. His study of nine forest councils in Kumaon Himalaya, India shows that very small councils were disadvantaged due to limited resources, while moderate-sized councils had greater resources that enabled them to better protect forest areas through effective monitoring and enforcement activities. In Chapter Four, Abwoli Y. Banana and William Gombya-Ssembajjwe compare five forests in Uganda and find that security of tenure and the level of rule enforcement for each forest accounted for variation of forest conditions. High levels of illegal consumptive activities occurred in three forest reserves, while limited illegal activities were found in the other two forests. Secure tenure regimes and effective rule enforcement were determined to be significant factors in preventing forest degradation.

In Chapter Five, Charles M. Schweik analyzes the spatial variation of the Sal tree in southern Nepal and finds that optimal foraging patterns are impacted by institutional and social factors. The importance of integrating social and biophysical research methods was a critical element in this study, and human behavior, slope steepness, elevation, and east-west location of forest plots were significant factors in determining the geographic variation of forest conditions. In Chapter Six, Clark C. Gibson and C. Dustin Becker demonstrate that comuna members in western Ecuador utilized different parts of a forest depending on property rights. The portion of the comuna forest not allocated to individuals had been seriously degraded, while allocated plots have had less exploitation. While variation did exist in the allocated plots, overall this part of the forest is in much better condition than the unallocated portion.

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In Chapter Seven, C. Dustin Becker and Rosario León investigate forest conditions of three Yuracaré settlements along the Chapare River in Bolivia. Forest condition variations were found to be the result of predictable factors such as moisture gradient, distance to market, and population pressure, and other activities, such as management practices undertaken to increase the number of game animals.

George Varughese argues in Chapter Eight that population pressure does not appear to be the main driver of deforestation in the Middle Hills of Nepal. He studied eighteen cases and found that areas of high population had forests in both good and poor condition, and that communities with strong institutional arrangements were associated with forests in better condition than those lacking effective institutions.

Chapter Nine summarizes the significant findings of the previous chapters, and Clark C. Gibson, Elinor Ostrom, and Margaret A. McKean provide theoretical insights into why some local communities are more effective at developing and implementing institutional arrangements that protect forest resources than other communities. The description of resource and user attributes that contribute to forest protection is a useful addition to the discussion of benefits and costs of collective action.

Overall, this volume is effective at persuading policymakers and scholars of the significance of studying the complex interrelationship between forest users, local institutions, and forest conditions. The integration of social and biophysical variables provides sophisticated analyses that expand the scope of explanatory factors affecting deforestation. The IFRI protocols provide a method for measuring social and biophysical variables that are important in understanding the interaction of communities and their forest resources. The systematic and interdisciplinary approach utilized by the IFRI research program promotes an effective research methodology that allows for the study of locally significant factors within a comparative framework. An appendix on the IFRI research strategy further describes the characteristics of this research project.

In conclusion, this volume is a valuable addition to the common property literature, and provides insightful contributions to the study of local communities and forest conditions. It demonstrates that local communities are capable of successfully managing common property regimes and delineates the institutional characteristics that promote sustainable forestry practices.

Fluid Arguments: Five Centuries of Western Water Conflict, Char Miller, editor. Tucson: University of Arizona Press (2001), xxix, 354 pp.

Reviewed by Staci J. Pratt, Shook, Hardy & Bacon.

Fluid Arguments: Five Centuries of Western Water Conflict, as edited by Trinity history professor Char Miller, presents a tapestry of stories woven around water usage in the arid Western regions of the United States. The volume opens with Mark Twain's observation that "Whiskey's for drinking; water's for fighting," and proceeds to examine the conflicts that have arisen as a result of various claims to this limited life-giving resource. Miller explains that contentiousness "has been woven into the history of water in the American West. This rich, sustained, and combative historical context is the focus of Fluid Arguments. Through the interdisciplinary insights of ethnography, geography, history, political science, law and urban studies, this book reveals ". . . the impact water and aridity have had on human cultures and ecosystems."

Fluid Arguments covers a broad chronological perspective and geographic range, employing individual cases studies and different disciplines to amplify the role played by water in the American West. The volume is divided into five parts, by topics: (i) Land and Water on New Spain's Frontier; (ii) The Native American Struggle for Water; (iii) Agricultural Conundrums; (iv) Dam those Waters! and (v) The Coming Fight. What emerges from this book is an understanding of water as the conduit through which individual social systems may arise, develop, deteriorate, or collapse.

In a chapter devoted to Native American story telling, Kansas State University Professor Bonnie Lynn-Sherow provides a Saynday story illustrating a Kiowa perspective on the nature of water. Saynday is "a skinny, egotistical, and irreverent culture hero," who one day interrupts a group of field mice holding a ceremonial dance inside a bison skull. "He is so enthralled that he gets right down on the ground to watch and, before he realizes it,

has stuck his head all the way into the skull lodge, where it becomes firmly wedged. The mice are understandably furious with him and leave him there, blinded and stumbling around. After falling down a few times, Saynday decides to feel his way to Cottonwood Creek, which he knows will lead him directly back to his camp. Saynday . . . gets into the creek, which carries him over the sand, over the shallows, over the mud, into the deep pools, and finally to his own camp." The creek leads him home, essentially providing the means for Saynday, despite his foolish antics, to return to his people and society. Water plays a similar role in many of Fluid Arguments' chapters, furnishing a way to define a people and acting as a touchstone of individual social systems.

Part One of Fluid Arguments includes a discussion of the ways in which water use organized landholding during the Spanish colonial period of the American Southwest, from roughly the 1400s forward. In this frontier, "land was plentiful, water was not." The Spanish occupation of Texas resulted in a general awareness that a property's relationship to water determined its value, as well as the need to engage in industries which did not make significant demands on water use such as livestock ranching. An article by Shelly Dudley traces the thriving agricultural community of the Pima Indians in Arizona, whose strength related to sophisticated irrigation practices. When Euro-Americans arrived in the 1820, the demands of frontier settlers and ranchers eventually destroyed the water supply, ending the Pima's agricultural success and the vitality of their community.

In Part Two, a number of the authors examine legal doctrines associated with Native American water rights, and the impact of the notion of prior appropriation. To establish a legal claim to water in the American West, one must show a diversion and use of the water resource. The rule boils down to: first in time, first in right. For this reason, many legal battles over water rights devolve into a historical analysis of who first made a beneficial use of the resource. The judicial definition of "beneficial use," however, often demands an agricultural pursuit, rather than the sporadic water reliance employed by hunting and gathering societies. This approach has meant that policymakers often encouraged tribes to pursue agricultural activities, even where the terrain or native culture did not support it. It seems somewhat self-serving that the courts have viewed "beneficial use" so narrowly. Native societies certainly relied upon water to sustain their people far before any European came and diverted water to a field.

The legal analysis is complicated by the Winters Doctrine, which mandates that the federal government act as a trustee for the tribes and assert treaty based water rights on their behalf. The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that the federal government could bring suit against nonfederal, that is non-Native American, irrigators to ensure adequate water on arid reservations. Immense litigation has resulted, where Anglo farmers and their descendants have battled Native Americans for access to water. As the essays of Alan Newell and Daniel McCool reveal, courtroom battles in New Mexico and late twentieth century water settlement negotiations involving numerous tribes, western states, and the federal government ensure that the issue will continue to define communities. This is particularly true as urban centers make greater demands on the water supply. McCool emphasizes that water use patterns are now changing dramatically in the West. "Today about 85 percent of the water diverted in the West is used by agriculture, mostly for hay and other low-value crops. But economics, population growth, and political opposition to irrigation subsidies are all placing pressure on the old water regime. It is probable that much of the water currently used by agriculture will be reallocated."

In Part Three, Fluid Arguments turns to an examination of agricultural pursuits and the availability of water. James Sherow provides an ecosystems perspective on the development of the Chisholm Trail. From 1860 to 1885, cattle ranchers sought to use the trail to bring cattle from Texas to railheads in Kansas. He notes, "in the early 1860s, Indian peoples dominated the use of solar energy and water sources along and near the trail; by the 1880s farmers had taken over the neighborhood. In between, the great cattle drives along the Chisholm Trail created an ephemeral and transitional ecosystem." A number of forces shaped the life of this system, including "the plight of Indian peoples attempting to preserve their energy supplies; the conflicting claims to water and stored solar energy; the perilous intersection of markets and winter grazing in 1871; and the cultural collision between farmers, cattlemen, and Indian peoples."

Other agricultural stories focus on the difficulty of irrigating land in the Grand Valley of Colorado, the development of intensive farming in the Lower Rio Grande and the eventual degradation of the environment as a result. Thomas Schafer's examination of cropping practices in southwestern Kansas confirms that changes in "basic agricultural practices can produce dramatic alterations in the entire economy of a region." His county-level perspective uncovers that communities "adapted to and transformed local environmental conditions" by shifting from corn to wheat, a less water intensive crop, early on, and then diversified their growing practices when technological innovations permitted use of water stored in the Ogallala aquifer.

Emphasizing the ways in which natural resources define communities, Environmental Historian John Opie suggests that we "jettison the traditional demarcation of western space along political subdivisions-particularly counties-and rectangular sections," and gain "more accurate information about the extent and quality of resources set within competing human pressures and environmental needs." For example, watershed based understandings of

community may offer better insights into the physical world we inhabit.

Part Four of *Fluid Arguments* presents a reevaluation of the role of damming projects in the history of water development. Donald Jackson indicates that the private sector played a crucial role in the creation of these public-works projects, while Mark Harvey explores the massive dams constructed pursuant to the New Deal. As noted by Char Miller, “The stunning complex of dams along the Colorado, Platte, Snake, Columbia and Missouri Rivers degraded riparian ecosystems, inundated natural landmarks, uprooted communities, and turned fast-flowing watercourses into placid reservoirs. They also produced considerable work in a region of high unemployment, generated cheap hydroelectricity to power new industries on the West Coast, and sparked the emergence of a potent political coalition that channeled federal spending into these ambitious projects.” As for the aftermath, legal scholar Raul Sanchez surveys the high price paid by individuals and the environment for these initiatives.

Finally, *Fluid Arguments* turns to the challenges for the future. University of Nevada History Professor Hal Rothman argues that reallocation may present the wave to come. “When Nevadans look to the fact that more than 80 percent of their water produces only \$1 billion in revenue and realize that 18 percent accounts for more than three hundred times that amount in gross revenue, they cast their eyes on the rural parts of the state with wonder.” Rothman suggests that the urban economy will eventually demand a greater share of water resources, and will “create considerably more opportunity for more people throughout the state” than water-intensive agricultural operations in an arid setting.

Given the prominence of water in the development of communities in the West, perhaps it is time to revisit allocation rules and come up with a reasoned approach to water usage. “First in time, First in right” provides predictability as a rule, but does not necessarily ensure a wise use of this limited resource. The Kiowa story of Saynday acknowledges that water brings us home; it is the guide for our communities and the center of our existence in the arid American West. In addition, water can bring diverse peoples to the table to discuss common interests and create common goals. *Fluid Arguments* provides a solid foundation for this discussion to proceed. As John Muir once observed, “Nature is always lovely, invincible, glad, whatever is done and suffered by her creatures. All scars she heals, whether in rocks or water or sky or hearts.”

Marketing Democracy: Power and Social Movements in Post-Dictatorship Chile, by Julia Paley. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, (2001), xviii, 255, pp.

Reviewed by Edward Murphy, Department of Anthropology and History, University of Michigan.

In *Marketing Democracy: Power and Social Movements in Post-Dictatorship Chile* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), Julia Paley provides a challenging and thoughtful critique of contemporary Chilean democracy. Countering the dominant interpretation of Chile as an economic and political model for “developing” countries, Paley’s perspective as an activist anthropologist allows her to probe the multifaceted inequities of neo-liberalism. Anchoring her writing to the experiences of neighborhood leaders in La Bandera, one of Santiago’s impoverished poblaciones [1], Paley demonstrates how Chileans have struggled to mobilize and criticize the democracy that has evolved in the wake of Augusto Pinochet’s military dictatorship (1973-1990). Writing in descriptive and accessible prose, Paley raises a series of critical questions about the nature of governance in a country and era ostensibly committed to “democracy,” “participation,” and “growth with equity.”

Acutely aware that knowledge production can contribute to unequal relationships of power, Paley attempts to transcend her position as a privileged foreign researcher by treating her local informants as “intellectual colleagues” (14). In fact, many of the theoretical perspectives in the book build on positions put forward by pobladores, especially the work of activists in the health group Llaretta. Attempting to understand the social causes of poor health in La Bandera, Llaretta members seek to combat illness among poblador residents by both administering medical assistance and educating and mobilizing residents to improve conditions. Through her intellectual exchange with these activists, Paley hopes to provide a practical critique of the larger processes that pobladores endure, resist, and partially help to create.

Paley’s focus on one población and her own activism in it has two important advantages. First, she is able to understand how social movements operate in practice, as she became a participant in the processes that she

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describes. By organizing activities in La Bandera and presenting her own work to the pobladores, Paley received first hand experience in holding popular education seminars and the obstacles faced by community leaders in confronting state officials. Second, she is able to provide telling glimpses of the inequalities and degradation that many Chileans continue to suffer during the Chilean economic "miracle." This includes descriptions of flooding in the poblaciones, lack of adequate housing and nutrition, the second hand clothes from the United States that pobladores often buy, and the ill effects of garbage accumulation in public spaces. Through oral testimony and firsthand observation, she also relates how poblador community leaders were often dismissed in public forums because they lacked academic degrees and prestigious positions.

In attempting to understand the forces that have shaped these conditions, however, Paley appropriately moves far beyond the specifics of La Bandera. In writing an "ethnography of democracy," Paley examines the political elites who forged Chile's democratic transition, situating them within international discourses of development and neo-liberalism (111-113). In developing the central argument of her book, Paley explores how these policy-makers have linked democracy to free market economic policies. For Paley, a "marketed democracy" has emerged in Chile, one which sells neo-liberalism and an electoral political system as steps towards national reconciliation and development. But this particular project of democracy, as the case of La Bandera well illustrates, continues to leave victims in its wake.

Paley claims that the roots of this constricted democracy lie in the Pinochet dictatorship. While elite politicians in the ruling center-left Concertación have sought to draw a clear distinction between the dictatorship and democracy, Paley points out that there have been a number of continuities between the two eras. Most importantly, the Concertación has remained faithful to the neo-liberal economic model that demands fiscal austerity from the state. Consequently, state spending in social services has not significantly increased since the advent of democracy. Moreover, economic and social policies have continued to be determined by a small group of highly educated technocrats. Although the Concertación's experts are less orthodox in their economic policies, they nonetheless deploy the same kind of professional knowledge that came to be revered during the dictatorship. Moreover, they also reject mobilizing popular sectors, relying instead on finding technical answers to poverty. Such a valorization of professional knowledge underscores a lack of respect for the poor that constructs them "as objects of knowledge and policy rather than as knowing subjects with rights" (195).

By examining how such knowledge operates in the post-dictatorship, Paley questions conventional interpretations of "democracy" and "participation." Focusing on social movements in recent Chilean history, Paley explores how pobladores had been mobilized during the pre-dictatorship years and during the national protests against the Pinochet regime (1983-1986). Few popular organizations, however, continued to exist in the first years of democracy. For those organizations that did remain, such as the health group Llaretta, critiques of government policies had to be couched in the same forms of professional knowledge in use by government officials, such as surveys and statistics (192-195). While Paley argues that such forms of knowledge can be helpful in contradicting erroneous, dominant perspectives, Paley also laments that they have been used to forge a fractured national project of "democracy." For example, Paley examines how the Concertación has used opinion surveys in order to understand the aspirations of citizens (131-139). Paley is able to demonstrate, however, that these polls constrict public debate by asking pre-conceived questions that have limited responses. Far from eliciting a forum for public debate, such polls legitimize frameworks established by elites. Underscoring the social links between politics and economics, Paley points out that these types of surveys are used by government officials, social science researchers, and private companies.

While opinion polls grant a false sense of political voice to citizens, Paley also argues that the Concertación has constricted the participation of community activists. In the Concertación's attempts to forge national reconciliation and consensus, community groups are expected to support the national government as it builds and "consolidates" democracy. Groups of "civil society" are thus expected to "participate" in this project of nation building. As both Paley and members of the health group Llaretta argue, however, this has often meant that activists have been forced into providing community services. Government officials thus abdicate responsibility for community development, claiming that it is the democratic responsibility of the people to identify and solve local problems. In practice, this often means that impoverished pobladores have to implement projects for free. Moreover, this conception of participation curtails protest against the government by both investing local actors in the system and demanding their support for democracy. Paley thus demonstrates that "participation" has reinforced the particular governing project of the Concertación rather than creating an effective space for citizens to participate in building their own society.

While Paley provides a thorough analysis of the democratic transition, her micro-historical examination of La Bandera lacks the depth of her ethnographic work. In the first chapter, Paley relates how the community was founded during the final years of Eduardo Frei Montalva's Christian Democratic regime (1964-1970) and Salvador

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Allende's socialist experiment (1970-1973). Since Paley is explicitly in solidarity with the people of La Bandera, she constructs a particular narrative of the población, one which privileges a history of collective action and the common historical experiences of the impoverished classes. For Paley, the history of La Bandera demonstrates how popular practices that became common before the coup, such as organized land takings, permitted pobladores to build their own communities and assume a shared identity in struggle. As Paley argues, such a perspective counters the historical narrative of many officials from the dictatorship and the Concertación, who have often cast the popular protagonism of the late 1960s and early 1970s as fomenting conflict and disorder (36). Paley's historical analysis thus serves a very important political end.

Nevertheless, Paley's treatment largely relegates the problem of knowledge and power to the specific time and place of the democratic transition, failing to engage with the historical persistence of this issue. Paley is aware that professional knowledge was also important before the coup, but makes a clear distinction to the situation in the post-dictatorship. Paley argues that a "different cultural premise framed the actions of Chilean politicians" in the late 1960s and early 1970s (198), one which privileged their commitment to the class struggle. Beyond homogenizing a diverse spectrum of politicians-- many of whom were more than satisfied in trusting professional knowledge-- Paley fails to recognize sufficiently how certain politicians of the left also resisted "popular power." As Peter Winn (1986) has demonstrated, there was a constant tension between how far government elites would permit "popular power" to go during the Popular Unity years and how officials in the government sought to control the course of the revolution. Government planners often felt that popular actions upset the "rational" and "orderly" development of the city (MINVU 1969: 529-555; see also Salvador Allende's comments in R. Debray 1971: 88).

Despite this problem in her historical presentation, *Marketing Democracy* is an excellent book that deserves a wide audience. Her ability to bring anthropological insights to bear on the nature of democratic governance and social movements in the neo-liberal era adds an important perspective to a literature largely dominated by political science and sociology. Moreover, Paley's position as an activist should be of interest to non-academics involved in local activism, particularly those who seek to understand how more general, global forces impact social movement organizing.

[1] Paley wisely uses the term población in her book, and refers to La Bandera's residents as pobladores. Many authors writing in English have loosely and inappropriately referred to the poblaciones as shantytowns. But the word shantytown hardly does justice to the possible connotations of the Chilean signifier población. One of Chilean society's most prominent markers of socioeconomic distinction, English expressions such as "ghetto," "slum," and "working class neighborhood" come closer to expressing some of the multivalent meanings of población. However, at least in the American context, they tend not to express the pride, solidarity, and nationalism that the word has often conveyed in Chile. Because the term has multiple and specific meanings, Paley sticks to using the term itself in her book, demonstrating through context the social importance that the term conveys. Similarly, in referring to a resident of a población, Paley also uses the Chilean expression, pobladora or poblador.

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Haugerud, Angelique, M. Priscilla Stone, and Peter D. Little, eds. *Commodities and Globalization: Anthropological Perspectives*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers (2000), vi + 249 pp.

Reviewed by Eriberto P. Lozada Jr., Anthropology Department, Butler University, Indianapolis, IN.

This collection of essays examines the impact of globalization on the social life of commodities in a wide variety of ethnographic sites (with the notable exception of Asia). The essays, originally presented at the 1995 meeting of the Society for Economic Anthropology, are thematically unified in exploring how theoretical definitions of commodities must be re-worked because of the increasing everyday interdependence of local communities on other communities throughout the world. The ethnographic examples include three from Africa, three from Latin America, two from the United States, and one each from Europe, the Middle East, and Oceania. Each essay focuses on a different commodity, from music and beer to cheese and grapes, as the starting point for theoretical reflections. Overall, this book is a solid contribution to the field of economic anthropology and, with its diverse range of case studies and methodologies (including two archaeology essays), can provide a valuable research and teaching resource for readers examining globalization, consumption, labor, development, and other theoretical topics in political economy.

Theoretical perspectives on the impact of globalization on commodities are explored in the introductory essay coauthored by the volume's three editors. They start with a discussion of an idea that has already become widely accepted in anthropology, namely that globalization – or more specifically, global economic integration and inequality – is not new to the postwar era. It is in this discussion, however, that their shared reliance on Arjun Appadurai's models of both commodities (from his 1986 volume *The Social Life of Things*) and globalization (from his 1996 book *Modernity at Large*) becomes explicitly clear, as do the implications of the theoretical problems raised by Appadurai. From Appadurai's and others' examination of the social life of commodities, the analytical boundaries between "gift" and "commodity" become blurred when examining the social and cultural impact of exchange. The editors of this volume valiantly seek to disentangle the complexity of this kind of economic analysis by offering a definition of a commodity: "A commodity is any good that can be exchanged for other goods. Commodities existed in precapitalist economies, are culturally defined and molded, and are embedded in political and social systems which they both reflect and help to shape" (p. 9).

The remaining eleven essays are divided into two thematic sections. The first theme examines commodities in a globalizing marketplace, starting with Bob White's essay on Congolese popular dance music (soukous). White immediately pushes the analytical boundaries of commodities through an examination of the global movement of a cultural commodity. White shows how the consumer listening to soukous, a cultural commodity, is continually reminded of the musicians/producers – a property quite different from other commodities today where global labor remains hidden. In the last ethnographic essay in this section, Jane Collins uses a commodity chain approach to examine large-scale and small-scale grape producers in Brazil, and shows how unlike a cultural commodity, the appeal of this agricultural commodity is product homogenization. Such product homogenization masks the identity of the primary producers, and perhaps this is the key perspective from which commodities and globalization must be understood. Collins concludes that "the homogeneity of quality and supply that we experience in our supermarkets, as a product of global procurement strategies, depends on the creation of new forms of differentiation in the labor force in other parts of the world" (p. 106). The way that global economic structures create and maintain this differentiation of local producers is clarified by the other two essays in this section. In a study of a "nontraditional commodity" (chili peppers in Gambia), Little and Dolan show how the very cultural unfamiliarity of the commodity to the producers serves to reinforce European hegemony through development agencies and transnational agribusiness companies. Local resistance to such global structures are shown by Lois Stanford, in a study of Mexican farmers, to be ineffective because of national complicity in global market processes.

The second thematic section consists of seven studies of a variety of different commodities, including American art, hybrid corn, Kenyan home-brewed beer to Sardinian Pecorino cheese. Two of the essays specifically examine the role of specialized knowledge and professionalization in the commodification process. In a study of the art market in St. Louis, Stuart Plattner illustrates how art dealers, critics, artists and respected art consumers help translate subjective aesthetic value to market value. In a similar vein, Randy Ziegenhorn describes how the value of

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hybrid corn seeds is shaped by the state (through judicial intervention and fair market rules governing labeling, patents, etc.), seed companies (including industry associations), and experts (researchers, universities, professional organizations and journals). With the increased technical specialization of farming, individuals and groups hide and contest knowledge such as the identity of particular strains of hybrid seeds to make a profit. Ziegenhorn's description of the hybrid corn industry highlights the close connection between the structures of science and global capitalism. Science itself is complicit in the penetration of global capitalism throughout the world because it both naturalizes market economic ideology and structurally supports business companies in their accumulation of knowledge and profit.

This penetration of global capitalism, however, does not come free of cost to those who adopt market practices. Nicole Polier's essay on changes in kinship and community relations resulting from the commoditization of labor and food has resulted in a destabilization of everyday life in Papua New Guinea. Similarly, Bruce Roberts shows how the commoditization of beer both helps and is harmful to local Kenyan society. The strategies selected by local communities to meet the challenges of global capitalism, however, are dependent upon distant, impersonal forces. Relying on such nonlocal vagaries make local strategies, such as the highly specialized Pecorino cheese export by highland Sardinians as described by Gabriela Vargas-Cetina, may be inherent to the expansion of the global market system itself. In her essay, Vargas-Cetina lays out a macroeconomic model of the commoditization process that implies social dislocation through the emergence of disparities of wealth and access to opportunities. The two archaeological contributions to the volume by Winifred Creamer and Mitchell Rothman give historical depth to the significance of economic processes of commoditization and globalization.

The essays in this volume contain solid ethnographic description and theoretical discussions that clearly delineate the local social issues of the world of goods. The variety of anthropological methods used by the authors can help others in different disciplines contextualize a variety of economic phenomena. One limitation that I would point out is the absence of any cases where the processes of globalization and commoditization are situated outside the West, such as what has happened in East Asia (such as Japan, the second largest economy and a major national agent of globalization). Nonetheless, this volume is well worth reading by those examining the cross-cultural impact of commodities and globalization.

Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines. Edited by Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield. New York: Routledge (2000). 239 pp.

Reviewed by Ellen Percy Kraly, Department of Geography, Colgate University, Hamilton, New York

Migration Theory is a welcome contribution to the field of migration studies, which, as the editors state in the Preface, "...cries out for an interdisciplinary approach" (p. vii). As several of the authors included in the volume demonstrate through literature review, the study of migration has often been inter- and multidisciplinary. But the editors are asking for greater analytic articulation of the conceptual value of interdisciplinarity within scholarship on migration. One of their three goals for the book is to foster a 'spirit of dialogue' among migration scholars. This is offered as one means to the dual ends of "gaining greater insight into the phenomenon of international migration" (p. vii) through multidisciplinary and comparative research (p. 20) and of "moving toward a more unified field of study" (p. vii). These analytic goals are highly relevant given the ever more significant role of international population movements in contemporary social, economic, political and environmental change - at all geographic scales: local, national, regional and global.

In the jointly authored Introduction, the editors provide a superb synthesis of the analytic characteristics of migration studies from the perspectives of particular disciplines. Brettell and Hollifield compare how different academic disciplines frame and implement research questions. They offer critical insight to the theoretical and methodological traditions as well as empirical emphases of each of the fields and, in the process, help to identify the major bodies of knowledge about international migration that have developed in many of the social sciences. This is a fine organizing chapter. It concludes with a presentation of specific research questions or areas that would benefit from interdisciplinary exchange and collaboration. For example, Brettell and Hollifield "foresee exciting collaboration on the question of citizenship between the political scientists and political sociologists who frame the

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in relation to the nation-state and the rights of a democratic society, and the anthropologists who frame the questions in relation to ethnicity and the construction of identity” (p. 19).

Each of the individual chapters provides a critical review of the theoretical and research literature within the respective social science disciplines represented in the volume: history, demography and population studies, sociology, anthropology, economics, political science and legal studies. Each author makes his or her own decisions about emphasis. Diner considers the receptivity of historians to theoretical models and hypothesis testing. Keely underscores the awareness among demographers about issues of data reliability and cohort versus period effects. Chiswick summarizes the economic literature concerning the issue of migrant selectivity and notes the policy implications of differing interpretations of empirical findings. In her excellent summary of the sociological literature on immigrant incorporation, ethnicity and citizenship, Heisler reveals the many different conceptual frameworks and methodological approach adopted among her colleagues. Brettell too provides a rich discussion of the ways in which the anthropology of migration has deepened to consider issues of identity and culture within the context of globalization and transnationalism. Hollifield identifies what he considers three central issues concerning the politics of international migration (national sovereignty and the control of migration; national security; and immigrant incorporation and polity) and looks at how scholars in other social sciences have addressed these issues. Schuck discusses how legal studies can illuminate critical immigrant policy concerns including the demand for immigration, and policy and program enforcement and administration. In a similar vein, but using the lens of economics, Chang focuses on four U.S. immigration policy issues: labor competition and labor market effects; distributive justice; public goods and resources; immigration law and policy reform.

Each of the chapters in this volume stands on its own by offering critical synthesis of disciplinary scholarship on international migration. Each discusses, in different ways, both the contributions and to some extent failings of the discipline to insights about the phenomenon of international migration and population movements. As a collection of papers organized to meet the goals set forth by the editors, however, I see two important limitations. First, most of individual papers do not identify clearly, or clearly enough, the ways in which interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary research on international migration might proceed. For example, Chiswick concludes his chapter by discussing the various dimensions of immigrant selectivity and social and economic mobility that might, we presume, be considered in research by non-economists. But the fostering of an interdisciplinary perspective and research program on immigrant selection remains implicit at best. Hollifield presents a detailed, well conceived agenda of research for political scientists, a “call for research” that I hope might be considered seriously by a foundation or other funding organization. But the agenda focuses specifically on work to be done within the field of political science that benefit both the discipline as well as the store of knowledge about the politics of international migration. The connections to other disciplines are not as clearly evident as one might hope given the goals of the book.

In fact, in my review, only two papers in the collection succeed at explicitly and concretely discussing the potential interdisciplinary ‘dialogue’ about research on international migration. Interestingly, Hania Diner discusses at length the inherent difficulties in promoting interdisciplinary research on migration that would involve historians and other social scientists. She draws a decidedly ominous conclusion: “...the nature of history as a field, the particular perspective of American history, and the inner dynamics of American immigration history as a field has militated against a conjoining of the study of immigration to the United States and migration theory. The two have gone their separate ways. While they both may be the poorer for it, there is no reason to predict that in the immediate future they will find common ground” (p. 39).

In contrast, but addressing the same goal of “interdisciplinary dialogue,” Barbara Schmitter Heisler concludes her chapter on sociological studies of international migration by setting out a “constructive” agenda for research. She suggests more scholarly connections among sociologists drawing from different emphases within the discipline, specifically between “Americanists” and “Comparativists/Globalists.” Because the latter more often adopt an interdisciplinary perspective, such dialogue will ultimately move analysis in a variety of new analytic combinations. Schmitter Heisler identifies transnationalism as a focus of interdisciplinary dialogue between sociologists and anthropologists as macrosociological processes emerge on all levels of human society. Similarly, according to Schmitter Heisler, the study of state sovereignty is an opportunity for interdisciplinary analysis between sociologists and political scientists given different assumptions about the significance of nation states in migration and settlement processes. Finally, Schmitter Heisler discusses the need for interdisciplinary and comparative dialogue about processes of immigrant assimilation, integration and incorporation and for critical assessment of biases inherent in the conceptual models. This chapter seems to me to accomplish the goal for “talking across disciplines” set forth by the editors.

The second limitation of the collection is the omission of professional geography from the social scientific map. The movement of humans is a spatial process and a major force of landscape and hence social geographic and

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environmental change. The subfield of population geography is virtually defined as the study of human migration and geographic mobility; in the past decade economic, cultural and feminist geographers studying globalization and development has given close and critical attention in field studies to the roles of transmigration and transnationalism in the 'relationships between people and places.' The work of Victoria Lawson (1998; 2000) is particularly notable in this regard.

Beyond significant theoretical and empirical contributions of geographers in the study of migration of all forms is the longstanding awareness among geographers of the need for disciplinary integration in the study of human-environmental interactions. Intellectual integration and synthesis is considered by many of us who teach the discipline at the collegiate level the analytic signature of the discipline. Among geographers Kevin McHugh (2000) has made a most clear and eloquent argument for interdisciplinary perspective, and also multi-method approach, in the study of migration, in his call for incorporating ethnography in the geographic analysis of migration and spatial processes:

Geographers – steeped in thinking in terms of space, place and connection – are well posed to explore and elucidate peoples, place and societal implications of migration and circulation systems. This challenge requires openness to multiple epistemologies and perspectives, as intellectual life across the social sciences and humanities is becoming increasingly defined by what Geertz (1983) term blurred genres in social thought. ... Cultivating ethnographic approaches will help enliven migration studies in geography and foster linkages with other branches of the discipline, opening up new vistas in migration, culture and society (pp. 85-86).

The editors of this good volume of theory and practice in migration scholarship would have done better to include the theoretical vantage and empirical insight of colleagues such as Lawson and McHugh in promoting conversation across social scientific disciplines about the study of migration.

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Indians, Merchants, and Markets: a Reinterpretation of the Repartimiento and Spanish-Indian Economic Relations in Colonial Oaxaca, 1750-1821. By Jeremy Baskes. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press (2000), 306 pp.

Reviewed by Jeffrey H. Cohen, Department of Anthropology, Pennsylvania State University

Jeremy Baskes's *Indians, Merchants, and Markets* is an excellent addition to the history of colonial Mexico. His discussion of the colonial economy, Indian-Spanish relations and the role structure and meaning of the repartimiento should be welcomed by historians and anthropologists alike.

Baskes uses the production, trade and export of cochineal (a red dye made from the dried body of the beetle *Dactylopius coccus*, that grow on nopal cactus) as a lens through which to question long held assumptions about colonial Mexico's economy, the place of natives in that economy, and the role of the repartimiento. For the author, the colonial economy is not an isolated system built upon the needs and desires of colonial rulers, rather, it is part of a broad global trade network that brought cochineal dye (called grana) from native communities throughout rural

Oaxaca, Mexico to buyers throughout Europe. The native Oaxacan becomes an active agent (albeit an active agent working under serious constraints) who uses the household production of cochineal in concert with farming to make a better living. In this economy the repartimiento becomes more than a coercive force, it is in fact an important source for credit among peasant and Indian households and communities struggling to survive.

Baskes begins the book by posing a series of ideas concerning the repartimiento. He asks that the reader reject the traditional approach to the repartimiento that characterizes it as a system through which labor was forcible drawn from communities to provide tribute for the Spanish ruling class. The point is not that there were no abuses of the system, or that it lacked a coercive side, rather, Baskes effectively shows that Indians throughout rural Oaxaca sought repartimiento relationships as a way to gain credit (the only avenue to credit available) that could then be invested in crops, cochineal or goods. In fact, he points out that Indians often sought repartimiento relationships voluntarily as a way to gain goods and income. Thus, the relationships that existed between *alcaldes* and Indians, did not necessarily “drive” those natives into the economy, rather the relationships created a social contract between the two groups that typically left the Indian producer with a small profit. For example, producers of cochineal who entered repartimiento relationships with *alcaldes* (themselves often natives), typically had some of the dye left after their contracts were settled that they could then sell for additional income, or perhaps invest in the purchase of animals or the maintenance of the household. Baskes does not deny that there was coercion, and *alcaldes* coveted their positions and the incomes those positions generated. In fact, Baskes points out that there was often fierce competition for positions among the upper class. Nevertheless, he effectively shows how local producers also benefited from the relationships.

The benefits of these relationships extended beyond the economic as the repartimiento help stabilize prices through long term contracts and afforded a way for two very different populations (Spanish and native) to effectively communicate cross-culturally. Thus, what might seem to be price-fixing from one perspective, also served to ease negotiations between populations that were effectively alien to each other. Native producers were interested most in gaining a “just price” that is a price that covered production expenses, a concept very different than one based on the value of time and more importantly profit. For the *Alcaldes*, who were installed under the pretext that they would protect the Crown’s interests, cochineal was a good investment, and one that would cover the short fall in Spain’s rather meager compensation. Nevertheless, dealing in cochineal was not without risks. In fact, the last chapters of the book focus on the market for cochineal, its shifts and swings, the risks that faced exporters and the role the dye played in broader market systems.

Baskes’s work is all the more satisfying given contemporary trends in Oaxaca’s economy. Anyone who is familiar with the state and its many crafts and traditional arts will recognize local models of contemporary production in this discussion of cochineal. Contemporary artisans often organize production around putting-out systems where patrons supply materials and designs in exchange for finished goods that are sold on international markets (Cook and Binford 1990; Littlefield 1978). Like their ancestor, today’s craftsmen and women are often at the mercy of the price a patron will pay. Like their ancestors, they turn to these patrons for loans and credit. And as with their ancestors, what can be a coercive system is also an avenue for household maintenance and sometimes profit (for example, see my discussion of contemporary weaving in Santa Ana del Valle, in Cohen 1999:48-52). Last, but certainly not least, cochineal is making something of a comeback and is now an integral part of the textile making traditions and marketing rhetoric practiced in many communities. Typically households have a nopal patch where they cultivate the cochineal beetle. When visitors arrive, they demonstrate how to get the rich red/purple dye from the dried crushed body of the insect. The dye becomes part of the pitch and authenticity of the wares that are for sale. The structure of this production, based as it is in household gardens and that can be tended in conjunction with farming, wage labor and so forth has changed very little from the model presented by Baskes (pp. 18-19).

Some readers might ask why anyone should focus on something as mundane as cochineal in a place so removed from the centers of power as Oaxaca. In fact, these are two of the best reasons to pick up this book. The discussion of local economies and global trade, of native producers and their relationships to colonial rulers and of the repartimiento’s role in production, trade and social organization of rural Oaxaca during the later colonial period should remind readers of the framework developed by Eric Wolf Europe and the People Without History (1982) and Sidney Mintz’s in *Sweetness and Power* (1985). Both authors ask that we break down categorical constructions like modern and traditional and explore the interactions between systems, and through which these systems are created. Oaxaca often seems about as far as can be from the modern (or even colonial) centers of power, and the role of cochineal production in global trade is easy to overlook in most discussions of Mexico’s colonial economy. Nevertheless, like sugar for Mintz, cochineal production established powerful bonds between native and Spanish society and economy, linking rural producers to merchants in London in profound ways. Cochineal’s rise and fall as a commodity has much to offer those of us who study contemporary crafts from anthropological perspectives. For historians, the book is a reminder of the wealth of information that can be found in small places. Baskes is to be

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commended for this well written, informative and lively account of the repartimiento.

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Naming the Enemy: Anti-Corporate Movements Confront Globalization, by Amory Starr, London: Zed Books (2000), xvi, 268 pp..

Reviewed by David Skidmore, Department of Politics and International Relations, Drake University, Des Moines, IA.

Despite, or perhaps because of, its wild diversity, the anti-globalization movement has in recent years emerged as a force with which to be reckoned. Leaders of the major institutions of global economic governance, including the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the G-8, can find practically no city in the world where meetings will not be plagued by rowdy demonstrations and the scent of tear gas. Pressure from anti-globalization non-governmental organizations (NGOs) played a role in the failure of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) negotiations, the collapse of efforts to launch a new "millennium round" of global trade negotiations and resistance in the United States congress to granting President Clinton unfettered fast track trade negotiating authority. The anti-sweatshop movement has harried Nike and a number of other corporations into promising improvements in labor conditions at the factories that produce their goods. Protests stemming from the Shell Oil Company's alleged complicity with government repression in Nigeria forced Shell to develop a new corporate code of conduct regarding human rights issues. A number of other firms have followed suit. The list of these and other recent successes is impressive.

Yet the anti-globalization movement has thus far mostly focused on slowing the juggernaut of corporate globalization and resisting the most egregious of governmental and corporate abuses. What has yet to emerge is a coherent and widely accepted vision of an alternative future. Amory Starr's provocative book surveys and assesses both the concrete goals and the philosophical worldviews that animate many of the groups involved in the struggle to craft an alternative to globalization as it is currently taking shape.

This is not simply another review of "the debate" over globalization. Starr accepts without question the damning critiques of globalization that have originated with others. Her focus is on the varieties of resistance to globalization and where they may lead. Globalization itself is treated as symptomatic of a deeper and more insidious disease; namely, the domination of modern political, economic and cultural life by large, powerful, globe-spanning corporations. Big business firms serve as the "agents" of globalization and should, in Starr's view, be considered the primary targets of popular resistance.

Starr's survey of more than a dozen distinct popular social movements assesses the degree to which each places anti-corporate motivations at the center of its ideology and strategic vision. In keeping with the book's rather

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blunt title, Starr's treatment of these popular social movements focuses on "... how they understand their enemy, and how they envision rebuilding the world" (p. x). Relying heavily upon organizational web sites as her primary data source, Starr limits her attention to movement rhetoric and ideas, leaving aside any attempt to "evaluate the movement's size, scope, practices or chances for success" (p. xi). In general, Starr reserves the most praise for those groups which explicitly treat corporations as "the enemy," while chiding groups that are insufficiently anti-corporate in their rhetoric.

Starr classifies each group or movement under one of three "modes" of resistance to corporate globalization: 1) contestation and reform; 2) globalization from below; and 3) delinking, or relocalization. The author explicates the logic underlying each mode while illustrating the diverse uses to which this logic or strategic perspective is put by various groups falling under each approach. A theoretical chapter at the beginning of the book draws upon various sorts of critical theory (e.g., Marxist, feminist, post-modernism, etc.) to identify useful concepts for the analysis of agency and structure in relationship to understanding anti-corporate social movements. A final chapter draws comparisons across the movements examined earlier in the book and summarizes the author's own conclusions about the merits of various approaches to constructing an alternative to corporate-globalization.

This is a dense, difficult and often frustrating work. The audience for Starr's book is uncertain. Activists will likely find the book's structure and prose too academic in nature to suit their tastes or needs. Many scholars, on the other hand, will dismiss the book as a heavy-handed polemic. Some parts of the book, especially the theory chapter, are almost unreadable,¹ although the flow improves considerably when Starr reports in relatively straightforward fashion on what grassroots activists are actually thinking and doing. The book's argumentative and often militant tone will irritate some while inspiring others. Substantively, this reviewer found far more with which to disagree than to agree, as the following critique will suggest.

In fairness, however, it must be said that Starr's book serves a number of laudatory purposes. It is one of the few works to attempt a broad survey of the loose coalition of anti-globalization groups and movements that first captured public awareness in the streets of Seattle during the 1999 meeting of the World Trade Organization.² More importantly, Starr's book is a powerful stimulus to thought and debate. One wearies, after a time, of the staid, cautious and, frankly, dull conventions of academic writing. Surely the vast tide of scholarly books and articles on the amorphous topic of globalization in recent years already includes more than enough specimens of the sort of bland, repetitious and pointless work that fails to either inform or provoke. In the course of reading Starr's contribution to this body of literature, however, the present reviewer found himself alternatively enraged, amused and challenged. Hours after laying down the book, one continues to imagine oneself engaged in an energetic verbal sparring match with a forceful, opinionated opponent. That is itself refreshing.

Nevertheless, the book's weaknesses outweigh its strengths. A good place to begin is with Starr's three modes of resistance. Each of these categories is home to a bewilderingly eclectic variety of movements. Land reform, peace, human rights and cyberpunk movements are all lumped together as examples of "contestation and reform." The "globalization from below" mode encompasses the environmental, labor, socialist, Zapatista and anti-free trade movements. The anarchist, sustainable development, small business, sovereignty and religious nationalist movements are placed under the "delinking" mode. This scheme gives rise to considerable confusion, starting with Starr's conception of what constitutes a "movement." It seems odd to consider "small business" a social movement - much less an anti-corporate movement. The term "cyberpunk" would seem better adapted to describe a literary genre or perhaps a cultural sensibility than a consciously organized movement. The Zapatistas are less a distinct movement than revolutionary group that has affinities with a number of broader movements, such as the indigenous rights or land reform movements. Treating apples and oranges as if they were like units leads to strained comparisons and conclusions.

Moreover, the three modes are themselves inadequately conceptualized. The first two modes, in particular, are insufficiently distinct from one another. "Contestation and reform" is meant to characterize movements that seek to constrain and redirect corporate practices through external pressure, such as state regulation or consumer boycotts. The second mode - "globalization from below" - is not so much an alternative to the first mode as an extension of it beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. The second mode foresees the development of a global civil society that will unite around common humanitarian goals, such as peace, justice, ecological protection and human rights. Given that capital mobility places serious constraints on effective action by individual states, second mode movements seek to strengthen global institutions that embody the legal and moral principles they support. Only global structures of control can guarantee that corporations are left with no place to hide. There is no compelling analytic reason to distinguish between these first two modes. Each seeks to tame the excesses of market capitalism by subjecting corporations to democratic control at either the national or global levels.

The third mode is, however, quite different from either of the first two. Third mode movements seek not to control corporations but to banish them from liberated territories. "Relocalization" or "delinking" would reverse the

process of globalization, instead centering market activities and political authority in the hands of local communities, each free to chart their own distinctive course. From a third mode standpoint, the principle problems of modern life concern issues of scale. Large-scale, centralized structures of economic and political power, including big corporations, nation-states and international organizations, all serve to render authority more distant from the control of average people and communities. The most important challenge, from a third mode perspective, is to wrest power away from large, impersonal and bureaucratic institutions and relocate decision-making at the level of local communities, which operate on a human (and humane) scale of social organization.

Starr is not content to merely report on the philosophical and strategic visions of the movements she sets out to investigate. She freely dispenses her own praise and criticism of various ideas, proposals and actions. Given the book's stated sympathies toward grassroots social action, Starr is surprisingly harsh in her judgments about many of the most well established progressive movements. Starr treats the micro-credit movement as a debt-trap for the poor. Peace groups who advocate the conversion of military industries to peaceful uses are criticized for buying into the industrial paradigm. Starr chides the anti-sweatshop movement for treating the abuse of workers as a case of corporate deviance rather than the product of a broader systemic logic. "Fair trade" campaigns organized by human rights groups to improve the terms of exchange for Third World producers are denounced for sustaining Southern dependence upon the North while encouraging consumerist habits among the wealthy. Environmental groups that negotiate with corporations in the interest of moving the latter toward greener production processes, technologies and products are denounced for collaborating with the enemy and legitimating corporate power. The movement for sustainable development is guilty of buying into the concept of "development" and ignoring the fatal contradiction between the latter and any meaningful concepts of ecological or cultural sustainability. Organized labor is dismissed for its complicity with the existing corporate-dominated political and economic order.

The heroes of Starr's book are those movements that have demonstrated uncompromising attitudes toward the corporate order, such as hackers ("Hacking can be heroic" (p. 76)), anarchists and Zapatistas. In contrast with most leftist commentators, Starr also embraces religious nationalist groups, such as the Christian/Patriot movement in the United States about which she states:

The movement has a number of legitimate political and political economic concerns about local economics and politics. Like religious nationalism elsewhere, the Christian/Patriot movement has racist elements, and, like movements elsewhere, panicked accusations of racism are being used to delegitimize core concerns and proposals, which are democracy, populism and the rights of locality (pp. 141-142).

Religious nationalists, whether right wing Christian fundamentalists in the United States or militant Islamic movements elsewhere in the world, should be viewed as potential allies or converts because they share with the left a suspicion and active resistance to pro-capitalist states, corporations and international organizations. Starr notes, for instance, that the Freemasons and the militia movements in the United States hold "conspiracy theories" that "differ little from left-wing analyses, emphasizing the Trilateral Commission, the New World Order and GATT" (p. 142).³

In general, Starr shows a clear preference for third mode movements over those associated with either of the first two modes. She rejects the "Lockean" and "Keynesian" character of first mode reform movements. Reformers hold out the promise of a refashioned social contract, one encompassing business, workers and popular movements and largely administered by a liberal democratic state. Starr, however, dismisses the idea that any social contract structured along these lines could possibly serve popular interests. Instead, Starr asserts, "social contracts are ameliorative. They pacify the working class temporarily to facilitate relatively undisrupted pursuit of capitalism and are rescinded as soon as politically possible" (p. 171).

Second mode visions of "globalization from below" are also flawed, in Starr's view. Movements in this mode want to use centralized and bureaucratic international organizations and agreements as instruments to impose universalized and standardized conceptions of rights and duties on a world of diverse cultures and values. Despite the anti-corporate thrust of second mode movements, the bland, homogenized future they envisage would locate power and authority in global bodies even more distant from the control of average people than at present.

Reformers in both the first and second modes are too often tempted to collaborate with the enemy; namely, corporations. Although reformers challenge corporate practices, too often their strategic objective is some sort of negotiated deal in which corporations and their critics work out a solution acceptable to all. Starr characterizes this attitude as "dangerous" on the grounds that the process of negotiation is itself a way of "legitimizing" the corporate order (p. 79).

"Coming to the table to negotiate often means accepting the corporate project, therefore negotiation tends to benefit corporate interests. Negotiation brings activists into a process of collaboration with the company, gets them invested in a non-oppositional process and changes the issues of 'salience' from siting (or not) to technical issues of operation, safety, and so on" (p. 157).

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Starr's critique of first and second mode reformers is overdrawn. Given existing power relations, negotiation with states and corporations is an inevitable phase in the struggle for social change. To the degree that they are successful, movements that begin with militant street action must alter their tactics and rhetoric as their issues move into the mainstream. As popular movements gain moral capital with the public at large, they come to pose threats to the legitimacy of states and firms. But this moral leverage can only be translated into real change through a process that involves bargaining with one's adversaries. Compromises are inevitable once the struggle reaches legislatures and boardrooms. As Starr suggests, the resulting changes are piecemeal in nature and both states and firms recover a degree of legitimacy from the process. But social movements that adopt an uncompromising stance - refusing to cash in their moral chips - risk either repression or irrelevance. Successful revolutions are rare, and more uncommon still are those revolutions that actually fulfill the initial dreams and promises of the revolutionaries. It is not surprising that most grassroots movements eventually settle for partial (but meaningful) victories.

Starr's uncompromising attitude stems in part from the way in which she defines the modern corporation: 'Corporate' as an adjective refers to the operating principles typical of such enterprises, such as prioritizing profit and growth over all other values; profiting on uncoded externalities, such as the environment, quality of life, environment, worker's health, stable jobs and community; and pursuing the homogenization and increase of consumption in order to maximize markets. (p. xiv)

While not inaccurate in broad outline, this picture fails to account for the fact that corporations vary in the degree to which they engage in anti-social behavior. In their search for profit, not all corporations employ sweatshop labor, or dump toxic chemicals or collude with states to deny human rights to local communities. The prevalence of such activities differs depending upon the nature of the industry, the type of products produced and, most importantly, the external constraints firms face. Corporations are vulnerable to outside pressures brought by socially-minded consumers, investors, the media and state regulators, each of whom controls assets crucial to corporate survival and success.

Corporations are not inherently evil. Indeed, the modern corporation represents an agglomeration of social assets - knowledge, technology, organization, and capital - that are crucial to the management of modern economic life. The chief challenge is how to reconcile private control of these assets with public interests. In principle, at least, this should be achievable by creating a web of democratic rules, constraints and obligations that steer corporate practice - in short, by fashioning just the sort of social contract that Starr rejects but to which most contemporary social movements aspire in some form.

This brings us to the heart of Starr's argument - her advocacy on behalf of third mode movements. Starr's uncompromising attitude toward contemporary states and corporations, her critique of "globalization from below," her defense of religious nationalism - all of these become comprehensible once we understand the values and assumptions underpinning her own preferred alternative future.

While corporate globalization is the ostensible bogeyman of Starr's story, the real villain is modernization itself. Among the prominent features of modern life that Starr denounces are science and technology ["scientists are nearly always wrong about the things that matter" (p. 127)], the green revolution, bureaucracy, the contemporary state, liberal democracy, economic growth ["Growth as a definition of development has failed utterly" (p. 14)], urbanism and consumption. In many places in the book, Starr identifies with a pre-modern vision of locally self-sufficient village-level communalism. Her intellectual and moral roots lie in the 19th century romantic tradition and in anarchist intellectual currents of the same period. For Starr, "delinking" and "relocalization" are necessary starting points for recreating imagined utopias that draw upon rural, pre-industrial traditions. Starr stresses the importance of conceiving political economy in terms of some sort of "moral order" (pp. 145, 190), which is one reason that she defends religious nationalist movements and rejects critiques that associate rural village life with parochialism and intolerance. Her neo-traditionalist vision reflects a longing for the return of human-scale communities in a world that is all too centralized, rationalized, bureaucratized and dehumanized.

From the standpoint of devising a practical program of social change, the drawbacks of this vision are palpable. The often grim realities of pre-modern rural life, whether in the past or the present, are a far cry from Starr's romanticized ideal. Starr's protestations that religious nationalism can be reconciled with the values of tolerance and pluralism are unconvincing given real-world evidence to the contrary. Most obviously, Starr's vision is profoundly ahistorical. There is no going back (or forward) to a world untouched by the pervasive influence of modernity. Nor can the process of globalization itself be reversed or undone. While it is quite feasible to relocalize some sorts of decision-making, "delinking" in the sense of cutting the bonds of interdependence across communities and restoring genuine self sufficiency is untenable. Nor is it apparent that many people would prefer this sort of world.

Starr's "back to the future" style vision thus fails as a viable political project. Nevertheless, this yearning for some escape from the "iron cage" of modernity is one with which many people can identify and has provided the

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basis for recent post-modern cultural and intellectual movements.

As Starr's survey demonstrates, there exist a wide variety of sometimes clashing ideas about both strategy and goals among the many groups and movements seeking to resist or alter the trajectory of globalization. While this diversity robs such efforts of cohesion, coherence and clear direction, it also contributes to a more vibrant and inclusive grassroots politics and leaves open many options for the future. There is no need to impose premature closure on the direction of struggle. Pluralism is messy, confusing and unpredictable. But a decentralized, open-ended politics makes sense under present circumstances as humanity sorts through the uncertainties and implications of a complex process of globalization.

NOTES:

1 An example: "The Foucauldian tug-of-war positions his recognitions alternately as liberatory rupture of the idea that political economy structures the rest of our social institutions, or as merely adding, along the lines of the Frankfurt School, further useful analyses of exactly how the structure structures" (p. 2).

2 Two other excellent books, published before the Seattle protests but covering much of the same ground, are Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Smith (1997).

3 This, in Starr's view, is a recommendation, not a criticism. Starr herself at one point affirms the view that "There has been a conspiracy" (p. 8).

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Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink,

1998. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Cornell: Cornell University Press.

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1997. *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

A Logic of Expressive Choice, by Alexander A. Schuessler, Princeton: Princeton University Press (2000), 177 pp.

Reviewed by Melinda A. Mueller, Department of Political Science, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, IL.

In *A Logic of Expressive Choice*, Alexander Schuessler uses rational choice theory, as well as sociology and anthropology - to explain why people choose to participate in elections. In doing so, he responds to some unanswered questions political economists have raised concerning political participation, and he presents a new set of questions for theorists to explore.

At the heart of Schuessler's research is the question of why people bother participating in elections at all, when the likelihood that they will affect the election's outcome is very small. Electoral participation is a classic collective action problem. Since incentives for voting are low, and the likelihood that one person can change the turnout of an election is also low, we should expect low voter turnout. People behave as "free-riders," relying on others to make electoral choices for them. The dilemma facing rational choice theorists was why people still vote at all. Granted, voter turnout has decreased in the U.S., but about half of the voting-age population still participates. What makes any voter turn out at the polls, when there are so few direct rewards from voting?

Schuessler tackles this question, and related ones, by arguing that political participation is not based solely on instrumental rewards. Instead, people receive expressive benefits from voting and other forms of political participation. While other social scientists have made similar arguments, Schuessler's is different in that he develops a formal model for explaining and predicting expressive participation. Furthermore, he argues that campaign strategists recognize the expressive benefits of voting today, and focus increasingly on the symbols associated with

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voting for a particular candidate or party.

Schuessler bases his argument on his "jukebox" model of participation. In Chapter Two, he draws an analogy between voting and a jukebox in an Italian restaurant located in Boston. Restaurant patrons can privately select a jukebox song, and patrons have no way of knowing which songs other patrons have already selected. Each song is played only once - even if several other patrons already selected it. Restaurant patrons receive an expressive benefit from hearing their song; they like to be associated with a particular song, even if they weren't personally responsible for selecting the song. Schuessler explains that voting is similar: we vote in private, and have no direct way of knowing how others are voting. Also, it doesn't matter how many people voted for the winning candidate, as long as the candidate received enough votes to win. Voters receive an expressive benefit from participation, such as the ability to associate themselves with a particular party or candidate.

Thus, according to Schuessler's theory, a person voting in the 2000 election may have been more concerned with being associated with the Republican, Democratic, or Green parties, or their respective candidates, than with the election's outcome. Voting has a certain status attached to it, like drinking a type of soda or driving a type of car. Schuessler's model provides a sound explanation for why so many people do vote in the U.S., despite the lack of instrumental rewards, and despite the fact that the impact of their vote is small. In Chapters Three and Four, Schuessler provides a very thorough literature review of voter turnout and voter choice, and argues that many of the current models, which focus primarily on the instrumental rewards of voting, are incomplete. In these chapters, he outlines his expressive model of voting, drawing heavily from sociological theories.

Schuessler's model also helps to explain how campaigns in the U.S. have changed over the past forty years. Chapter Five, entitled "Soft Drinks and Presidents," explains how the rise of mass marketing techniques developed through the twentieth century, and ultimately became used for campaigning as well as selling products. Schuessler focuses on the marketing of soft drinks in particular. Since the mid-twentieth century, the competition between Pepsi and Coca-Cola was based more on lifestyle and image than on the price or quality of the products. For instance, Pepsi marketed its product to the "Pepsi Generation," suggesting that those who drank Pepsi were young and more modern. However, Pepsi marketers didn't directly claim that Pepsi drinkers were young - they wanted the actual demographics of their consumers to remain ambiguous, to attract as many consumers as possible. With this style of marketing, soft drink choice had become a lifestyle choice.

Schuessler claims that campaign strategists have developed similar techniques to attract voters to certain candidates and voters. Campaign mottos, like Reagan's "It's Morning Again in America," or Clinton's "Building a Bridge to the Twenty-First Century," are prime examples of ambiguous "feel-good" expressive messages. The messages were not urging people to vote for Reagan or Clinton because of specific policy choices, but because they would feel good about voting for them, and being associated with them. Indeed, most campaign mottos from recent elections focus more on symbols and feelings than on policy choices.

In Chapters Six and Seven, Schuessler outlines the formal model of expressive voting that he developed in previous chapters. This model shows how a theory of expressive choice predicts electoral phenomena, including momentum and bandwagons, as well as negative campaigning. In Chapter Eight, Schuessler provides a formal model to explain behavior by campaign managers and strategists. In particular, he shows that a campaign manager strategically focuses on symbols that make his or her own candidate's message somewhat ambiguous, to attract voters with expressive symbols. At the same time, campaign managers develop negative attacks on their candidate's opponents. The negative symbols associated with the opponents can deter turnout and polarize voters, and often result in more voters being attracted to the campaign manager's candidate. Altogether, Schuessler argues that an expressive campaign - focusing on symbols and lifestyles - will be more successful than a instrumental campaign - focusing on policies. It is worth noting that while Schuessler attempts to keep his model basic for readers who lack a strong background in formal modeling techniques, the material is still rather complicated for a non-expert. Nonetheless, his substantive explanation of the model is still clear and readable.

Schuessler's theory provides a stronger explanation for campaign managers' behavior than it does for voters' behavior. Clearly, campaign managers do focus on symbolic messages to persuade voters - expressive campaigns do appear to be more effective than instrumental ones. Indeed, many political pundits and critics argued that the 2000 election was so full of ambiguity and negativity, that it was difficult to distinguish the two major candidates. However, if voter turnout and voter choice are something akin to the kind of car we drive and the kind of soda we drink, then why don't more people vote? If people are so easily persuaded to purchase sports utility vehicles, despite their low gas mileage and poor safety record, then why aren't they more easily persuaded to vote? It's likely that the expressive benefit of voting just isn't as important to us as the expressive benefit of driving a type of car, but more research must be done to explain why about 50 percent of eligible voters choose not to participate at all. While negative campaigning may deter some voters, using it as the sole explanation seems insufficient.

Furthermore, Schuessler's research raises important normative questions about the types of campaigns we

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have today. The effect of electing a candidate is fundamentally different from the effect of choosing a car or a soft drink. Is ambiguity and negativity appropriate, given the importance of elected offices, particularly the presidency?

Overall, this text would be excellent for graduate level courses on voting behavior and rational choice theory. His work is a fine example of how rational choice theory can be integrated with other theoretical frameworks. It is always fascinating to see a theory that turns a question around and attempts to provide a more innovative answer. Even if the answer is somewhat incomplete, it offers new in-roads for future research.

Kerala: The Development Experience. Reflections on Sustainability and Replicability. Edited by Govindan Parayil. London: Zed Books (2000), x, 274 pp.

Reviewed by Norbert Dannhaeuser, Department of Anthropology, Texas A&M University.

Intensive public protest at the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meeting in Seattle was the first widely publicized indication that the neo-liberal development strategy, which has become a widely shared paradigm especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union, was facing rising opposition. Until then, only little public controversy surrounded the conventional policy prescription for Less Developed Countries (LDCs) provided by the WTO, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and similar international bodies. This includes opening LDC economies to foreign investments, lowering internal and external trade barriers, reducing domestic subsidies, encouraging corporate and government transparencies, and expanding the private sector. This "New World Order" has, over the years, generated increasing opposition by left-leaning activists and intellectuals, humanitarian and service NGOs, environmentally sensitive groups, and by others concerned with the negative impact of globalization. This opposition is nowadays sufficiently organized to vent itself in public protests whenever international trade and financial bodies meet. Professor Govindan and the other contributors to Kerala: The Development Experience no doubt sympathize with these protests. To them, the Indian state of Kerala represents an alternative development model preferable to the neo-liberal one touted so widely today.

During the International Congress on Kerala Studies (1994), 1,600 local and international participants focused on the special case of Kerala as a development model (the Kerala Model). This led Professor Parayil to the conviction that "there was a need to bring together as a single resource the best theoretical analyses and empirical studies...by experts in the field" [pp. ix-x]. The result is this edited volume.

The aim of the book is to provide "a balanced account of Kerala's development achievements and shortcomings," with special attention being given to whether it can be replicated elsewhere and whether it can be sustained over generations [p. ix]. The book is in fact less balanced than the stated aim. For nearly all of the contributors, the achievements of the Kerala Model outweigh its shortcomings. Moreover, all of them adhere to a left-oriented populist and collective action perspective when formulating solutions to development problems, while being highly critical of those strategies advocated by governments and their international agencies that emphasize the importance of the private commercial sector, free trade, and competitive markets. Finally, sustainability in the human-environmental sense receives only very limited attention. This book is more about socio-economic development than ecological sustainability, and I will review it as such.

Kerala has achieved much since it became a state in 1957. Though lacking a rich mineral resource base and burdened with an high population density, Kerala's 30 million residents along the south-western coast of India resemble in their social indicators First World populations. Infant mortality rates, fertility values, and population growth are low. Long life expectancy and a relatively even sex ratio prevail. Nutritional levels are adequate and health conditions are good due to public distribution efforts and health services. Finally, the proportion of working children is very low, educational/literacy levels are high among both genders, while female status and participation in public life are high. This stands in stark contrast to what is typically found in LDCs, including India at large. The Kerala condition is the result of a number of factors, chief among them being a consistent policy followed by the

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center-left government and socially responsible activists to push for social welfare by means of collective action. Not only are the achievements in social welfare noteworthy; so is the fact that Kerala has maintained a civil society in which democratic principles operate within the government. This stands combined with a strong tradition of trade union participation and social activism by NGOs. Given the failings of many LDCs and former Soviet bloc countries, it is no wonder that concerned development specialists, including the contributors of this volume, are convinced that the Kerala Model is a way out of poverty without the, to them, socially disruptive and environmentally threatening policies represented by the New World Order.

While all chapters focus on the Kerala Model, the manner in which they do so differs. Some of the contributors analyze particular groups and institutions within the state in relation to the Kerala Model, while others compare the model to the development experience of “other” countries. Then there are attempts to determine whether the model can be replicated elsewhere and sustained over time. Finally, a number of authors concern themselves with problems the Kerala Model has encountered beginning in the 1980s, and with the efforts undertaken to revive it.

Among the first group of authors, Heller examines social movements among Kerala’s formal and informal sector workers, and notes that there has been a synergetic relation between the state and non-state delivery services due to the fact that the society is mobilized along class lines, yet has retained a “democratically accountable state” [p. 84]. In both the formal and informal industrial sectors there has been a move from radical class struggle to class accommodation; after all, “too much collective action in an economy governed by private investment is a negative-sum game” [p. 85]. Kurien analyzes a community that until relatively recently was outside of the domain of the state’s public action. It consists of the 770,000 marine fishermen along Kerala’s coast. In contrast to most of the state’s residents, in the early 1980s the fishing community had a social profile more akin to a typical LDC population: gender bias, poor health, low literacy rates, high infant mortality, and so on. Why? According to the author, it was not incorporated into the collective action programs for social betterment provided by the government and private organization due to the community’s mode of production (fish as free good) and religious orientations (Hindu, Muslim, and especially, parochial Catholic interests). Following a crisis of over-fishing in the early 1980s, trade unions and others moved in to mobilize the population and to provide social services that presumably improved living conditions (no hard data showing this exist to date). To the author, collective action is the key in the fishing community’s change for the better, not only a committed state. Alexander, finally, identifies kinship as a contributing factor accounting for Kerala’s uniqueness. Unlike the rest of India, the family structure in Kerala stands between the matriarchal and patriarchal extremes, thus resulting in gender equity. This, according to Alexander, helps account for the low fertility and high well-being for which Kerala’s population is known. Of course, it might be pointed out that relative gender equality in countries such as the Philippines has not lead to similar socio-economic and demographic conditions as in Kerala; similarly, male-oriented societies such as South Korea, Taiwan and Sri Lanka have attained equivalent, if not even higher well-being than Kerala.

Several authors examine the Kerala Model by setting it off against other regions. Kannan compares Kerala’s social record with that of six LDCs. Though finding the average per capita income in Kerala low compared to that of most of the LDCs, the social indicators of the state are among the highest. An historical review of this achievement convinces Kannan that poverty alleviation under democracy is possible if done by means of concerted public campaigns and if the active involvement of women is encouraged. When comparing Kerala with “other” countries, Sri Lanka is usually pointed out to be among the few LDCs reaching Kerala’s human development record. Casinader’s chapter does so. While noting similarities between the two, figures he provides [Table 10.2] also indicate that per capita income in Kerala is considerably higher – a fact not explained or discussed by Casinader. Much of his chapter consists of pointing out that the current ethnic conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka is increasing the difference in the development experience of that country and Kerala. Shrum and Ramanathaiyer examine Kerala’s record of capacity building in science and compare it with two African countries (Ghana and Kenya). They find that in contrast to the African states, in Kerala a greater autonomy of research exists (yet, 60% of the Kerala scientists, compared to only 25% of the African ones, consider it important to send scientists abroad for training [p. 170]), educational levels are higher, publication productivity is more impressive, and there is a greater tendency for NGOs to be involved in science. The authors laud Kerala as a place second to none where education and knowledge are emphasized.

One theme that runs through much this volume is that the Kerala Model can, and ought to be, emulated elsewhere. However, only one contribution addresses this in detail. Ramachandran does so by discussing the replicability of the Kerala Model in the rest of India. Before doing so, he makes the point that the Kerala Model does not represent unalloyed success; today, high social indicators are combined in the state with low economic growth, low income, high unemployment, and so on. “There are many societies that have achieved these levels and better” [p. 97]. Consequently, Ramachandran reformulates the replicability question to whether public action can ensure

that all of India's states at present levels of income can reach Kerala's human development achievement. The author answers this affirmatively, so long as other states become committed, as Kerala is, to public action for social welfare. What the author does not point out is that such a policy would leave India with the same condition as Kerala currently faces; that is, high human development combined with low economic growth – a combination he criticizes at the beginning of his essay.

There has been a growing concern with the fact that the Kerala Model seems to lead to a condition as described by Ramachandran. Since the early achievements of the model in the 1960s/70s, growth rates have been disappointing, industrial and agricultural output have stagnated, and infrastructure remains underdeveloped. In fact, were it not for remittances from migrant labor to the Gulf States and better food supply on the national level, matters would be worse. Several authors address this crisis of the Kerala Model. They do so by reviewing the attempts by the government and private organizations during the past 20 years to revive development in the state through a series of public action campaigns. This began with mass literacy, group farming, and resource mapping campaigns during the 1987-1991 period. After the Kerala Studies Conference (1994), the renewal effort continued with the People's Campaign for the Ninth Plan. This long-term campaign seeks to have local districts and panchayats make decisions about developmental needs and to provide these grassroots levels with resources to implement solutions. Planning from the bottom became, and still is, the goal of the renewed Kerala Model.

Two chapters examine this recent effort by turning to the concept of sustainability. To Franke and Chasin, sustainability entails the ability to improve or at least maintain material quality of life, entitlements for vulnerable groups, political/economic rights and equality, and productive resources (the only environmental variable) [pp. 16-17]. Kerala's population is adequately provided with all of these elements, which the authors illustrate by describing an average Kerala village. With respect to whether this condition is sustainable, they turn to the People's Campaign for the Ninth Plan that has introduced local development planning and implementation. While noting that it is too early to say whether these reforms have made the Kerala Model sustainable, they maintain that this revival effort by means of public action is better than removing subsidies and opening the economy to foreign investments. In the only truly political ecology chapter of this volume, Véron also uses the concept of sustainability to assess Kerala's recent attempts at renewal. He defines sustainable development in an ecological sense; it must meet the "needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (quoted from the World Commission on Environment and Development) [p. 213]. Véron refuses to employ the often used proxy of low resource use and low population growth to stand for sustainability – after all, this condition could be due to scarcities, poverty, and restricted access to resources. Instead, he turns to the environmental impact of humans as a direct measure of sustainability. He can do so only qualitatively, however, because "comprehensive appraisals of Kerala's environmental condition are absent" [p. 216]. After this disclaimer, he notes that although environmental problems exist – for instance, coastal mangrove areas are being threatened – they seem not to be as bad as they are in many other LDCs. According to Véron, the problem with the current bottom-up approach to development is that it does not ensure empowerment, future generations are not considered in local planning, and temporal/spatial externalities are usually not taken into account. Even though Véron, like Franke and Chasin, points out that it would be premature to actually assess the recent renewal efforts, he does conclude that "Kerala is certainly not yet a model of sustainable development" [p. 227]. He finds the main hope for the future sustainability of Kerala's development to lie with environmentally sensitive NGOs, rather than with the state government or local interest groups.

Törnquist and Parameswaran also assess the 1990s renewal campaigns, though without employing the notion of sustainability. For Törnquist, the recent People's Campaign, even if good in intention, has failed to solve a number of economic problems, such as the negative trade balance and the lack of industrial development; Kerala's economy, in fact, continues to have a colonial flavor by its emphasis on the export of raw materials. He admits that "it remains unclear exactly what the new obstacles to development are" [p. 131], but rather than liberalizing the economy, he feels that the solution lies in politics. In what might sound puzzling to observers who worry about the already highly politicized economic process in Kerala, Törnquist calls for more politics, not less to coordinate the activities between the state, local government, and the civic end for development [p. 138]. To Parameswaran, in turn, the People's Campaign for the Ninth Plan so far has been "more pain than pleasure." "Bringing individual citizens to the centre stage of self-governance is an ambitious, perhaps an unrealistic notion" [p. 247]. He argues for a Fourth World (not in the usual sense of the most destitute of countries) that combines Marxism and Gandhism; a genuine communist society with "an organic world union of self-reliant local communities" [p. 231]. He refers to this utopia, which Kerala should strive for and partly already represents, as a "participative and decentralized new people's democracy" [p. 232]. Among other things, it includes the right to recall politicians at any time (not only during elections), the presence of small-scale private enterprises that do not maximize profit but rather social good, and the existence of wisdom that differentiates needs from greed [pp. 234-239]. As the People's Campaign for the

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Ninth Plan is flawed due to its enemies in the form of “vested interests of politicians, officialdom...and lumpen elements” [p. 247], Parameswaran sees the only hope in the People’s Science Movement (KSSP). This is a teacher-based mass organization in Kerala with some 60,000 members that since the 1960s has been in the forefront, according to the author, in the struggle with the people against corruption in Kerala.

Though a good attempt to describe and analyze the Kerala development experience, this edited volume falls short of what one would expect from a collection that includes the “best theoretical analyses and empirical studies” [pp. ix-x] about this fascinating case. Aside from the fact that the chapters vary considerably in quality, with Véron’s and Kurien’s articles being among the best, the volume has several deficiencies and problems, some of which are relatively focused, others are more fundamental. Turning to the more focused ones first, in certain key areas data are either not available or not provided. For instance, nowhere is the state budget summarized, nor is it shown how it is linked to the national budget of India. This information is essential to evaluate economic sustainability. The otherwise insightful article by Kurien is marred by the fact that he is unable to present numerical data about the present-day human conditions among Kerala’s fishermen two decades after the presumed benefits of social reform took hold among them. Similarly, Véron’s very useful essay is not helped by a similar difficulty; in this case, no quantified data exist about the human impact on the environment. One wonders why attempts are made to assess the Kerala conditions if relevant information to do so is not available.

The inclination of some of the authors to express extreme and tendentious statements reduces the scholarly quality of this work. For example, there exists no “working example of a large sustainable society in the First World” [p. 156]; people both in India and Kerala lack individualistic motivations [p. 138]; the First World has failed, while a limited number of Third World states have succeeded, in particular Kerala [p. 232]. These statements may sound good, they may be politically correct, but hardly any evidence is provided to substantiate them.

Finally, to retain the attention of the reader, it does not help for the chapters to overlap as much as they do. Not only are they similar in their general approval of the Kerala Model and the public action means to construct and maintain it, they also repeat themselves in specific subject areas. The editor’s introduction and several essays describe the Kerala Model, trace its history, and indicate the difficulties it currently faces. The result is that by the mid-point of the book the reader becomes tired of reading yet another list of human development indices found in Kerala and yet another historical review of public action that created the Kerala Model.

More fundamental are two other problems. There is, first, the tendency to compare Kerala with “other” countries. This extends to comparing it even with China and the U.S. Kannan mentions that taking Kerala “out of the national context is not insignificant analytically or qualitatively” [p. 44]. It certainly is not. By comparing a state that is part of a country with independent nation-states is like comparing apples with oranges. They are not equivalent. Kerala is a state of India with a commendable human development record. To compare it to China (or any other large country), and then to point out the wisdom of the Kerala Model is to bias the comparison in favor of Kerala. Far more valid (and fair) would be to compare it with one of China’s better run provinces (or with, say, Connecticut in the U.S.). By the same token, though the authors seem reluctant to admit it (Kannan is an exception), Kerala does receive considerable benefits from being part of India. This ranges from having a large, accessible export market and not having to finance its own defense, to the more abstract benefit provided by India’s constitutional guarantee of upholding democratic processes in the presence of radical political interests in the state. All of these factors should be taken into account before comparing favorably Kerala with “other” countries.

Another problem is that none of the authors consider the neo-liberal path as a possible option. Many contributors point to the current crisis of the Kerala Model reflected by chronic low income and growth, but none suggest that maybe now that human needs have been taken care of and social indicators stand at a high level, it is time that activist lead mass campaigns should step aside for an economically more liberal set of policies. In fact, what is disappointing is not so much that the contributors to this volume see continued public action campaigns as the way to get Kerala out of its crises, but rather that none make clear why at least some elements of the neo-liberal development paradigm should not be seriously considered as policy alternatives. Törnquist comes closest in giving a reason when he points out, without further justification, that “development work goes least well” under conditions of privatization and commercialization because it results in “fragmentation of civil society” [p. 137]. The message of this volume is that to get out of the current crisis of the Kerala Model, it is necessary to employ similar populist, mass action methods used three to four decades ago when the Kerala Model was first constructed. Times and conditions, however, have changed!

Indigenous Mestizos: The Politics of Race and Culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919-1991. by Marisol de la Cadena. Durham, NC: Duke University Press (2000), xiii, 408 pp.

Reviewed by Sarah England, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Davis.

In the past two decades scholars and activists have increasingly come to question hegemonic national ideologies that claim there is no racism in Latin America. While it has long been acknowledged that there are serious social cleavages in Latin American societies, these were analyzed primarily as the result of cultural discrimination and class stratification rather than persistent racism. This ideological feat was accomplished largely through the work of Latin American elite intellectuals and North American anthropologists who argued that because Latin Americans do not understand social groups as constituted by a set of strictly biological and immutable traits, but rather by cultural attributes and social conditions, then their thinking and forms of discrimination were not racist in the same sense that race and racism operated in North America and Europe. In *Indigenous Mestizos*, Marisol de la Cadena makes an excellent contribution to a burgeoning literature that is working to deconstruct this prevailing view and illustrate the many subtle (and not so subtle) ways that racism and race-thinking continue to shape social groups, hierarchies, and personal identities in Latin America. De la Cadena draws on recent literature by European scholars (Paul Gilroy, Etienne Balibar, and Verena Stolcke) who argue that though current forms of cultural discrimination and xenophobia in Europe and North America elide references to biological concepts of race, their ideological underpinnings and social consequences still constitute a form of “racism without race.” De la Cadena argues that though this form of race-thinking may be new to Europe, it is not at all new to Latin America. Her book is dedicated to explaining the intellectual origins of this version of “racism without race” in Peru starting in the 1920s, and illustrating how it has been both appropriated and redefined among working class peoples in Cuzco.

Like many other studies of race in Latin America, a large portion of *Indigenous Mestizos* is dedicated to explaining the elite intellectual origins of the ideologies of *mestizaje* and *indigenismo*, the latter of which would eventually become official state ideology in Peru, guiding the formulation of cultural, educational, social, and even political policies. These twin ideologies, found in various forms throughout Latin America, valorize miscegenation and indigenous heritage in the face of North American and European beliefs of the early 1900s that the relative “underdevelopment” of Latin American societies was due to a moral, cultural, and physical degeneration caused by the mixing of the “pure” races. De la Cadena shows that while the early indigenistas of the 1920s did believe that hybridity led to moral degeneration because it placed the races outside of their “natural” environment and social milieu, they did not believe that any particular racial origin constitutes a permanent stain of inferiority - rather they argued that any moral or cultural deficiencies of “pure” Indians or mestizos could be remedied through education. In this way they avoided arguing for the racial inferiority of Indians and mestizos (which would have implicated many of themselves as light-skinned mestizos), but were still able to argue for the social and moral inferiority of the “*genter del pueblo*.” For indigenistas, Indians represented a valuable element of their national heritage but one that had been degenerated from its pure and honorable state by their movement out of the indigenous communities. Their brand of *indigenismo* focused, therefore, on recapturing and recreating the “authentic” culture of the noble Inca, not that of the current “degraded” and “demoralized” Indian. In contrast, another wave of intellectuals of the 1930s, the neo-indianistas, valorized not the pure Indian but rather the hybridized popular culture of the “*cholo mestizo*” as a source of national identity. Whether arguing for the natural and necessary separation of the “pure” Indians in their rural villages as indigenistas did or celebrating the hybrid culture of the urban mestizo as neo-indianistas did, cuzqueño intellectuals always maintained a distance between themselves as students and representers of indigenous or “*cholo mestizo*” culture and the working class cuzqueños from whom this culture emanated through a racialized class discourse which marked them as the natural carriers of “decency.” As de la Cadena convincingly argues, it was this discourse of decency that allowed elites to avoid the language of biological race while maintaining social hierarchies. De la Cadena’s analysis of these elite formulations is replete with historical detail and pays close attention to the variations that existed among them due to their historical era, personal histories, and relation to the hegemonic ideologies of race and place in Peru - all details that show the peculiarities of intellectual thought in Cuzco due to its location in the highlands and former seat of the Inca empire.

Aside from the thorough investigation of elite representations of *mestizaje* and *indigenismo*, what makes de la Cadena’s work an especially valuable contribution to the literature on race in Latin America is that she also discusses the way that these ideologies have been both appropriated and reformulated by the cuzqueño working

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class; that is, how the discourses of mestizaje and indigenismo operate “on the ground.” In contrast to elite and anthropological formulations of mestizaje, working class cuzqueños do not understand the process of becoming a mestizo as one that necessarily entails miscegenation nor a permanent unilinear loss of indigenous culture. In fact she shows that “mestizo” and “Indian” are not fixed identities but rather are relational and contextual - one can be mestizo in one context and Indian in another; one can be mestizo (as a social condition, i.e., urban and literate) but with indigenous cultural traits. Thus for these “indigenous mestizos” being Indian or mestizo is not about blood nor about unilinear acculturation, but rather about improving one’s social conditions. Through a process that she calls “de-Indianization” grassroots intellectuals distance themselves from the negative connotation of Indianness by not self-identifying as such and yet proudly exhibit indigenous culture. Using Gramsci’s notion of contradictory consciousness, de la Cadena points out that while this redefines Indianness as a social condition, rather than as an immutable, biological essence, the fact that the social conditions of Indianness are still associated with the bottom of the social hierarchy continues to leave room for racism to persist and be reproduced.

One of the more interesting conclusions that she draws from her material is what the implications that this process of de-Indianization has for understanding the relative absence of social movements in Peru that are explicitly articulated around an indigenous ethnic identity. She argues that this absence can be explained by the effects of the hegemonic assumption originating with the indigenistas that an educated and political savvy Indian is really a mestizo, and therefore any political movement among Indians is either inauthentic or irrationally motivated. Through this ideology of Indianness, indigenous political movements, at least through the 1980s, have been discredited and/or redefined as purely economic rather than socio-cultural struggles. Though the consequences of this discourse might be particular to Peru (in contrast to many other parts of Latin America where ethnic social movements are very conspicuous), de la Cadena’s analysis of the process through which indigenous identity has been muted has implications for understanding the discursive struggles of many different indigenous social movements throughout Latin America.

In general de la Cadena offers an insightful, complex, and multilayered analysis of the workings of race in Cuzco, Peru. Throughout the text she shows multiple subject positions among elite and the working class. Her analysis is always gendered and pays close attention to detail. In spite of the length and detail of the book, however, I was still left with the feeling that more of the voices of de la Cadena’s informants could have been brought to the fore. She states in the introductory chapter that she spent hours talking with market women and she includes a wealth of detail about the organization and functioning of *mayordomías* and *comparsas* (dance troupes) with whom she conducted participant observation. And yet her analysis of racial discourses mainly revolves around intellectual writings, oral histories, and folklore performances, rather than the details of how terms and discourses are used in day-to-day life. Her argument that “indigenous mestizos” have redefined the terms “mestizo” and “Indian” to refer only to social conditions and not to biology would have been even more convincing had she included at least some consideration of the way that race is articulated to notions of kinship and descent. As other scholars of mestizaje have shown, kinship, marriage and reproduction are often the sites where racialized discourses emerge most forcefully even when other arenas of social life can be glossed as culture or class.

Nonetheless I highly recommend this book for students of race in Latin America. It is theoretically sophisticated, rich in detail, and adds a much needed analysis of how mestizaje is understood from the point of view of those Peruvians whose identity fluctuates between mestizo and indigenous. In the end, de la Cadena’s analysis lays an important foundation for understanding the historical, intellectual, and social origins of current popular social movements in Peru.

Marx and the Postmodernism Debates: An Agenda for Critical Theory by Lorraine Y. Landry. London: Praeger Publishers (2000), xiii+232pp.

Reviewed by Douglas J. Cremer, Department of Natural and Social Sciences, Woodbury University, Burbank, CA.

Lorraine Landry has confidently entered a field that has drawn much attention among philosophers: the debate between Jürgen Habermas on the one hand and Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Jean-François Lyotard on the other. Rather than seeing this intersection as one between a rationalist modernism and an irrationalist postmodernism, Landry seeks to create what she calls a “fruitful tension” between these two warring camps by reconceptualizing the debate through the work of Karl Marx. The connection between Marx and Habermas is clear. Habermas, as the heir to Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, is recognized as the latest German philosopher to build off of Marx’ work. That a rapprochement between these two positions might be accomplished through the work of Marx has also been hinted at in Derrida’s later works as well as in the widely known early Marxian roots of Lyotard and Foucault. Landry makes profitable use of a wide variety of well-known commentators on the debates, among them Seyla Benhabib, Matei Calinescu, Mike Featherstone, Douglas Kellner, Andreas Huyssen, Alex Callinicos, Christopher Norris, Thomas McCarthy, Peter Dews, and David Rasmussen. Due to the wide range of material covered and the clarity of writing, *Marx and the Postmodernism Debates* is a welcome addition to this highly developed, intellectually rich and philosophically challenging literature, doing an admirable job of summarizing the major issues and developing a new approach that keeps the book from being another rehash of a now lengthy debate.

By explicitly reintroducing Marx to the debates, Landry hopes to show the relevancy of postmodern thought for social change and contemporary politics, making it part of the tradition of ideology critiques begun by Marx. Yet before undertaking this project, Landry goes back to the work of Immanuel Kant, who is as important as Marx in her overall analysis. It is in Kant’s work that Landry sees the fully developed form of modernity: individualist, instrumental, mechanical, methodological, and manipulative. Yet this modernity, she argues, was from its origins tied to and complicated by the earlier existing organic conception of the world as well as the emerging romantic view. Landry makes the argument that there are thus as many modernisms as there are postmodernisms, as many different forms of Enlightenment rationalism as there are postmodern critiques. Her analysis of aesthetic modernism, as a variant within modern thought that was intensely critical of the rationalist strain of modernism, is well argued. It is one of the cornerstones of her effort to show how the paradoxes and complexities of postmodernity were embedded in the paradoxes and complexities of modernity. One of the strengths of this book is the clear way Landry lays out these important issues.

The apparent conflict between modernity and postmodernity is repositioned by Landry as a “fruitful tension,” a phrase she admits is a bit trite. Her stated methodology is to take the positions of Habermas, Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard each on its own terms and as empathetically as possible, referring to similarities and differences, avoiding easy syntheses and polemics, and seeking a viable theory and politics from each. She initially addresses Habermas’ critique of postmodernism where he argues that postmodernism is neo-conservative, irrational and potentially fascist. Detailing Habermas’ rejection of the aesthetic modernism at the root of postmodernism, Landry discusses Habermas’ associated dismissal of the outsider view taken by the tradition from Friedrich Nietzsche through Martin Heidegger to Derrida and Foucault. She offers that Habermas was mistaken to take aesthetic postmodernism as a natural ally to political conservatism. It is precisely in the fact that both critical theory and postmodernism seek a critique of late twentieth century modernity, and that both have taken reified, and thus amendable, views of the complexities of modernity, that Landry sees the possibility of rapprochement, of creating a fruitful tension.

The chapters on Derrida and Foucault are clear and concise summations of their positions and of their defenses against the attacks launched by Habermas. If there is a fault here, it is that Landry’s voice is often lost amid all the commentators and philosophers, to the point that it is sometimes unclear exactly who is speaking in any one part of the text. Landry’s goal is to emphasize the rootedness of postmodernism in modernist aesthetics, especially in Kant’s third critique, the Critique of Judgement. It is this Kantian connection that is key to Landry’s effort to rehabilitate postmodernism in the light of its confrontation with critical theory. In a Kantian light, Landry sees deconstruction as a form of ideology critique converging with the tradition of Adorno and Habermas. Foucault’s genealogy is also placed within a Kantian framework, recasting Foucault’s essay on the Enlightenment as a defense

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of the spirit of inquiry against deadening principles and the promotion of an aesthetic of existence. For Landry, Foucault's practical ethics, along with Derrida's deconstruction, recognizes the inescapability of reason but does not accept its absoluteness.

If there is one unreachable postmodernist in this group for Landry, it is Lyotard. His aesthetic postmodernism, which rejects the connection between political theory and practical politics, is less likely to produce anything of value in fruitful tension with critical theory, according to Landry. Although Lyotard is the central catalyst in the fractious discussion between Habermas and postmodernism, he tends to drop out of the discussion after Landry's critique in the fifth chapter. This is a weakness in the work, for Lyotard, along with other French theorists such as Jean Baudrillard, appear to be among the most intractable of the postmodernists as far as critical theory is concerned. By effectively limiting the discussion of postmodernism to its poststructuralist adherents in Derrida and Foucault, Landry makes her efforts easier, but also less significant. The tensions within postmodernism between the intense critiques of consumer society and of the oppression of institutionalized knowledge on the one hand and the celebration of image, virtual reality, and computerized data banks on the other, are obscured by the perspective Landry chooses.

The result is an emphasis on the postmodernism debates as a twentieth century extension of the differences between the Kant of the first two critiques, refracted through G. W. F. Hegel and Marx, and the Kant of the third critique, developed by the work of Nietzsche and Heidegger. Landry wants to remind us again of the complexity of modern thought, of an Enlightenment tradition that embraces rational, moral, and aesthetic critiques. She rightly desires to keep us away from the simplicity of the so-called "Enlightenment Project" with its tendencies towards intellectual repression and political terror. She effectively takes us away from the stale dichotomy between transcendental rationalism and nihilistic relativism towards sustaining the tension between the Nietzsche-Heidegger tradition and the Hegel-Marx tradition. Finally, Landry tries to preserve the postmodern awareness of the multiplicity of otherness and to emancipate modernism from the domineering universality of the subject by using Kant as the touchstone.

Much more critical of Habermas than of Derrida or Foucault, Landry accuses the German philosopher of failing to see that his theory of communicative action does not hew to either a correspondence notion of truth nor to a purely realist epistemology. For Landry, a nonfoundationalist, antirealist philosophy can establish the ground for the intended reconciliation of postmodernism and critical theory and for a progressive political theory, including Habermas' goals of completing modernity and avoiding the political linkage between postmodernism and neo-conservatism. Habermas, according to Landry, misses the importance of language in Marx' writing, making Marx bound to the philosophy of the subject than to ideology critique and the analysis of class conflict. Similarly, postmodernism's misinterpretation of Marx as focused on production, wedded to materialist thought and realist philosophy, is also taken to task, but Landry's fire is directed mostly at Habermas. The detailed critique of Habermas' position is not matched by an equally thorough critique of poststructuralist or postmodernist concerns.

After outlining and debunking the Habermasian and postmodernist critiques of Marx, Landry finally makes her case for the rehabilitation of Marxian critical theory in a postmodern context. Landry's Marx is an advocate for situated knowledge, much like the postmodernists, a still important voice for critical theory and radical politics. Furthermore, Marx is seen, as are all the others, through a Kantian lens, emphasizing the critique of language and ideology. Landry wants to move beyond the negative evaluations of Marx towards a positive reception of Marx' refusal to be caught between the poles of universal reason and relativist skepticism. The rejection of simple bipolar dichotomies, a common denominator among postmodernists, is characteristic of Landry's thought as well, illustrating once again her closer affinity to Derrida and Foucault than to Habermas in the postmodernism debates.

Ultimately, Landry wants to argue that a limited, pragmatic transcendence can be sustained by deconstructing textual play, that a marriage of critical theory and postmodernism can be made. She opens the door wide for a consideration of this as a possibility, but does not firmly make the case that it can be accomplished. For a book that perhaps could have been alternately titled "Kant, Critical Theory, and Poststructuralism," Landry does a fine job in establishing the conditions for the possibility of a rapprochement between critical theory and certain forms of postmodernism. Rather than using Marx to reinterpret the postmodernism debates, as the actual title might imply, Landry has shown how postmodernist concerns over difference, the Other, and the uses of language can possibly rehabilitate Marx, and through him, critical theory.

The Evolution of Inequality: War, State Survival, and Democracy in Comparative Perspective by Manus I. Midlarsky (1999), Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, xiv, 349 pp. Reviewed by Patricia Kachuk, Lecturer, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of British Columbia.

Reviewed by Manus Midlarsky, Department of Political Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ.

Rarely does one see a review that misses the mark in so many areas. Patricia Kachuk's review of my book *The Evolution of Inequality: War, State Survival, and Democracy in Comparative Perspective* appearing in Volume 6 of the *Journal of Political Ecology*, happens to be one such rarity. At first, I wasn't even sure the reviewer read the book that I wrote, until I realized that in her review, my book had been distorted virtually beyond recognition. Errors are found in at least four areas. They include misunderstanding, if not outright misrepresentation of 1) intent of the book, 2) specifics of the theory, 3) conclusions from case studies, and 4) the nature of social science modeling.

Intent of the book:

My purpose in examining democracy clearly was to comprehend the sources and workings of democracy, if only to better understand the democratic peace, a dominant theory in international politics (my primary field of study), which holds that democracies do not make war on each other. Somehow Ms. Kachuk understood this as, "Midlarsky's focus is on how democracies are necessary to keep internal peace by justifying the extreme inequalities within the state in such a way that those who suffer most will continue to believe that supporting those who rule will be in their own best interests, thus protecting the state from any external threat of political violence." After making some sense of this passage, I reluctantly came to the view that only a totalitarian sensibility could have yielded this conclusion, which is quite the opposite of my statements in the book. There, democracy as a sham and opiate of the masses implied by the reviewer is explicitly criticized by me in the context of my denial of the validity of Marxist-Leninist "derogation of parliamentary democracy as a sham foisted on a virtually helpless public by the landed elite. For parliaments changed, and gradually the earlier control by the elite gave way to more inclusive forms" (p.14).

Specifics of the theory:

In a similar vein, my use of the word "genetic" once at the beginning of the book and twice in one paragraph towards the end of the concluding chapter suggesting some possible implications of the theory, was transformed into a basic component of the theory mentioned five times in her review. Perhaps this is one measure of the extent of Ms. Kachuk's distortions; a word used three times in a 349 page book is mentioned now five times in a 2-3 page review. The book index has not a single entry for either the word "gene" or "genetic." Although my initial mention of genetics was drawn from a quote emanating from Darwinian theory, upon reflection I now believe that there are more important reasons for differential rates of expansion among human groups. Several of these include the overwhelming size of one ethnic relative to another that enables the former to expand its territorial holdings, disparities in levels of militarization between groups, geopolitical vulnerabilities of certain ethnicities relative to others, or simply the luck of the draw in having empty space adjacent to a potentially expanding population. But the reason for expansion is not a basic argument of the book. Instead, it is the expansion itself in a fractal pattern establishing the foundation for state formation that is fundamental. This basic fact appears to have eluded Ms. Kachuk.

It certainly was not genetics that led the British, Jamaicans, Icelanders, or Trinidadians to be more democratic than others, but island locations that maximized state security and allowed democracy to flourish, as I point out in the book. My use of the word "genetic" in the conclusion, explicitly constrained I might add by the artifice of differential birth rates between the intellectually gifted and those less fortunate, was limited to the question of the potential scarcity of human resources in a technological age to be coupled with the ongoing debate over the scarcity of non-human resources. My solution to the possible existence of such a problem was to suggest a vigorous education program, hardly an emphasis on genetics. For the sake of symmetry and completeness I included availability of human resources in addition to non-human; somehow this brief mention of genetics became the basis for the entire theory in the reviewer's mind.

The basics of the theory are not understood by Ms. Kachuk, else she could not ask "why the ultimate winners in this random process, by his own analysis, are always white males of Western European descent." The answer given by my analysis is simple & they were the first to expand globally in a fractal formation by virtue of

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competition among their states and a consequent resort to new technologies and navigation methods, among other reasons. I even included in Chapter 2 a test of the fractal model applied to colonial populations governed by European powers in 1914. And the “ultimate winners,” of course, are not “always white males of Western European descent,” as the vast decolonization process of the 20th century amply demonstrated.

Conclusions from case studies:

Here, I am quoted and criticized for taking seriously the Roman example and Arnold Toynbee’s finding of a threat to societies from internal immigrant populations collaborating with their external counterparts. As one might expect, the context consisting of at least three counterarguments is not mentioned. In the paragraph immediately following this quote, I state, “Again, however, the presence of democratic procedures, the possibility of electing representatives from the new immigrant groups, and other mechanisms of redress distinguish these more contemporary instances from that of Rome” (p. 273). Geopolitical configurations enhancing the security of North America, Western Europe, and Japan also render this aspect of the Roman example and the Toynbee model less applicable to Western democracies, as I indicate in the succeeding paragraph. On the following page, I suggest that probably a greater danger to Western democracies arises from the process of elite withdrawal into an international culture of work and leisure, identified by Christopher Lasch. I wrote, “This orientation away from the state is eerily reminiscent of the later Roman Empire. The commonalities of ethnicity and language between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ Germanic elements, combined with political collusion by large landowners, are here replaced by commonalities of workplace, work ‘language,’ and ultimately shared values of this internationalized privileged class” (p.274). This process is intimately related to the issue of state survival under globalization conditions examined in a recent Foreign Affairs article by Martin Wolf.

On the matter of a probable threat of warfare from the Islamic world argued by Samuel Huntington, I explicitly stated: “Results of this study suggest that such conflict is not likely in the foreseeable future, if only because there are certain compatibilities between democracy and Islam that deny the mutual-exclusivity hypothesis” (p. 227). As a consequence of the democratic peace, the Islamic world should not be a threat. Once again, the book speaks for itself when confronted with these misguided, if not misrepresented challenges.

Nature of social science modeling:

At the end of her review, Ms. Kachuk’s rejection of simplification in modeling brings to mind Henri Theil’s injunction that models are not to be believed, but are to be used. That is, a model is not to be judged by how much it simplifies, but by the outcomes of research stemming from its usage. In my book, understanding the rise and fall of states including the sources of democracy, the finding of patterned inequality in the onset of Latin American political violence and the urban disorders of the 1960s, the awful consequences of African-American ghettoization during that period, the necessity for redistribution, the virtues of social mobility for state survival, altruism under conditions of equality during the Holocaust, and circumstances fostering gender equality, I think amply justify the simplifying assumptions required for the construction of my model. And these emphases constitute virtually the entire book. It is a pity that Ms. Kachuk, whatever her personal agenda, could not concentrate on this large body of material readily available for her review.

Smokestack Diplomacy: Cooperation and Conflict in East-West Environmental Politics, by Robert G. Darst. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press (2001), xii, 300 pp.

Reviewed by Barbara A. Cellarius, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Germany.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, disintegration of the Soviet Union, and subsequent end of the Cold War, environmental issues in former socialist bloc countries have received considerable attention from scholars in many disciplines. The reasons for this are many, including increased access both to archives and ordinary people (at least in some countries), interest in the aftermath of the Cold War and the ‘transition’ from socialism, and increased contact with and influence of the West in such countries. A recent contribution to this literature is *Smokestack Diplomacy*, the latest book in the MIT Press’s series on *Global Environmental Accord: Strategies for Sustainability and Institutional Innovation*. In it, Robert Darst, a political scientist, analyzes transnational efforts to promote

environmental protection in the USSR and five successor states (Russia, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) from the late 1960s to the late 1990s. In analyzing changing strategies and levels of success, he focuses on three issues — nuclear power safety, transboundary air pollution, and pollution of the Baltic Sea marine environment.

The study is driven by what Darst calls a “profound paradox” (p. 2): the greatest enthusiasm for East-West environmental cooperation occurred in the second half of the 1980s — that is, during the Cold War — instead of during the 1990s, as one might expect. Instead, the 1990s situation is described as being characterized by confrontational smokestack diplomacy. In the author’s view, the key to this paradox is “instrumental manipulation of external environmental concerns” (p. 3) — in other words, the manipulation of Western concerns about transboundary environmental problems by the (former) USSR in order to advance other goals. These goals changed over time from largely political ones, and particularly promoting an image of cooperativeness, during the Cold War to a more economic goal of generating funding for economic development and the amelioration of internal environmental problems (e.g., through plant modernization or replacement) in the post-Cold War period. The latter is made possible by what the author calls transnational subsidization, in which Western governments offer financial support for the desired pollution reductions. This, in short, is the central argument of *Smokestack Diplomacy*.

In a brief discussion of methodology, the reader learns that the book is based on extensive field research, including more than 150 interviews with diplomats, government officials, scientists, and environmental activists, particularly between 1990 and 1995, supplemented by press reports, government reports, and documents from international organizations. The author lived in the (former) USSR from 1990 to 1992, but does not specify whether this was for this project, nor whether he conducted interviews in the local language. He is candid, however, about the fact that Cold War-era information is reconstructed and that he sometimes had trouble gaining access to particular people or discussing sensitive topics such as environmental blackmail.

The book is organized into six chapters. After the introduction summarized above, Chapter Two lays out the book’s analytical framework and outlines the general argument. In a brief literature review, Darst argues that existing perspectives used for analyzing international environmental politics — perspectives that focus on domestic politics, transnational diffusion of environmental information, and the international distribution of power — are not necessarily wrong, but are incomplete in explaining the (post) Soviet case. He suggests, instead — or perhaps better additionally, since domestic politics do play a part in his analysis — a focus on instrumental manipulation. Beyond the goals and manipulation strategies of the recipients, the strategies of external actors — Western or capitalist governments and organizations — are also briefly examined. Of particular concern is direct subsidization of measures to reduce transboundary environmental threats, referred to at one point as “bribery” (p. 34). In analyzing the motives for subsidization and how recipients manipulate it, the author draws upon a well-known theory in environmental economics, that of Ronald Coase, applying it here to an international setting. The basic idea is that market transactions can lead to a reduction of negative externalities (i.e., pollution) to socially optimum level — essentially, the victims (or victim countries) will pay the polluter (or polluting country) to reduce pollution if it can occur at a lower cost than at home. But Darst does not place complete reliance on this economic theory. In the real world, he notes, transnational environmental subsidization is driven by the economic interests of the donors, including who does the work and what work is done (e.g., western contractors and technology). In addition, interest in subsidization is sometimes influenced by broader political interests, such as supporting friendly governments or eliciting cooperation on other issues. Finally, such subsidization is described as having three kinds of unintended consequences. “Moral hazard” refers to situations in which actors deliberately take more risks than they might ordinarily, because they assume that someone else will bear part or all of the costs or consequences if things turn out badly (p. 47). In other words, the prospect of subsidization acts as a disincentive to clean up one’s own mess or avoid polluting activities. “Polluter life extension” occurs when economic interests favor modernization (paid for by someone else, of course) over closure. And, in “environmental blackmail,” potential recipients threaten donors with greater hazards in order to get payment for not doing so.

The next three chapters flesh out this argument through empirical case studies. The specific environmental problems examined were selected because there was Western interest in and East-West interaction on them dating back to the late 1960s or early 1970s, and the USSR and successor states could not avoid internal environmental damage by simply exporting pollution or free riding on the clean-up efforts of others. Each case is organized historically, with the major time periods being (1) the late 1960s to 1985, (2) the late 1980s under the rule of Gorbachev, and (3) the post Cold War period in the 1990s. The case studies move from most successful to most contentious in terms of the nature of cooperation and the achievement of pollution reduction goals.

Darst describes attempts to reduce Baltic Sea pollution as the “most successful case of transnationally subsidized environmental protection” (p. 53). These efforts began in the socialist era, with little initial success in terms of concrete pollution reduction, but they led to the creation of an “epistemic community” and increased

information sharing. Several factors contributed to the subsequent success in addressing pollution problems in the Baltic by the late 1990s: the pollution sources were of relatively great domestic as well as western concern; regional decision makers had greater control following the Soviet Union's breakup; the newly independent Baltic States experienced relatively rapid political and economic stabilization and had relatively strong environmental lobbies; municipal wastewater treatment provided a focal point for the efforts; and, finally, the pollution sources were substitutable and evenly distributed, which allowed fewer opportunities for extortion. This is one of the few places where Darst traces the role played by an individual — Dr. Harald Velmer — an issue to which I return in my concluding remarks. There were a few unexpected dimensions to the success of this case. A proliferation of actors (albeit limited) in the post-socialist period was favorable for cooperation, and a centralized pool of funds was not necessary for a coordinated program — although it was in a sense replaced by an integrated abatement plan with a common list of specific targets and a central forum for discussing progress and experience.

In contrast to the Baltic case, relative willingness to cooperate on the reduction of long-range transboundary air pollution during the Cold War, beginning with overtures by Brezhnev in the 1970s, was not followed by substantive concrete success or cooperation in the post-socialist era. While early detente-inspired efforts created a mechanism for future bargaining and stimulated national research programs, reducing sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxide levels was not a priority for the Soviets. Much of the pollution reduction that occurred was due to other factors, such as changing patterns of energy production in European Russia in the 1980s, and declining production associated with the post-socialist economic collapse in the 1990s. Beyond this, Western pressure on the Soviet Union and successor states on this issue was nominal because, due to prevailing wind patterns, they are not a significant source of air pollution in Europe. (Poland and Czech Republic, which border directly on Western Europe, were of greater concern, and thus the focus of European attention.)

The exception to this relative lack of Western attention concerned facilities in the far northwest corner of the (former) Soviet Union, which closely border on Nordic countries and thus 'export' pollution to them. This is the site of the most sustained effort to subsidize such abatement in the newly independent states. Yet, in contrast to the Baltic case, these efforts were hampered by a general lack of convergent interests. Local (e.g., Russian) concern was about ash, dust, and other substances posing serious human health risks at short range, not the sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxides of long-range (i.e., Western) concern. The latter pollutants require different and more expensive abatement equipment. In two of the three plants examined in this chapter, Western-initiated modernization efforts failed largely due to changes in firm ownership. In the third case, privatization involved a Western firm that agreed to modernize the facilities as part of the deal, rendering subsidization unnecessary. An important factor in this last case was that the facility was located in Estonia, and thus that country's aspirations to join the European Union created an additional incentive to modernize the plant. Such was not the case with Russia — perhaps a major difference affecting the environmental policies and politics of East European countries when compared to those of most former Soviet states in the post-socialist period.

The case of nuclear reactor safety and radioactive waste disposal is largely a post-Chernobyl story, which the author describes as the "most tragic, paradoxical, and instructive" (p. 135) of the three case studies. In the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident, the anti-nuclear movement in the Soviet Union was relatively successful in the late 1980s, and many new nuclear projects were cancelled. In the post-Cold War period, however, the successor state governments decided that they could not afford to do without nuclear power and several projects were revived. In addition, the local anti-nuclear movement is described as largely disappearing with the end of the Cold War. (As someone interested in environmental movements in post-socialist countries, I found this "now you see them, now you don't" story unsatisfactory and would like to have seen a bit more discussion or at least some concrete evidence that this was indeed the case.) Meanwhile, with the availability of Western money through transnational subsidization, the successor states were willing to take more risks because they knew that richer states would come to their rescue if something went wrong. Beyond this so-called moral hazard, Darst documents two cases of what he calls "environmental blackmail": The Ukraine threatened to keep reactors running at Chernobyl until the West paid for replacement nuclear energy sources, and Russian threatened to continue marine dumping of radioactive waste until the more affluent countries provided assistance with alternative means for processing and disposing of such waste. The chapter ends with a more general consideration of environmental blackmail, concluding that such cases are actually relatively rare because numerous conditions must be met.

Smokestack Diplomacy's concluding chapter focuses on the successes and failures of transnational subsidization in the post-Cold War period and uses the lessons learned to make recommendations about how to maximize its effectiveness in the future. The basic message is that the end of the Cold War and introduction of transnational environmental subsidization has had both positive and negative effects: Most political barriers to East-West cooperation were eliminated, but the initial reason for cooperation — a desire to moderate East-West hostility — also disappeared. In its place appeared transnational subsidization, which has resulted in environmental

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progress in cases where, among other things, interests converge and recipients have the economic and political ability to carry through. But subsidization has also produced some undesirable outcomes — moral hazards, polluter life extension, and vulnerability to environmental blackmail. Yet, in the end, Darst argues, transnational subsidization can still be an effective tool for addressing transboundary environmental problems under the right conditions. He suggests that its effectiveness can be improved by building upon recipient environmental interests when possible; by ensuring that economic benefits of joint implementation reinforce environmental goals and avoiding situations where economic and environmental goals are at cross purposes; by placing recipients in competition when possible; and by coordinating donor efforts. Furthermore, he cautions against investing large sums of money in problems that will go away on their own or paying for pollution reductions that have already occurred. Finally, regarding theory, Darst concludes that international environmental politics cannot entirely be reduced to Coasian bargaining. The transaction costs of bargaining are high, after the conclusion of the bargain there are still costs for monitoring and enforcement, and donors have limited money. Beyond this, such bargaining does not occur in a vacuum, but is rather affected by larger conditions.

Overall, *Smokestack Diplomacy* is a quite readable book that clearly tells a plausible story. Like Janine Wedel's *Collision and Collusion* (1998), it is a needed cautionary tale about some of the actual and perhaps unanticipated effects of Western aid to former socialist bloc countries in the last decade. To the extent that it uses specialist theory or concepts, these are explained in an understandable way. The production was good, without problems in copyediting or typographical errors, although I would have appreciated somewhat more user-friendly endnotes — for example, headers could have been used to indicate the page range for the notes on a given page of endnotes. More importantly, however, as an anthropologist I would like to have seen more discussion of the people involved in the story being told, beyond state figureheads such as Brezhnev and Gorbachev or the few relatively faceless scientists, and also the relationships between them. In contrast, Wedel (1998) and Weiner (1999), to name two recent works both cited by Darst, provide detailed discussion of people, organizations, and relationships of a kind that did not make it into *Smokestack Diplomacy*. Further discussion about how generalizable the proposed theory was to other contexts might also have been useful. Does it, for example, work best in reference to the former Soviet Union (or perhaps even only its western zones), or are such factors applicable to the countries of post-socialist Eastern Europe or other less well off nations. Most of the former have aspirations to join the European Union, such that this is likely to be a significant incentive for them to address environmental issues of concern to the West.

Yet, in the end, Darst makes a convincing argument based on substantial in-country research, and given its readability and clarity, the book is likely to make it onto the reading lists for many courses. Perhaps it will make it to the desks of some decision makers as well. While this is deserved, I would hope that it does so alongside works that get below the level of state figureheads and discuss the individuals and relationships involved.

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Rainforest Exchanges: Industry and Community on an Amazonian Frontier, by William H. Fisher. Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press (2000), xii, 222 pp.

Reviewed by Gay M. Biery-Hamilton, Department of Anthropology and Program of Latin America and Caribbean Affairs, Rollins College, Winter Park, FL.

“Nuance” is the first word that comes to mind after reading Fisher's *Rainforest Exchanges*, because the author satisfyingly integrates change throughout his story of the Bakajá Xikrin, a Kayapó group in the Amazonian State of Pará in Brazil. Most ethnographies integrate the material only at the end of the book. I used it in one of my

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undergraduate classes about the Brazilian Amazon and the students liked the book very much. The material triggered many thought-provoking discussions in class. The book is an outstanding ethnography and also an excellent tool for students to examine all types of issues about indigenous peoples who have to negotiate their interests within a continually changing wider regional, national and global arena. It stimulates students to interact with the instructor and each other in class.

For example, Fisher argues that we should not see the Kayapó as consumers of trade goods allured by their desire for them. Nor should we take the view that trade goods are inherently corrupting to pristine indigenous cultures. Fisher's main contention is that they acquire trade goods into their society based on their social conditions. Thus, we gain a better understanding of why the Kayapó trade their precious natural resources for these trade goods, rather than viewing them either as corrupt Indians who inevitably want to modernize by embracing consumerism, or as helpless victims caught up in a maelstrom of outside interests. Students have differing opinions on this issue. The challenge is to demonstrate to them that a scientific argument, backed by strong supporting evidence, is not just mere opinion, and thus, one opinion is not as good as another. Delightfully, in every chapter, Fisher presents abundant evidence that supports his argument by focusing on the Bakajá Xikrin, among whom he conducted fieldwork on and off for more than ten years, and also by comparing them with other well-studied Kayapó groups.

The Kayapó have interacted with Brazilian society for almost two centuries, and have been involved in trading natural forest products, such as rubber, animal skins and Brazil nuts, for European goods. Over that time they have had to learn to come up with new strategies to gain trade goods in an unpredictable boom-bust economy that is based on the extraction of forest products. Further, they have had to contend with living on an uncertain "hollow frontier," which consists of overlapping social groups competing over extractive natural resources under intermittent periods of legal and administrative control. This type of frontier is contrasted with a solid-moving one based on an expanding productive economy that eventually comes under the firm control of the state as happened in the United States. This hollow frontier in Brazil remains significant today because the Xikrin cannot depend on the underfunded Indian agency, FUNAI, to adequately provision them or protect them from encroaching outside groups, such as loggers, gold miners, ranchers and small farmers. Throughout the past few decades they have become more dependent on trade goods, and the lack of agency support has stimulated the Xikrin to depend on their own abilities to negotiate agreements with loggers and gold miners in exchange for needed goods. The landscape in which natural resources are extracted for trade goods is not merely ecological and economical, but also political in that the Xikrin have different degrees of power to influence their dealings with outsiders depending upon the group in question and the situation, specifically when FUNAI decides to support or thwart their efforts and the agency's own power to do so. In answer to why illegal logging continues on Kayapó land, for example, Fisher writes:

The power of the wealthy in a land where everyone—including it must be said, local government agencies—is impoverished, is hard to overestimate. They retain what amounts to a practical monopoly on means of communication and transportation in the area. Through their political influence elites ensure that local government agencies that could exercise a restraining influence are kept underfunded and essentially irrelevant. (p. 160)

Political processes within Kayapó society also influence the exchange of their natural resources for trade goods. In fact, one of the most beautiful things about this account is that Fisher demonstrates the heterogeneity of interests between the Bakajá Xikrin themselves, according to whether they are chiefs or commoners, men or women, young or old. Instead of viewing the Bakajá Xikrin as a homogenous group that operates by a common cultural logic, Fisher gives numerous examples of the contradictions, tensions and differences of opinion among group members, because he grounds his study in social organization, using a political ecology approach.

For example, chiefs are placed in an increasingly difficult position of having to supply trade goods to influence and maintain the respect of their followers. In order to retain their position they actively work to limit the avenues for commoners to obtain trade goods on their own, and they use manufactured items to encourage people to work for them in gardening, hunting and fishing activities. Yet commoners do not like the exercise of that influence over them as the chiefs have gained power and wealth in recent years. They especially do not like the growing economic and power disparities that they see between themselves and chiefs, and actively resist attempts by the chiefs to make them work for "the common good," which they see as adding to chiefly provisions. For example, chiefs control the means of production for making manioc flower and for the larger hunting, collecting and fishing expeditions. They also try to make commoners work in the collective gardens. No one willingly works in these gardens because it takes away time from ones' own subsistence activities, and they know that the chief will control the product. Women especially resist because it undermines their control over their labor, time and product, and increases male authority, along with that of the chief. Yet, people must work in collective activities organized by the chief if they want to remain in good favor and be able to receive the trade goods that the chief controls. Despite the increasing wealth and power of the chiefs, commoners are still able to put pressure on chiefs to redistribute their wealth, especially in the ritual naming ceremonies for children. By complying, chiefs gain prestige, yet they find

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themselves in a difficult moral situation according to Xikrin standards. Fisher states:

The expectations created by the Xikrin social organization put chiefs in a position where they must supply goods to commoners but simultaneously are de-authorized from converting surplus produced by commoners into the means of social control. (p. 125)

Fisher points out the different perceptions between commoners and chiefs about the redistribution process. Chiefs emphasize how they are redistributing goods according to the "morality of kinship," for the good of the community, yet commoners calculate the generosity of chiefs in terms of who "pays well" (p. 187). The chief's role is viewed differently between commoners and chiefs reflecting the changes in recent years. Fewer men aspire to be chiefs because of the increasing contradictions of the position. They must be able to negotiate relationships with outsiders and among their own people as able leaders who can coordinate both secular and ritual activities, which involve these trade goods. In order to obtain trade goods they must sell the natural resources within Xikrin land holdings and be able to control the negotiations with outsiders, in order to maintain the respect of commoners.

Tensions and contradictions exist between men and women, also, because women perceive that recent changes are affecting them negatively. They only obtain some foods, especially game, through their relationships with men, especially their spouses. This becomes significant with the rise in female-headed households in recent years and with the increasing self-sufficiency of young men who are able to acquire trade goods from the chiefs. Further, some chiefs now hire poor Brazilians to work as gardeners, which undermines domestic production by women because of the potential breakdown of the chiefs' reciprocal obligations to them. Women actively resist chiefly authority to redistribute by appealing to FUNAI to give goods directly to individual workers, including women, rather than to the chiefs. They also refuse to work enthusiastically in the chiefs' collective gardens, despite the encouragement of their male kin, because only the men would receive the trade goods for their cooperation. Fisher points out that women do not oppose the influx of trade goods into their society, but they resist their increasing dependence upon men and the chiefs for trade and subsistence goods. Thus, we should see the divergence of men's and women's opinions and initiatives "as part of a complex interplay of contradictory social trends rather than as something given by a cultural charter for masculinity or femininity" (p. 192).

These examples only scratch the surface of Fisher's highly readable and nuanced text. He reminds the reader of the importance of recognizing that a political ecology approach must include the social, historical and political as well as the natural environmental. It is only through using such an approach, he argues, that we can truly understand why such groups as the Kayapó continue to allow the extraction of natural resources upon which their livelihoods depend, and to assist them in coming up with viable alternatives. Fisher makes the case that any solution-making process must recognize the external and internal political economies involved.

Democracy and Development in Mali. Edited by R. James Bingen, David Robinson, and John M. Staatz. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press (2000), 352 pp.

Reviewed by Dolores Koenig, Department of Anthropology, American University, Washington, DC.

In May 1998, Alpha Oumar Konaré, president of Mali, was granted an Honorary Doctor of Humanities degree by Michigan State University (MSU). In light of President Konaré's commitment to learning, MSU held a one-day academic symposium to celebrate both the commitment and the achievements of the president and his wife. Some of these presentations are assembled in this volume, *Democracy and Development in Mali*, which emphasizes the scholarly work of MSU faculty and present and former students. The only contributions by non-MSU affiliated persons are by Adame Ba Konaré (a noted historian and the president's wife), Cheick Oumar Diarra (ambassador from Mali to the United States), and David Rawson (then ambassador from the United States to Mali).

One might ask whether honoring a president might lead to a volume of limited usefulness, one that would inflate Mali's achievements or discuss only the positive. While it is indeed true that no harsh critics of Konaré's administration are included, the pieces generally represent very sound scholarship. They include articles by some of the foremost scholars of contemporary and historical Mali, among them people I systematically turn to for my own background reading. As I perused the book, I realized that I had in fact read a significant number of these pieces in earlier report form and found them important and useful. The articles here feature the latest thinking on the specialties of the authors are by no means puff pieces to please politicians.

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The volume concentrates on history and social science, agricultural development, and political studies of democratization, specializations reflecting the strengths of the scholars affiliated with MSU. While these perspectives may not represent a true cross-section of contemporary scholarship on Mali, they are important areas of inquiry. In any case, contemporary scholarship on Mali investigates so many varied questions that no single volume could do justice to them all. The strengths of MSU are as good a place as any to start. Readers of the *Journal of Political Ecology*, however, should note that while the political and economic are quite emphasized, the ecological receives much less attention.

The first section of the book addresses cultural and historical issues; with one exception (an anthropologist), the articles are by historians. The volume begins with an article by A.B. Konaré, who looks at the selectivity of collective memory in contemporary Mali and its uses for both positive and negative purposes. D. Robinson's article focuses on three colonial administrators in Senegal, Mali, and Mauritania, stressing the way in which these ambitious men were able to pursue their own visions of colonial change by deliberately cultivating certain allies (both in metropolitan France and locally) and by playing off opposition groups against one another (again in both places). J. Hanson's study of generational conflict looks at two generations of soldier-followers of the 19th century Islamic leader, Al-Hajj Umar Tal. After initial conquests, the first generation of soldiers settled down in conquered areas, taking up commercial farming; when outside threats induced leaders to recruit new soldiers more committed to jihad than to personal gain, tensions arose. G. Lydon discusses the studies done for the Popular Front government in the 1930s by a French woman, Denise Moran Savineau, with the goal of improving the situation of women in the colonies. Finally, M. Grosz-Ngaté analyzes why Malian villagers encouraged the migration of young men but discouraged that of young women, showing how this trend is linked to patterns of family patrimony that include young men but exclude young women.

Although these articles cover diverse topics, they are united by a view of culture as an institution in which social groups participate differentially. Hence men and women, youth and elders, those of different ethnic background, those with different economic or political interests, usually benefit unequally from existing cultural and social institutions. Individuals do not necessarily take cultural constraints as given, but manipulate them as active agents, with responses that may range from support to resistance. This is an important perspective for Malian cultural scholarship, which sometimes tends to reify cultural ideologies and traditions. These articles taken together show that Malians have faced significant change for a long time.

The second section focuses on economic and agricultural policy reform. This section is more focused than the first one because the articles are by agricultural economists, Malian and American (J. Dioné, N.N. Dembélé, S.B. Diarra, G. Dimithè, J. Staatz, J. Tefft), who have worked together and sequentially on a series of Mali-MSU projects on the effects of contemporary policy reforms. These articles address the effects on production and trade of major Malian crops (coarse food grains [millet, sorghum, maize], rice, cotton) of recent policy changes meant to liberalize markets, prices, and distribution. The articles raise common issues. First is the ineffectiveness of prices alone to create incentives for increased farm production; rather these need to be complemented by improved technologies and institutions that improve farmer access to them. This is shown in two contrasting cases: rice, where technologies and institutions encouraged quite dramatic production increases in response to liberalized prices, versus coarse grains, where lack of more productive technologies, agricultural extension, and targeted credit facilities correlated with very slow growth. Second is the emphasis on the changes in commercial distribution circuits created by liberalization and their effects. Of particular interest is the way in which liberalization opened up possibilities for small-scale distributors (grain traders) and processors (rice millers) and broke the control of a few large intermediaries - to the benefit of both consumer and producer. Third is a concern for the ways in which market imperfections (especially transport and information difficulties) created an economic context that favored flexible, small-scale processors and traders over large-scale, less flexible ones. Fourth, analysis of farm production is placed in the context of intimate knowledge of Malian farm households and the cultural underpinnings and conflicting interests in them, for example, the divisions between elders and youth, or the relationships between men and women.

The agricultural economists associated with MSU, both Malian and American, have perhaps done some of the strongest work on recent changes in Malian agriculture. These are impressive empirical studies with fine data. I have long consulted much of this work in the form of unpublished reports. Evidently, articles have appeared as well in specialized journals, but it is important that this work be made available in more places, as it is here. The market liberalization of interest was separate from the formal structural adjustment reforms during the same period but it was clearly inspired by a similar philosophy. These articles present nuanced views of the on-the-ground effects of liberalization for real farmers and traders and appear not to be driven by pre-existing ideologies about the role of the market. Perhaps this is due, at least in part, to the active collaboration of Malian and American researchers.

The final section looks at the road to democracy and decentralization in Mali. A. Clark looks at the contribution of the national conference, an institution found in many Francophone countries, to the creation of

electoral democracies. D. Rawson considers the contradictory tendencies toward centralization and decentralization in pre-colonial states, the French colonial administration, and the various post-independence governments as well as the challenges that these offer to plans for democratic decentralization. J.U. Davis looks at the opportunities for political socialization offered by diverse local groups and stresses the importance of capacity building to facilitate their inclusion in the democratic process. N. Mezey focuses on health and the way in which unequal gender roles constrain women's access to and use of health care, proposing some alternatives for health-care financing. R.J. Bingen's article looks at a variety of agricultural interest groups, their relationships with one other and with the central administration; he suggests that greater decentralization is likely to lead to greater access to the state by these groups because the nature of state centralization and concentration will change. Finally, C. Diarra outlines the contemporary challenges to the institutionalization of Malian democracy and efforts by the government to meet them; although placed formally in a separate epilogue, this article fits thematically in the third section.

Several of these articles provide historical perspectives of Malian political change; although they are all valuable, D. Rawson's is particularly comprehensive and noteworthy. While recognizing the achievements that Mali has made in creating multi-party democracy, all the authors recognize the broader institutional and grassroots changes that need to occur in order to strengthen and deepen the process; elections are a only a necessary beginning. The articles also reflect some of the controversies that have marked interpretations of recent Malian history, for example, the extent to which previous regimes were actually able to carry out their centralizing schemes. So, while A. Clark emphasizes the repressiveness of the pre-democracy regime of Moussa Traoré, R.J. Bingen notes the ineffectiveness of central government attempts to transform the countryside.

This book is an important contribution for those interested in Mali, in French-speaking Africa, or the savanna countries of West Africa. Political and economic changes are occurring very quickly in Mali; a few of those discussed here have already been overtaken by events, yet these articles offer an invaluable evaluation of the situation at the end of the 1990s. Another outstanding feature of the collection as a whole is the dedication of the authors to explanatory frameworks that emphasize the factors within Mali that enabled contemporary change; while some might suggest that this gives insufficient attention to larger questions of the relationship of these changes to international political economy, it offers a refreshing corrective to analysts who slight the local context to privilege global issues. Overall this is a fine collection of works about the contemporary Malian political economy

**The Economic Evolution of American Health Care: From Marcus Welby to Managed Care
by David D. Dranove. Princeton: Princeton University Press (2000), 211 pp.**

**Reviewed by Merrill Eisenberg, College of Public Health, The University of Arizona,
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For all of you who are wondering just exactly how our health care system came to be so dreadful, David Dranove has the answers. Dranove was a student of Alain Enthoven, the Stanford based health care economist who was one of the architects of managed care as we know it in the US today. His book *The Economic Evolution of American Health Care*, tells the story of the recent paradigm shift in health care that has taken place over the past two decades. This book is not a critical analysis of the changes that have occurred – Dranove is a champion of paradigm. The book is an informative narrative – an emic description from an industry insider of how business and economic concerns rose to ascendancy and now control health care in the US. It is written for the lay reader and does an excellent job of explaining how we got to managed care and the issues that drive its continuing development.

Dranove, like his mentor Enthoven, is a champion of market forces. He not only explains, but celebrates the economic rationale for what appears to many Americans to be the erosion of both access to and the quality of basic health care services that has accompanied the transition to managed care in the US. From a market perspective, the problem with the traditional fee for service medical care system is the “shopping problem” (pp. 8-14) - the consumer has no incentive to shop for the best value in health care, since a third party is footing the bill. While he acknowledges that empirical evidence for improvement in health care quality and efficiency under managed care is largely equivocal, he defends the market approach with a fervor that borders on the religious.

Dranove traces the history of managed care back to the 1890s, when fraternal organizations and associations

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of workers created prepaid medical lodges to provide health care to members for a cost of \$1-\$2 per year per member. At that time, more than one third of all families, mostly in low-income brackets, were covered by these lodges. Dranove follows the development of health care reimbursement schemes throughout the 20th century, touching on prepaid plans for work-related injury and illness in the 1920s, and the emergence of Blue Cross and Blue Shield in the 1930s. The Kaiser system was created in the 1940s, providing complete coverage for ten cents per day, per employee. These early third party reimbursement systems were small, and by 1950, only 10% of health care costs in the US were paid by third party payers. It wasn't until the 1950s, when antibiotics and anesthetics lowered the mortality rate in hospitals, that demand for hospital insurance began to rise. By the 1960s, the majority of working adults were covered by health insurance, which paid 21% of medical costs. During the early 1960s, states began to provide coverage for the elderly and poor and in 1965 the federal Medicaid and Medicare programs were established. It is then that health care costs began to rise precipitously as a percentage of gross domestic product, with hospital costs being the largest component of overall costs.

Government attempts to curb the rate of health care cost increase during the 1970s and early 80s are described. Dranove downplays efforts such as community based planning, rate setting, and certificate of need requirements, calling them "a waste of time and effort" (p. 63). However, the political power of the health care industry ensured that regulatory health care cost containment efforts were attempted only half-heartedly in all but a handful of states, primarily Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Maryland and New Jersey. In those states, costs were indeed contained. As one veteran Connecticut regulator told me, the "...quality of the leadership and determination to duke it out with the industry" are what made the regulatory approach successful in these states. For example, in Connecticut, a strong rate-setting program resulted in health care costs that were \$300 million lower over a seven year period of time than they would have been if costs had increased with the national average. (Forand, personal communication, May, 2001). Hadley and Swartz (1989) studied hospital costs in 43 large standard metropolitan statistical areas and found that hospital regulation was the single most important factor leading to the slowdown in the rate of increase between 1980 and 1984. In Dranove's opinion, these efforts were misguided and useless, and in some cases, "did more harm than good." (p. 63). He states that "the failure of government cost containment efforts forced businesses to seek their own solution" to rising health care costs (p. 65).

Managed care to the rescue! Dranove describes how his mentor, Alain Enthoven, along with Paul Ellwood and Harold Luft "began spreading the word about HMOs" (p. 66) in the 1970s and 1980s. We learn about how these pioneers in the movement enlisted the support of local business groups, and how business leaders were invited to Ellwood's vacation condo in Jackson Hole to map out the principles of "managed competition" in conjunction with Bush administration officials. Dranove credits HMO "evangelists" (p. 67) with increasing HMO enrollment from 9.1 million in 1980, to 33.6 million in 1990, and applauds the fact that today, more than 80% of working Americans are enrolled in some type of managed care plan.

Dranove does a good job of describing different forms of managed care organizations (MCOs) that have emerged, delving into the alphabet soup of HMOs, IPAs, and PPOs as well as explaining the difference between a staff and group model HMO and other industry buzz words. He clearly outlines the strategies that MCOs use to curtail health care costs, including selective contracting (demanding large discounts from providers in exchange for steering a large volume of patients to that provider), using "innovative incentives" for primary care gatekeepers (creating incentives for providers to withhold treatment), and instituting utilization review (allowing the payer, not the doctor, to determine the appropriate course of treatment).

After reviewing the research Dranove concedes that there "there is clearly no best way to use incentives to balance concerns about cost and quality. There are always trade-offs" (p. 76). He also concedes that there is no definitive evidence that utilization review affects either cost or quality. Nevertheless, he is not ready to give up on these strategies and asks for more time for the industry to tinker with these approaches in order to find the optimal strategy.

Dranove cites evidence that MCOs have reduced health care costs by selective contracting and by reducing the acquisition and use of costly technologies. However, he states that the effect of managed care on quality is "ambiguous" (p. 87). He dismisses patient perceptions of poor care as misguided because patients do not define quality properly. "Unless and until consumers take a more sophisticated view of quality, HMOs will necessarily look bad in comparison with traditional fee-for-service medicine" (p. 89). He admits that the US public does not trust MCOs, and blames the newspapers for publishing accounts of MCO "horror stories" (pp. 89-90).

He explains that managed care has caused providers to contain costs by shifting many procedures from inpatient to outpatient settings, and by cutting back on uncompensated care and research. With regard to the latter, he says the public will just have to accept this situation or the government will have to start funding it. In a market based health care system, medical research and health care for the uninsured are someone else's problem.

Dranove describes other strategies for cutting costs while improving quality that have become popular in the

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industry, including the institution of continuous quality improvement (CQI) programs to eliminate mistakes in existing processes, and reengineering by introducing new systems, making major organizational changes, and adopting treatment guidelines and disease management programs. He is especially hopeful about the development of disease management guidelines, telling us that their development has become “an opportunity to make a profit” (p. 99) and that many consulting organizations have taken advantage of this opportunity.

While applauding the fact that efforts to improve quality and efficiency have spawned new business opportunities, Dranove reviews the research and concludes that there is not strong evidence that either CQI or reengineering have had an impact on cost or quality. He nevertheless believes that disease management guidelines have a great potential for eliminating inappropriate variations in medical practice.

Dranove moves on to describe how hospitals and hospital networks use the competitive system to maximize their revenues, how physicians have been forced to get business educations, and how this new efficient system has created a need for a whole new class of professional services - physician practice management and pharmacy benefits management. He reviews the importance of data for strategic planning in a market based health care system and how generating those data is now yet another new and lucrative business opportunity. A competitive system also requires providers to make substantial investments in marketing so they can “evaluate their competitive position, attempt to differentiate themselves from the crowd, and price accordingly” (p. 102). That money is being diverted from direct service into these new industry support systems is evidently not a concern.

A long chapter is devoted to the intricacies of measuring quality of care. In a competitive system, consumers should have information about quality in order to make informed choices. Various measures, their strengths and shortcomings are described. Dranove concludes that not only are better measures necessary, but consumers and providers must change the way they think about quality.

Competition among MCOs is addressed and as with many other topics in this book, Dranove states that there is no direct evidence that competition has resulted in cost savings for consumers. Competition has, however, led to a wave of mergers and acquisitions involving not only MCOs, but hospitals, physicians, and other types of providers as well. Systems have also merged vertically – with hospitals, nursing homes, outpatient clinics and diagnostic facilities, and physicians being reorganized under one umbrella. This is the point where Dranove starts to get nervous about the direction in which economic incentives are driving the industry. He cautions against mergers that do not “create value” (p. 129) and is especially fearful of provider mergers because when providers band together there is less competition in the marketplace and MCOs lose their negotiating advantage. Dranove favors using antitrust laws to keep this from occurring.

In the end, Dranove tells us that managed care has saved us millions of dollars, but that it must continue to evolve to remain economically viable. He calls for continued investment in outcomes research to enable MCOs to identify cost-effective approaches to treatment and disease management, and quality research to develop information so that patients can make informed choices about providers and MCOs. Dranove is optimistic about the future of managed care as long as markets remain competitive and information is available for patients and MCOs to make informed choices.

As one of those uninformed consumers, I fail to see how I have any choice or how I have benefited from the market-based health care economy. My state offers University employees one HMO “choice”, and I have had four primary care physicians in four years because of mergers, closings, and HMO errors. My rates have gone up, I wait months for routine appointments and days for sick ones, I must arrive at the pharmacy on a particular day to refill prescriptions, and getting a new prescription filled takes several phone calls between the doctor and pharmacist to identify a drug my policy will pay for. On a personal level, I am clearly conceptualizing quality health care from the old paradigm. Dranove’s book provides the mental map of those who have conceptualized and implemented a new paradigm. It’s an interesting, informative, and maddening read.

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The Baobab and the Mango Tree: Lessons About Development - African and Asian Contrasts. By Nicholas Thompson and Scott Thompson. London: Zed Books (2000), xii+212 pp.

Reviewed by A. F. Robertson, Anthropology Department, University of California, Santa Barbara.

On the eve of decolonization half a century ago, attention in academic circles was focused on the new leaders of the “developing nations.” Progress would depend very largely on the quality of the “inheritance elite,” western-educated leaders with the intelligence and integrity to build on the material endowment of the colonial regimes. The dream was shattered by the apparent incapacity of developing societies to produce “good” leaders by recognizably democratic processes. Too soon, power was growing from the barrels of guns, and leadership in “The Third World” was characterized by ugly words like “kleptocracy.” As a new wave of scholars sought to apportion blame for the most conspicuous political failures of the twentieth century, i.e. the expansion of poverty and environmental damage, attention shifted to social forces beyond the range of individual personality, initiative and qualification. Externally, the new states were seen as the hapless products of imperial rule and the global expansion of capital. Internally, they were seen as enmeshed in “clientism” or “prebendalism,” dysfunctional blends of “traditional” and “modern” politics.

Good leadership was the hope of the 1950s, bad leadership the despair of the rest of the century. This view resonates with popular judgments in the rich countries about the personal incompetence of people in poor countries to govern themselves. Ascribing these ills to personal failings like greed, stupidity or ignorance is a way of evading the broader and more profound causes that lie beyond the compass of individual motivation and agency. The policy implication that we can progress by replacing bad leaders with good is incredibly trite. If we have learned anything from fifty years of development studies, it’s that life is much more complicated than that.

Blaming leaders rather than society or history for the ills of humanity is not so much a theory as a political presumption. According to Edward Luttwak, in one of several flyleaf puffs, “This book is propelled by a brilliant intuition: by comparing two non-Western countries (Ghana and Thailand) with each other, instead of the usual and futile comparisons with Western models, the authors have uncovered some true secrets of the ‘wealth of nations’ or lack of it.” If this is indeed the intention of Nicholas and Scott Thompson (son and father) it is surely disingenuous. The book and its comparisons are predicated not on something authentically Ghanaian or Thai, but on a very familiar set of Western ideological premises: “the evidence, in totality, is that there is indeed a relationship between political freedom and economic growth” (p. 14); “development really boils down to freedom” (p. 93).

The Thompsons’ criteria for progress are “openness” to international markets, unconstrained freedom of choice, the conservation of “good” traditions as “cultural capital” (pp. 20-23), change by gradual reform - “perseverance” (p. 15), investment in formal education, and above all, smart leadership. These very mid-twentieth-century virtues are augmented by a fashionable concern for courtesy to women and reasonable care of the environment. Other tell-tale preferences pop up from time to time: an enthusiasm for Francis Fukuyama, Harry Lee of Singapore, and Botswana (“the most astonishing economic miracle of Africa” (p. 45)) on the one hand, and a distaste for trade unions, “political correctness,” Libya, Iraq, and Cuba, on the other.

If you are seeking reinforcement for your liberal convictions, you will enjoy this book. If you are looking for new explanations of urgent issues such as the abuse of natural resources, or ethnic and sectarian violence, or corporate greed, or child armies in Africa and Asia, or generation warfare anywhere in the world, you will be disappointed. Nor can the Thompsons make much headway with such curiosities as the greater equality of income - and wealth - in the benighted Ghana than in enlightened Thailand, or why the latter could do little to resist the “meltdown” of its economy (pp. 53,112) in 1997.

The authors argue by parable: “Kwame Nkrumah thought,” so they say, that “dump trucks full of money arrive in the middle of the night, spill their loot around the countryside and, in the morning, people wake up, look out of their windows and see that, oh neat, development has arrived” (p. 81). They lean heavily on innuendo - “it was widely believed,” “it was everywhere said” (p. 49) “by all accounts” (p. 121). Metaphors of all sorts abound (leprosy, smallpox, hyenas, geese, chickens, albatrosses), the baobab and the mango of the title being the most prominent and the most abstruse. The role of the beastly baobab, alias the state in West Africa, has been “to

swallow, to consume, to obstruct, to stick its branches aggressively in the air and thrust its roots through the ground, sucking up every available resource" (p. 11). The way of the baobab (the image is from Saint-Exupéry and his Little Prince) "leads to certain destruction" (p. 15). Thus, after independence, Africa's "pioneer republic" Ghana began its "long blunder into poverty," degenerating into a "tragic Kleptocracy" with a "bursting population" (p. 1,3).

Although the baobab seems to raise its roots to the sky, I do not grasp the Thompson's image of "top-down development." Naively, I always thought the baobab a marvelous tree that survived where no other could, and offered succor to the traveler. But then I never did find Saint-Exupéry appealing. Neither, it seems, would West Africans, for whom the baobab is a vital, popular symbol. "You see," said the leader of Senegal's famous Orchestra Baobab recently, "we are just like the tree we are named after. The baobab lives for years and years. Storms and cyclones can rustle it, but it always stands firm" [Guardian Weekly May 10-16, 2001].

The mango, alias Thailand, develops modestly and fruitfully from its bourgeois middle, which "leads to qualified success, if you do everything else right too" (p. 15). "Thailand is not paradise - it has been turning "forests into asphalt" and is "the whorehouse of the world" (p. 4). It has had a procession of military rulers, and concluded the century with a massive economic "meltdown," but in the authors' eyes it is redeemed by its open-door liberalism. "Thailand may have been corrupt or even careless at times, but at no point was the government consciously and intentionally acting against the interests of the people or of development" (p. 11). The underlying reason for the pernicious comparison is clear: "East Asian leaders have gripped Adam Smith's invisible hand, while for forty years African leaders tried to cut it off" (p. 103).

For the Thompsons, underdevelopment is a product of historical and environmental disadvantage - how the dice are loaded. But what matters now is the how the game is played, the decisions "made at identifiable times by real people with names which need to be remembered, for better and for worse" (p. 184). Structural explanations (e.g., class conflict, the international expansion of capital) and solutions (e.g., national planning) are dismissed or ridiculed. Britain prospered historically because of its well-regulated commerce. That old leftist bogey imperialism is largely absolved of blame for the political and economic predicament of post-colonial states like Ghana (pp. 29-34). The causes of inequality are basically "just human nature" (p. 86) which good leaders should try to alleviate - "without crippling the rest of economic and political society" (p. 81). Smart leaders play the economic game on the board, but wicked leaders try to mess about with the rules. Luck, that great theoretical standby of the neoclassical economic tradition, is evoked to explain market failures, but failures in socialist planning are just bad leadership. "Idiot leaders have led to idiot economics" (p. 118). There is very little sympathy for leaders who, for all their faults, tried very hard to lead in a world that was so plainly concerned to lead them.

Political agency is a notoriously slithery notion in an analytical genre that can reach little further into causation than individual interest and action. Various entities like "Thailand," "the government," "the state" and "the people" appear often as univocal actors, rather than as political composites. The Thompsons' understanding of agency extends to what used to be called "the demonstration effect" in rural economics: smaller polities learn invidiously from strong regional exemplars (pp. 66-68), like peasants from kulaks. But they must know their place in the wider scheme of things: "A country must have a strategy proportional to the size and competence of the society" (p. 60). What this actually means, who should kowtow to whom, and what distinguishes benign and malign hegemony, glossed over. African Unity of the sort visualized by Nkrumah is unequivocally bad - but for whom? The Thompsons condemn Ghana for its monstrous "international hubris," whereas the Thais' "sense of gratitude" for assistance, especially from the US, is their "finest cultural trait" (p. 73).

The behavior of leaders is understood as a very transactional sort of morality, rather than one shaped by social forces rooted in history. Economics and politics are held distinct, the one a pure science, the other a corruptible art. Politics threaten markets, they don't define markets. Unfettered markets have the curative power to "root out" corruption (p. 135). For the Thompsons, the ideal politics are consensual, embodied in their own vision of "civil society" as the social context of liberal democracy. It is a comprehensive "we group," a critical public moved by national sentiment and with the capacity to moderate state power and "mercantile greed" (p. 153). The endemic "tribalism" of Africa is inimical to civil society, but primordial loyalties function positively if there is a "strong enough central ethnic group to pull the rest into their magnetic field" (p. 26) like the Han Chinese majority in Asia. Ethnic conflict in Africa is apparently the work of silly leaders: "Ibo officers killed the prime ministers of the non-Ibo regions and knocked off the Hausa Federal Prime Minister and his mentor for good measure, then wondered why everyone turned on them in a ruinous civil war" (p. 28).

In characterizing their version of Civil Society, the Thompsons make much play on "Essential Structures," a cluster of conservative values defined as conducive to expansion, security, and legitimacy of "the state and nation" (p. 89). They include religion, "culture" (p. 88) and "environmental protection" (pp. 90-91). Monarchy, as in Thailand, or Buganda, or Ashanti, can be an essential structure, but a class working for itself can not. Thailand's

“authoritarian but gentle regime” is praised for the way it “kept unions down in the 1960s” (p. 13), and Busia likewise gets grudging praise for his assault on Ghanaian unions in the 1970s (p. 166). There is a loosely populist assumption that a healthy civil society, whose life force is exchange (markets, transactions), will spontaneously generate groups (“NGOs”) which will express corrective interests (e.g. “bodies devoted to protecting obscure animals, distant human rights, and small farmers growing odd crops” (p. 141).) “Switzerland and England” are the paradigms of the “voluntarist participatory order,” which constitutes “civil society” (pp. 151-2). Disagreement is healthy, and utilitarian democracy is the gentlemanly way of resolving it. But consensus is the optimal political ecology of progress, and civil societies that become too querulous stagnate.

“When men and women at the top are open and dedicated to the country, it is likely that millions of countrymen will be too” (p. 184). Why? The authors’ account of “civil society” might be more convincing if it conveyed a clearer understanding of the massively rural populations of Ghana and Thailand. Focusing as they do on elite networks rather than the grass roots produces very odd images, like “the strangely contented Ghanaian villagers” (p. 95). Errors about people and places in Ghana (“villages like Mamprusi,” “Bolatanga” (p. 94) don’t inspire confidence, but more worrying is the Thompsons’ apparently tenuous grip on the history, ecology and political economy of cocoa production - and consequentially, their failure to understand the market forces to which anyone attempting to manage the economy at any level fell victim.

Practicing “openness” in this political prospectus involves entertaining debate while keeping a tight and tacit clamp on its resolution (a bourgeois trick that the Marxists were so concerned to expose). This book is interspersed with little boxes containing the bickerings of a mysterious couple, “Tara and Taylor,” who toss out opinions which the authors themselves seem too squeamish to voice: “Africa is poor because of Africans” (p. 32), “Wal-Mart is something that comes along with development and with freedom” (p. 80) etc. Other assertions are offered boldly as fact: “at the end of the millennium, every society that had tried to direct its economy had failed” (p. 8). (That must include all the national planners of the twentieth century such as Japan, France, and West Germany - along with such bold American ventures as the Marshall Plan and the Tennessee Valley project.) Again: “The global information economy is all-consuming and it depends on transparency” (p. 13). (It feeds very selectively, and it thrives on opacity.) And: “Short of Antarctica, Africa is the hardest continent for human beings to survive on” (p. 23). (That’s a poisoned chestnut - as with every other continent, it depends where you live and who you are.) And one more, to take the breath away: “Africa has been isolationist, hostile to immigrants and international business, reluctant to accept foreign advice” (p. 31).

The Thompsons’ version of bourgeois internationalism is fashionably cagey about “homogenizing globalism,” cautiously valuing “diversity” so long as it doesn’t interfere with free markets. The “open society” idealizes diverse peoples with diverse cultures freely trading diverse commodities. But the Thompsons bravely insist that there are good and bad “cultures.” A “good” cultural trait is “openness,” which implies “open economies, open attitudes towards foreign affairs and, most importantly, a view of the world that is not reducible to a zero sum” (p. 8). And if this is the best of all possible worlds, then we can probably tip the wink at a bit of corruption - especially of the “mango” variety (p. 12, 125) - so long as it is efficient and bears a few social benefits. But where do we draw the line between this sleight of the invisible hand, and “[t]he whole baroque monstrosity of theft” (p. 128) in West Africa? The answer, for the Thompsons, is disarmingly simple: markets - good, leaders - bad.

True to the liberal doctrines of individual initiative, rationality and morality, leadership is what links “history” and “tradition” in the making of a healthy “open society” (p. 7-8). “Bad leadership transcends ideology” (p. 39). The book homes in on the fetish of corrupt leadership, widely regarded by people in the rich countries as the cardinal failing of those in the poor. That leaders go bad is a complaint as old as politics, but these authors are at a loss to explain why they do so. Redemption, some prospect of a second chance, will depend on whether “the right people make the right decisions” (p. 174). The first piece of advice the authors have for the brave new leader is that “you have to consolidate political power so that what you accomplish doesn’t fall back on itself” (p. 165). This is exactly how Jerry Rawlings inaugurated his regime: the Thompsons’ make no less than seven scandalized references to his swift and prudent execution of his “three living predecessors” (pp. 44, 46, 64, 133, 148, 163, 181). If, as a Flight Lieutenant you have just seized power, the last thing you want is predecessors breathing down your neck. This he had apparently learned from their mistakes (the Thompsons’ second item of advice). He also (the remaining items) made snappy decisions and authoritative changes. The authors credit him very grudgingly with “a strand of cranky idealism” (p. 148) for capitulating to the IMF and its “Structural Adjustment” policies. His cardinal sin, it seems, was his distaste for professional economic advice (p. 168).

The Thompsons’ praise for King Bhumibol of Thailand, a “mild, ascetic and gentle man” (p. 58), is unstinting. In his “great and long reign,” this “beloved ruler” (p. 12) “has arguably been the most successful monarch of the century anywhere” (p. 5). Numerous other Thai officials, politicians and generals are also praised unreservedly for their complaisance. By contrast, the Thompsons are unstinting in their condemnation of those

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“plain brutes” (p. 50) the leaders of Africa. After independence they were “absolutely awful but their successors have been even worse” (p. 7). Nkrumah, with his “crazed dream” of socialism and unity for Africa, is their *bête noire*, slammed for “his vanity, ideological duplicity and disingenuousness” (p. 42). Jerry Rawlings does not fare much better: he was “a typical African despot,” the “great whale” (p. 163), though apart from bumping-off his predecessors, the authors are unable to nail him for a truly convincing vice. Busia was “bumbling” (p. 43). Acheampong was “an incompetent tyrant” (p. 10) and “Ghana’s chief kleptocrat” (p. 11). The disapprobation sweeps out to the other African leaders: Sekou Touré was “the destructive President of Guinea” (p. 66) and Eyadema of Togo “one of the worst blights ever to be cast on Africa” (p. 58).

The jacket blurb presumably has these excoriations in mind in commending the book as “courageous.” One way or another, it has all been said before, and so many of the culprits are on the litigiously safe side of the grave. The thought-provoking contrast, however, is not with the Thompsons’ approbation of the Thai leaders, but with their panegyrics for the bourgeois intellectuals with whom they ally themselves: “that great economist Partha Dasgupta” (p. 158); “the great development economist Robert West” (p. 14); “the learned Carl Rosberg” (p. 44); and a stream of others, many of whom rate the over-exercised label “brilliant.”

At Independence, African leaders had a passionate respect for academics, and insisted on the qualifications they had acquired, one way or another: Doctor Nkrumah, Doctor Obote, Doctor Banda. Now, everywhere, and with justification, the mood is skeptical. “It’s all academic now,” we say, when one football team is being incontrovertibly thrashed by another. Publics, even in Africa, are getting thoroughly inured to the vacuities that stream from the ivory tower. As for liberal panaceas and moral harangues about leadership, they have certainly heard all that before. As Jerry Rawlings famously remarked, when he was being lectured by the Structural Adjustment pundits: “blah blah blah” (p. 46).

Teetering on the Rim: Global Restructuring, Daily Life, and the Armed Retreat of the Bolivian State. By Lesley Gill. New York: Columbia University Press (2000), 222 pp.

Reviewed by Robert Albro, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Wheaton College, Massachusetts.

In her relatively compact urban ethnography of El Alto, Bolivia (a peripheral migrant city in Bolivia of at least half a million people) Lesley Gill asks a question we should all be asking: “what is wrong with the global economic order” (p. 181)? She asks this question in provocative ways, as well, encouraging us to think hard about the costs and benefits (if any) for people living in the onetime 3rd and 4th worlds. Cutting to the quick, for El Alto, at least, she detects virtually “no” benefit whatsoever for *alteños*, forced to come to terms with a draconian legacy of fifteen years of neoliberal structural adjustment. Therefore, her ethnographic goal is a study of “the complexity of local experience and the ways in which pain, loss, and desperation shape daily life” (p. 185) in El Alto, a marginal place of increasingly bleak prospects, forced to absorb the blows of neoliberalism as best it can, which is to say, often not very easily and with dire costs for those left to muddle through.

Given the increasing ubiquity and seeming inevitability of so-called “neoliberal democratization” in Latin America, detailed studies of what we might tactfully call its “fault lines” are surprisingly few and should be welcome. Gill’s analysis and critique “from below” of the fallout of Bolivia’s neoliberal regime for daily life in El Alto takes aim both at lacunae in the ethnographic attention to the aftermath of structural adjustment, and in the urban anthropology of the Andes. One reason why there has not been the sheer quantity of ethnography one should justifiably expect with regard to this, the most pressing global issue shaping turn-of-the-century Latin America, is the often bedeviling challenge of just exactly how to go about it. Given the intimate stock in trade of ethnography (that is, prolonged participant-observation by a single researcher in a “place”), it is a daunting task to confront such a scale and complexity of wholesale macro-level social transformation. Where to begin and how to describe the systemic effects of reform are not questions with singular or simple solutions.

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In Gill's reckoning, "neoliberalism" is less an optimistic set of policies embodying the "magic of the market," and more a plenipotentiary "field of force" of ominous shape. If neoliberalism begins as mere economic doctrine, as applied it is nevertheless polyvalent (rather than synthetic). The ethnographer explores the deployment of this polyvalent field in El Alto as an encompassing and infecting set of economic, political and cultural-moral practices, as a whole, both a site of "struggle" and a form of domination shaping "social relationships of inequality" (p. 20). This recognition of neoliberalism as much more than just an economic solution, and as a set of cultural-moral practices with the potential to wreak havoc on intimate lived worlds, is a key step in any critique.

Gill pursues how the deeply corrosive effects of neoliberal reform aggravate "urban spoliation" (p. 50). This refers to the state's disregard for its own responsibilities toward peripheral urban neighborhoods. Urban spoliation amounts to an assault upon the very integrity, stability, and wellbeing of familial and other traditional and intimate social relations (of "class," "gender," and "ethnicity"), now fundamentally reordered as a result. As a contribution to what can be called cultural anthropology's corpus of the critique of "modernity," such an analysis is certainly what we would hope to see from an ethnographic approach grounded in what, for political scientists and economists, might be the almost irrelevant minutiae of daily life. And this is just the point. Such issues are far from irrelevant, but rather fundamental. That they must be our point of departure (rather than, say, the boons of foreign investment) lies at the very heart of Gill's undertaking.

Gill's solution, a damning "critique" of neoliberalism as an ongoing process of social dislocations and cultural conflicts, reflects her choices for the description of the problem. She provides the reader with a "multi-sited" series of snapshots of key sectors of life in El Alto (using the methods of such "postmodern" ethnographers as George Marcus). In conspicuous contrast to the by now long-established tradition of intensive "community studies" in Latin America (in the past used to explore similar issues, as with June Nash's landmark study of Bolivia's tin miners), Gill uses the "multi-sited" approach in diverse considerations of relocated miners (chapter 4), plights of public educators (chapter 5), the role of the military (chapter 6), NGO's (chapters 7 and 8), and the ways family economies have had to diversify in the face of economic necessity. The abiding concern throughout is a commitment to understand "how changing forms of state rule are affecting the lives of vulnerable people in El Alto" (p. 4).

As a cohesive critique of neoliberal hegemony, the array of cases presented in this ethnography coexist only uneasily at times. At its best, Gill's multi-sited aperture convincingly takes in how non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are frequently ineffective as palliatives to poverty, in representing the poor, or as engines of grass-roots development. More often than not, she suggests, NGOs have come to work within the neoliberal context (rather than countering it) as a means for selective class mobility, to support the private sector, and to recreate clientelistic ties, all contrary to the interests of poor *alteños*. In short, Gill persuasively examines how the proliferation of NGOs in the Bolivia of "popular participation" amounts to an emerging front in a "neoliberal class war against the rights and interests of ordinary Bolivians" (p. 143), an insight applicable to other nations as well.

On the other hand, while Gill's discussion of the military is insightful – particularly in sketching out the ways that popular notions of masculinity are produced in collusion with dominant national institutions like the military – it is disconnected from the matter at hand, to wit, the question of how social rifts have been exacerbated or inculcated by recent neoliberal reform. Gill's discussion of the rifts between the armed forces and the poor is not really "time bound" in her argument as an aspect of structural adjustment, so much as an expression of hegemony in a paternalist state, a rather different matter with a distinct context. The case for neoliberalism as contributing to what Gill calls Bolivia's "low intensity version of militarized democracy" (p. 106) is not convincingly established in this short ethnography. It is also at such moments that thin ethnographic description and interpretation give way to polemics about the categorical impossibility of a humane capitalism, a view often treated in a matter of fact a priori sort of way.

With such a multi-sited, if occasionally scattershot, approach, one can wonder what happens to ethnographic thick description under a neoliberal regime. If Gill's work suggests anything, thick description is easily victimized in the "displacement" of ethnography both by the multi-sited technique itself and by the destabilizing effects of the structural adjustment process, the very object of Gill's analysis here. When inadequately framed or underdeveloped, such ethnographic detail becomes monochromatic as cipher for the polemic. One such instance is the discussion of *kharasiri* (pp. 51-54), a supernatural figure widely noted in the Andes, and which can take many forms. Gill briefly summarizes a single instance of *kharasiri*, and concludes, "The tales graphically depict feelings of vulnerability among those who are losing control of their lives as well as their bodies" (p. 54). The implication is that the desperate straits of state-sponsored health care under the neoliberal regime have either created or exacerbated such a loss of control among poor *alteños*. As implication, such imputed connections help create the ethnography's texture of critical indictment, while leaving the thick description of those connections for readers to infer. A multivocal figure if ever there was one, *kharasiri* has been interpreted in a variety of ways, though not here. It is thus not clear what kind of response *kharasiri* might be, if a response at all, by the "margin" to neoliberalism's refiguration of

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social relations.

Gill's reading of the predicaments facing former miners – once members of a highly militant union movement and now casualties of privatization – is also telling. She emphasizes the established history of “worker solidarity” (p. 80) and mobilization against state-sponsored injustices, and contrasts this to the present decline of the Fordist system of labor regulation, which has created the miners' unemployment and undermined their heroic basis for struggle. Gill makes the good point that lessons of the past are not always applicable to the present. She explains how ex-miners, now primarily tenuously surviving in the informal economy, have had to distance themselves from the struggle of collective mining unionism, something she laments.

In a funny sort of sleight of hand, “collective” resistance in the mines is aligned with the “community” currently being dismantled by neoliberal reform. And yet, the state-sponsored miner's life of past decades was clearly not an enviable one, but instead characterized by the extremes of family hardship, isolation, and vulnerability to not infrequent government oppression. Collective action amid misery and fractured communities are both bleak choices, but Gill's framing of the history of miner activism serves as heroic past counterpoint to grim current reality, where collective mobilization against unjust capitalist practices seems, in her words, “extremely difficult” (p. 183).

And yet just this has happened in Bolivia, in spectacular fashion, and with an unexpectedly successful outcome. In a series of confrontations between an inter-class and inter-ethnic coalition movement and the Bolivian government between April of last year and April of this year, “ordinary Bolivians” won a major victory over global capitalism, forcing the Bolivian government to renege on a deal it made with the Bechtel corporation to privatize the water system of the department of Cochabamba. Since called the “Bolivian Water War,” in effect participants were able to give the boot to a multinational corporation, Bechtel, while reasserting their local autonomy, and inalienable right to the precious resource, water. Not surprisingly, perhaps the key figure unifying and mobilizing the movement, Oscar Olivera, cut his teeth on the same style of “radical” worker union politics as the militant mining unions. It seems the outcome for a post-neoliberal Bolivian is not a totally grim and foregone conclusion, and nor is the story yet written.

In El Alto, the City of the Future, whatever might once have been “community” (and this includes the community of erstwhile “community studies) has become a “sick joke” (p. 27), an “extremely unstable amalgam of social relationships relative to the conflicts and contradictions that generate, sustain, and often dissolve it” (p. 35). Evoking and interrogating this unstable amalgam amidst neoliberal reform is no easy task, given the difficulties of tracing out its manifold and often alarming effects. We should thank Lesley Gill for taking it up.

Global Multiculturalism: Comparative Perspectives on Ethnicity, Race, and Nation, edited by Grant H. Cornwell and Eve Walsh Stoddard, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers (2000), 368 pp..

Reviewed by Frank J. Lechner, Department of Sociology, Emory University.

For all the faddish talk of “multiculturalism” in the 1990s, there are few serious academic studies of the subject. Yet it offers scholars a great opportunity: here is an idea that spread across the globe and changed, at least among many elites, common ways of thinking about the diversity of nation-states. It would go too far to echo the title of one American essay on the subject by saying that “we” are all multiculturalists now, for “we” are not. But more and more of “us” are, and even those who aren't must now contend with a new global discourse. How, and to what extent, did multiculturalism become a global model for dealing with internal divisions? How did integration-via-assimilation lose its luster? What does multiculturalism mean for different groups? How did it play out in particular contexts?

Reporting the results of an eight-year project on “Cultural Encounters” at St. Lawrence University, Cornwell and Stoddard shed some light on such questions. They initially equate multiculturalism with the mere fact of diversity in states made up of more than one culture or ethnic group. From this diversity stem certain tensions, notably between “cementing a national identity” and “recognizing . . . identities that can cross national boundaries”

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(pp. 14-5). This multiculturalism, which I would call descriptive, provides the theme for most of the case studies that make up this volume. But multiculturalism is now more than just a descriptive category. As the “glue binding the major Western nation-states is weakening” (p. 6), divisions are now to be negotiated, differences to be dealt with as such. Multiculturalism becomes a deliberate approach to diversity, a type of normative discourse. In some countries, it has been adopted as official policy. This multiculturalism, which I would call reflexive, more closely relates to the global questions posed above. At least some of the essays in this book go beyond description of diversity to address this deeper dimension of the subject.

Organized into three parts, the volume examines diverse approaches to diversity as nation-states wrestle with the unsettling impact of three potential fault lines: ethnicity, race, and inequality. All the essays are informative to some degree, but they vary in the extent to which they address the problem of multiculturalism. Some, such as essays on the Chinese in Thailand or on postcolonial Kenya, mostly shed light on the form of diversity in those countries. A chapter on race and land reform in Zimbabwe efficiently reviews the history of struggle over land ownership in that country, but does not systematically pursue its consequences for Zimbabwe’s current version of national identity—difficult to define though it may be. Other contributors, for example in chapters on France and Brazil, probe more deeply into the implications of the presence of “others” for previously universalistic notions of national identity. An essay on the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas shows, in useful historical detail, how the struggle between indigenous groups and the state has helped to open up the Mexican political system, but does not pursue the consequences of assertive “indigenismo” for the redefinition of Mexican national identity. From my point of view, the most successful chapters are those that address the multicultural theme head on, because they deal with cases in which multiculturalism has become a fairly explicit part of official discourse and policy. For example, Stoddard and Cornwell contribute a chapter on Trinidad and Tobago, under the telling title “Miscegenation as a Metaphor for Nation-Building,” and Dupont and Lemarchand analyze Canada’s official multiculturalism, showing how its virtuous rhetoric has provoked various critical political responses.

Partly because the book offers few explicit comparisons, it is difficult to draw general lessons from the long series of cases. The Canada chapter provides some: “the facticity of diversity does not induce, in itself, multiculturalism,” the authors argue; the latter is “a solution to specific problems” but also “a construction, and . . . debatable as such” (p. 311). Multiculturalism can come in different guises, they add: as diktat, as myth, or (ironically) as assimilation device. And even where it becomes state policy it may leave the structural organization of power unchanged (p. 329). Multiculturalism as a form of containing and celebrating difference may therefore fail—for example, because it can be used as a power tool, because it can degenerate into mere division for division’s sake, or because it can fail to make a dent in actual monocultural forms of domination.

As the editors recognize, “[t]he parceling of chapters and states into unitary containers masks transnational identities that spring from indigenous locations, diasporas, and globalization of the workforce” (p. 16). Some essays in the book do touch on such transnational links, but few analyze them thoroughly. For example, the Brazil chapter only tantalizingly mentions the role of international conventions and the international music industry in supporting a movement of racial solidarity. The Mexico chapter focuses on indigeneity as it plays out in that country, without situating the Zapatistas as part of a global movement. Apart from the editors, few contributors address an issue raised by the title of the book, namely how multiculturalism “went global.” To be sure, charting the flow of initially nebulous, sometimes esoteric ideas is hard. But with the historical evidence at its disposal, this group of scholars could have said more about that flow. Only occasionally do we get a glimpse of the globalization of multiculturalism as a model, for example when the chapter on Canada briefly shows how the meaning of multiculturalism there changed under the influence of a discourse flowing back from the United States. By examining multiculturalism primarily within the confines of particular nation-states, this book takes on a postmodern problem in surprisingly modernist fashion.

In its selection of evidence, the book does convey a postmodern sensibility. Some chapters, such as those on Zimbabwe and Bosnia, examine the “hard” realities of racial or ethnic politics; a chapter on China examines actual minority policy. But most contributions rely on interpretation of some symbolic display of identity—the controversy about racial mixing in Trinidad, representations of race in the Brazilian mass media, various cultural performances in Guatemala, arguments about what it means to be French articulated in hearings of a commission on nationality, artistic renderings of African-American double consciousness in the U.S., and so on. Of course, such analyses are indispensable in understanding the meaning of meanings. But in nation-states, identities crystallize in rules and relations, institutions and policies. Understanding multiculturalism in practice, therefore, requires more institutional analysis than this volume provides. For example, a reader of the French chapter would want to know how educational practices changed after the work nationality commission, taking into account the distinctive position of Muslim minorities, had made the traditional French understanding of integration more problematic. Similarly, closer analysis of the “structural organization of power” would have provided stronger empirical backing for the

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skepticism about the reality of multiculturalism that some chapters understandably express.

Linking the symbolic politics of identity to actual policy formation and power struggles, on a global scale no less, is a tall order. It is no fault of this book that it does not constitute an exemplar for how to carry out such multidimensional, distinctly global analysis. Had it been more successful in realizing its ambition, it might indeed have offered the “new paradigm for a critical and transdisciplinary approach to global studies” (p. ix) promised by the editors.

On the Plaza: The Politics of Public Space and Culture. by Setha M. Low. Austin: University of Texas Press (2000), xv, 274 pp

Reviewed by James N. Green, Latin American History Department, California State University, Long Beach.

Foreign travelers meandering through small cities or towns in Latin America will inevitably find themselves at a main plaza. A belle époque fountain, an antique looking bandstand, or a monument to a national figure may dominate the center of the square. If one sits for a while on one of the benches strategically stationed around the plaza, one might soon be approached by vendors peddling wares created for an international tourist market, a shoe shine boy offering to spit polish one's Reeboks, or a homeless girl selling Chicklets or some cheap item for a nominal price. If a canopy of trees shades the plaza and the gardens are kept up, one might linger a while to observe the occupants of this space: clusters of old men chatting among themselves, a small boy begging his mother to purchase a bright balloon, bunches of uniformed school girls on route home for lunch, and a couple intimately sharing some secret. Setha M. Low has artfully captured this world of Latin American public sociability in her meticulous ethnographic and cultural study of the politics and the social production of public space as represented in two plaza in San José, Costa Rica. Relying on twenty-five years of fieldwork and research in this Central American nation, the author offers an excellent example of how a micro-study can inform on much broader trends in urban transformation and serve as a tool for theorizing the effects of United States-driven globalization, not only on Latin America, but also perhaps on many parts of Asia and Africa.

Low is interested in the contested meanings and uses of public space, especially as modernization, urban renewal, and international capital alter public areas of the city. Her ultimate argument is that these places are among the last forums for democratic and personal interactions in a civil society. She arrives at this perspective through a careful study of two different public spaces: the Parque Central that represents the legacy of the intimate social world of colonial San José and the Plaza de la Cultura that projects modernity and commercialism onto the capital's downtown area. The different uses of these plazas by the city's residents and the significantly different cultural meanings associated with the two areas symbolize the dramatic changes that are taking place in urban Latin America. In this work, the author points to considerable economic and political transformations in urban social ecology that transcend the example of Costa Rica. This study could have focused on a small town in the Brazilian Amazon, in the highlands of Bolivia or in rural Argentina. The forces at play are the same and the implications for urban sociability are similar. One of the many strengths of this book is the way in which Low's analysis about the changes taking place in San José can be applied to urban areas throughout Latin America.

The traditional grid pattern of the colonial Latin American city placed the main plaza at the center of the political, religious, and social life of its inhabitants. Low and others have argued that many times the Spaniards built new urban centers directly on top of the markets, temples, and public spaces of the sedentary indigenous populations that they conquered. Constructing churches, arcades with market stalls, and government buildings on the sites that already had dense cultural meaning created a new spatial hybridity. Whereas the Spanish colonial elite enjoyed the newly constructed plazas and gardens as spaces for socializing, gossiping, and ostentatiously demonstrating their wealth and power, African slaves, indigenous people, and the mestizo population crisscrossed and occupied these same areas. The social interactions that took place, whether among the high or the humble, became an integral element in the dailies lives of people who occupied a world where time was certainly much slower than it is today and face-to-face communication was an essential component of all kinds of interactions.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Latin America elites, enamored of Georges Eugène Haussmann's urban

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reforms of Paris in the late-nineteenth century, remodeled some of the central areas of their nations' capitals. San José's Plaza Central was given a facelift, and a new Victorian kiosk crowned the space. Military bands offered concerts of classical and popular music for the public, and young couples used the park as a site for courting. In the post-World War II era upper class families moved away from the city's center, and the elegant polish to the park faded. Yet the rhythms of everyday life continued to pulsate through the plaza as friends met there to socialize in the midst of growing urban decay. San José's Plaza de la Cultura, on the other hand, is a recent invention, a modernist construction of stark concrete with little vegetation that has become the province of teenagers, tourists, sexual cruising and solicitation. In contrast to the intimate familiarity that characterized the Parque Central, the Plaza de la Cultura proclaims itself as an open forum for less personal and more temporal social and commercial interactions.

Municipal governments have remodeled and rebuilt these sites in recent years as a part of urban renewal. Users of these spaces have responded in various ways. The author documents some of the public debates and controversies regarding alternative plans for park renovations to reveal how important these places remain for urban residents, arguing that "public spaces, such as the Costa Rican plaza, are one of the last democratic forums for public dissent in a civil society (p. 240)." This is certainly true, as social movements in Latin America continue to occupy central plazas for protest demonstrations and public parks still offer an open forum for political debate. Yet, as Low points out, the massive influx of foreign capital and consumerism have restructured urban life. MacDonald's fast food restaurants have begun to replace traditional leisurely lunchtime eating establishments, and new pedestrian shopping promenades channel thousands of consumers along narrow paved-over streets overflowing with commercial establishments. Urban planning and spatial renovations can also erase sites of social contestation. One dramatic example is the Praça da Sé in central São Paulo, Brazil. When architects designed the new Metro station during the military regime, they created a renovated multi-layered plaza in front of the cathedral that diminished the possibilities for holding traditional mass rallies at that location. As politicians and bureaucrats manipulate public spaces for an array of purposes, the democratic power of these open expanses can dissipate. Ultimately, *One the Plaza: The Politics of Public Space and Culture* is an appeal to save those public parks and plazas that have historically facilitated social interactions and political engagement, not only in Latin America, but in other parts of the world as well.

Hardest Times: The Trauma of Long Term Unemployment. by Thomas J. Cottle. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers (2001), 311 pp.

Reviewed by Paul Durrenberger, Department of Anthropology, Pennsylvania State University.

Hardest Times reports conversations with 13 unemployed men. It also provides chapters on shame and trauma and discussion of the psychology of male identity to connect the narratives to the theoretical literature in psychology. Cottle's focus is on personal portraits of individual men in their own words, rather than illustrating particular attitudes or opinions (p. 6). Early in the book (p. 8) he acknowledges that the stories may cause discomfort to some readers because "we too dread the possibility of unemployment . . ." In the epilogue he suggests that unemployment is a consequence of a public policy that requires a portion of Americans to be kept unemployed and in poverty (pp. 283-284). One of his informants says, "The government bails the S and L boys out of trouble with our money, but don't bail us out when we didn't break a single law, how do you explain that one?" (p. 228). That's the question I'm left with. My problem with this book is that nowhere does Cottle connect these three points.

Some of the problems with the book are technical, and the lack of thorough copyediting suggests that the book was rushed into production. Some might wonder how and why Cottle put together these stories of an unemployed white construction worker, white engineer, immigrant Jewish Hungarian and an American Jew, two black manual laborers, white insurance salesman, two black teenagers, a housing project dweller in his sixties who prepares to die when his wife dies as he watches without the choices resources or insurance would allow, a West Indian immigrant in London, and a suburban-dwelling unemployed corporate computer guy who finally found some work. The one thing they have in common is long periods of unemployment. That is the topic of the book, but there is some reason to think that responses to unemployment differ by class, nationality, and ethnicity. The pattern that

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emerges seems forced — unemployment unmans men and makes their lives worthless to the point that some kill themselves. There is some talk of sampling, but I don't think it addresses the issue of why the author presents these stories. He does say that he is interested in the lethal aspects of unemployment (p. 191) and in extreme cases. But readers might benefit from knowing the range of responses.

Nor does he discuss how the material in the book relates to the interviews. How did he edit the interviews? Sometimes he tells us he had talked with a person of a period of years, sometimes he tells us the setting of the interview, but nowhere does he discuss an editorial policy that relates the narrative to the interviews. Some of the language of the narratives is so repetitive that I began to wonder if the author weren't reporting responses to leading questions rather than constructions of individual informants. Part of the argument, though, is that all of these people are in the same situation and respond in the same way. Cottle could have strengthened the case by discussing his editorial policy.

Social scientists who discuss identity could benefit from reading Chapter 8, which focuses on the psychology of identity. The problem with his treatment here is that it shows no awareness of cultural variability. He writes of "Western culture" and of "traditional society" as if these are meaningful entities. There are no ethnographic references to the just-so stories about traditional society. Like an economist, Cottle is filling in the blanks in psychological theory with assumptions. Nor will it do to point to what we all know by experience, our own folk models. Such cultural models mislead as often as they enlighten, and they should all be the objective of scientific treatment rather than folklore.

To discuss variable responses in terms of competencies, coping skills, social supports, and sense of control or power (pp. 201-205) is just to assert again that people's responses differ, without explaining why. Why would they differ on these dimensions? It might be related to class, or geography, or ethnicity or religion, but the author does not develop these questions. If responses differ on these dimensions, what guarantees that what we are witnessing in the narratives is a result of unemployment and not one or more of these variables? The fact of unemployment as well as suicidal feelings might both be related to some third variable such as one of these. The author could have addressed such issues so that readers do not draw such conclusions and blame the victims, a stance that is all too easy to take from middle class vantage points of merit and responsibility.

Finally, I was bothered by contradictions in the work, some of which seem to me to be based on stereotypes. If the communal orientation of support groups and gatherings is "feminine" (p. 271), what about the communal orientation of armed forces, fraternities, unions, lodges, old boys networks and other such "traditionally" male domains? If creating projects creates identity and work is at their center, and if men focus on contributing to family and communities, where they represent stability (p. 256), why is a job so central in the equation? Why not any kind of project? Cottle shows us that this is not the case, but does not explain why. If "the male worldview" contains elements of purpose, rationality, sanity, goal oriented-behavior, agency, instrumentality, intentionality, personal integrity (p. 271), why isn't unemployment liberating? Jobs, from the menial to the elevated, often assault all of these as surely as unemployment. Domineering supervisors, irrational procedures, insane management practices, self-defeating policies, irrational evaluation procedures — these are characteristics of employment celebrated in the extreme sample narratives of the comic strip Dilbert — characteristics that ring true because they echo shared experience of employment. Why is unemployment not freeing? If his job binds a man to family and community (p. 272), then it also separates him from them. There's the saying that no dying man ever said he wished he'd spent more time at the office.

This looks like a book made of a lot of pieces of interview transcripts and a review of the psychological literature. The latter is interesting to one who doesn't know it, but the former lack any pattern except that losing the job causes men to lose their lives, metaphorically and physically.

It is a pity that Cottle did not make better use of his experience and his materials to discuss the function of unemployment suggested at the beginning of the book and of this review — that the reason it is necessary is to keep the middle class worried. Whatever the intention of the policies that create unemployment and homelessness, one of their functions is to keep working people, especially those who are hanging over those pits by one paycheck, worried. People who are worried for their health insurance, their car and house payments are easy to manage, will accept the irrationalities of Dilbert-like jobs without protest. The genius of the American system is that our ruling class hires half of the working class to manage the other half of the working class. Unemployment and the ideologies of individuality and merit are ways to keep the middle class worried enough to be loyal to their employers. But such an analysis would take more than a string of first-person narratives, moving and tragic though they may be, and a review of the psychological literature. It would take an awareness of the operation of a political and economic system, a political ecology, that defines unemployment, poverty, and worry as parts of its operation.

Information Ecologies: Using Technology with Heart, by Bonnie A. Nardi and Vicki L. O'Day.. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1999), viv, 232 pp.

Reviewed by Dr.Chris Halaska , Social Design, Eugene, Oregon.

In *Information Ecologies*, Bonnie Nardi and Vicki O'Day present a new metaphor for thinking about technology. Going beyond the common metaphors of: technology as tool (objects to control and manipulate), technology as text (carrier of meaning from designer to user), and technology as system (technology embedded in social systems), they introduce the idea of technology as ecology.

Based on biological ecosystems, a technological ecology has several key components:

- it is a system of interrelated people and tools;
- it contains a diversity of roles for the people and functions for the tools;
- there is a coevolution over time as new technologies arrive and are assimilated, and as people's roles develop and change;
- there is a keystone species - a particular role, such as a person who can translate across disciplines - that is essential to the success of the ecology; and
- it has a defined locality.

According to Nardi and O'Day, the limited size and human scale of technological ecologies offer the possibility for meaningful action by individuals. Thinking about technologies in a defined environment lets people act locally in a committed, reflective way. "by responding to technologies with an initiative that is grounded in local understanding and values."

The book is divided into two halves: the first describes their views within the field of technology criticism and elaborates on their ideas about information ecologies, and the second is a collection of real-world case studies based on field work the authors have carried out. The field studies are all examples of information technologies being used in small-scale commercial or educational settings: corporate reference libraries; a virtual world based in an inner-city school in Phoenix, Arizona; corporate spreadsheet and CAD user; digital photography in another school; and a dysfunctional hospital operating room.

Local Action

The concept of a technological ecology is a useful metaphor, particularly because of its local focus. It has the possibility of changing relationships in the same way that the ecological notion of a watershed does. Political boundaries can become less relevant, while geographical ones predominate.

Nardi and O'Day point out correctly that looking at technology as part of larger political and economic systems can leave one feeling hopeless. If one sees technologies as embedded in these large, unresponsive systems, it is difficult to see how to effect change. The ecological metaphor helps address that dilemma by bringing the action down to a local level. The authors repeatedly point out that in smaller, local arenas, individuals and groups have the most influence and opportunities to leverage the system. This idea is crucial, as one can't overstate the positive benefits of giving people a way to make individual contributions, especially those who normally see themselves (or are disparaged) as technologically unsophisticated.

I wish the authors would go further, however, by locating personal, local action as a first step in a larger framework of taking responsibility for the technologies we choose to use and how we use them. By focusing exclusively on the local, they preclude important, wider action and place people into the position of always reacting to the next technology coming down the road instead of helping direct which technologies are created in the first place.

Presenting information ecologies as the first step in a progression could show how becoming involved on a local level will give people experience with directing the use of technology - experience that can be valuable later when they enter the larger arena of political activism. That growth has already been seen over time in such arenas as the environmental and civil rights movements. People who have started by focusing on immediate, local concerns

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have ended up being active participants in national, political organizations working for wider changes.

Evolving Information Ecologies

Nardi and O'Day's suggestions for evolving information ecologies are useful, although somewhat vague. They first suggest that one understand one's own and others' core values, to avoid letting technology designers or the marketplace decide what values are important.

They also suggest that one should pay attention to technologies and the activities that involve them, and wonder aloud why things are done the way they are. It is, of course, hard to pay attention to everyday activities -- we actively ignore them so we can get on with our lives. But particularly around the use of technology, it is important to occasionally rethink why we do things and why we are using particular tools. This is when it is particularly useful to have people unfamiliar with a technology -- those who are not experts -- comment and ask questions.

Nardi and O'Day provide a good list of strategic, open-ended questions to get one thinking about technology in a particular setting. Because asking lots of questions and re-thinking the use of technology in a particular ecology can lead to an excess of information and indecision, they suggest focusing on something small that will jump start larger action.

Isolated Ecologies

While I find the metaphor of technological ecologies to be a useful way to think about technological systems, my biggest criticism of the book is the way in which the authors place themselves in the larger discussion about technology. In particular, they set up simplistic technophilic and technophobic extremes, while claiming an untrodden, nuanced middle way for themselves.

The problem with this positioning is that at least two middle ways already exist. One of these is the dominant view of technology, which says that technologies are neutral, and good or bad effects depend only on how the technologies are used. This morally neutral view does not admit that technologies might have inherent biases. Nardi and O'Day do agree that technologies are not neutral, but don't acknowledge the extent to which the technology-is-neutral viewpoint dominates and influences our conception of technology.

For example, they point out how our culture often unquestionably accepts new technologies, and how that acceptance is actively promoted by technologists who expound on the inevitability of the new tools and techniques. But Nardi and O'Day don't talk about how this "rhetoric of inevitability" is fostered by thinking of technologies as neutral. If we consider all technologies to be morally neutral, then there is no point in judging whether or not a technology should be allowed. If all technologies are allowed, then it becomes inevitable that any technology that can be conceptualized, will eventually be created. The authors' middle way of focusing on information ecologies avoids dealing with one middle way that already exists -- the prevalent and damaging idea that technologies are neutral.

The authors also dismiss another middle way, the metaphor of technology as politics. This view has much in common with the metaphor of technology as system that they discuss -- the views share the belief that technologies are integrally embedded in our social, political and economic systems. However, while the system metaphor they use leads to the conclusion that technological systems are overwhelming and autonomous -- and therefore uncontrollable, the politics metaphor recognizes that technologies are created by humans for human purposes, and can therefore be controlled by humans who work to change social and political structures.

Nardi and O'Day write off political action in a paragraph, claiming it is not the appropriate avenue for everyone. That may be true, but without tying information ecologies to political action, larger change will not occur, and those inhabiting local ecologies will always be reacting to outside forces. Technologies will continue to be developed and introduced by others outside these local ecologies, while within them people will attempt to adapt the technologies for local use. There is no avenue for participants in a local ecology to help direct the development of technology so that it might reflect their values in the first place.

Abandoning Control

The theme of not wanting to control or restrict technologies except on the smallest scale runs through Information Ecologies. In their theoretical chapters, Nardi and O'Day specifically say that we shouldn't turn our back on technologies, and that in any case, technological systems are too complex to understand and control. They don't mention the existence of the field of technology assessment, which has been successful at predicting the major effects of new technologies.

Nardi and O'Day say that it is important to look at specific uses of technologies to avoid becoming trapped in generalizations about those technologies -- an excellent suggestion, as long as one doesn't lose sight of the big picture. Unfortunately, the authors use their suggestion in a one-sided manner to avoid the possibility of restricting the Internet. They criticize the technology commentator Jerry Mander for not looking at the way specific uses of the Internet foster diversity and help oppressed peoples. Then, despite discussing the dangers of commercialization of

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the Internet, they don't look at specific uses of the Internet that further commercialization and standardization -- two related issues they oppose. If they did, they would probably see that the list of detrimental uses of the Internet exceeds the positive uses.

This holistic comparison of a technology is precisely what Mander says needs to be done. He suggests that if you look only at the personal and local impacts of technologies, you might see personal and local benefits. But if you take a wider view, you might see that although a technology has benefits for you, it might have much greater benefits for institutions that harm you. Although the Internet (or any technology) can appear beneficial for everyone, it can be a net loss for those in favor of increasing diversity and community power.

On the scale of information ecologies, Nardi and O'Day do encourage people to control technologies. In their examples and case studies, they highlight the ways in which technologies are restricted in particular ecologies: one school decided not to send out newsletters via email because it would lose something in the new medium; another school decided to restrict certain technical features of virtual world software to help kids learn to deal with uncomfortable social situations; and in libraries they advise not replacing librarians with software due to the human expertise librarians add.

Finally, there are a couple of weaknesses in the case studies. First, they all involve information technologies, which is not surprising, given the authors' backgrounds (and the title of the book!). However, it would have been useful to have at least one example of a technological ecology that didn't involve computers. The case studies also could have benefited from a summary that compared the five aspects of information ecologies (system, diversity, coevolution, keystone species, locality) in each case to show how those factors affected the different situations.

Conclusion

Information Ecologies is written in an engaging style, which makes it easy to delve into, even in the more theoretical chapters. Nardi and O'Day's main project of introducing the concept of a technological ecology is an important one. Any metaphor that helps us think about how to encourage more individual and small group control over technologies is positive. However, there are a couple of key failings that make the book less persuasive and useful than it could otherwise be: their discussion of the technology criticism field is incomplete and less nuanced than they claim, and the presentation of their real-world case studies is not well connected with their theoretical material.

By focusing on the small, they provide an entry point for non-technical people to begin to control the technologies they face daily. But by failing to connect their information ecologies with the larger political system of technology development, their metaphor limits the possibility for larger change. The ecologies seem geared to deal with an inevitable flood of new technologies into small, local worlds, rather than places where committed people can direct the development of desired technologies.

Environmentalism: A Global History, by Ramachandra Guha. New York: Longman (2000), xiii, 161 pp.

Reviewed by Kathryn Hochstetler, Department of Political Science, Colorado State University

Environmentalism: A Global History is best read as a short but ambitious text that will introduce readers to a series of environmental thinkers from across the globe. In Guha's own explanation of the book, "this is a historical account and analysis of the origins and expressions of environmental concern, of how individuals and institutions have perceived, propagated, and acted upon their experience of environmental decay" (p. 2). As such, it is not a history of the environment itself, which he leaves to scientists, but a history of environmental ideas. In just 145 pages of text, Guha covers many of the most prominent environmental thinkers over the last two centuries, and adds a few lesser known as well. The thinkers are placed in their social contexts, with particular attention to the unfolding of industrial and colonial (and post-) processes. Taken as a whole, the book is well written and engaging; I think it would be successful as a text chosen to instigate discussion of global and historical varieties of environmentalism.

Guha divides the book into two halves, one for each of two waves of global environmentalism. In the first wave, which began in the 1860s and continued through the interwar period, three varieties of environmental thought competed to construct a diagnosis of environmental degradation and an alternative vision to it: the back to the land movement, the scientific conservation movement, and the wilderness movement. The back to the land movement found strong adherents in England and Germany, as industrialization brought a revival of agrarian sentiment. Pre-industrialized India also contributed a more practical agrarian thinker in Mahatma Gandhi, who read Carpenter and Ruskin while studying in England. Scientific conservation, characterized by a concern with environmental degradation and confidence in science's ability to reverse that degradation, also took root in Britain and Germany before spreading elsewhere. Global transmission of the ideas of scientific conservation was more direct and custodial, as colonial powers established state-run departments to manage their colonies's forests, soil, water, wildlife, and fisheries. Guha strongly criticizes these management efforts on both social and environmental grounds, preferring Japan's indigenous forest science. Similarly, colonial rule spread the wilderness idea to Europe's colonies, with protection of native wildlife often taking priority over native peoples. The wilderness thinking of the Americans John Muir and Aldo Leopold (born in Germany) is presented more sympathetically, with attention to their differences as well as their shared appreciation for non-human species.

The first wave of environmentalism ended with an interlude of "ecological innocence" after World War II, when both North and South were committed to economic growth through technology. Dissenters from technological optimism — Sauer, Mumford, Schumacher, Mira Behn (in India) — were easily ignored in the industrialized world, and the newly independent countries sought economic liftoff on the western path, not a renewed village economy.

With numerous others, Guha dates the beginning of the second wave of environmentalism to Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* (1962), which he extols for its impact and quality. Across the globe, the second wave added an environmentally engaged public to the previously expert arena of environmental thought. Guha organizes his discussion of the second wave with three chapters on what would once have been called the first, second, and third worlds. Among the affluent, both the threat of impending doom and the desire to consume nature as another good drove the steady growth of the environmental movement after 1962 (Guha's data end with 1991). Guha differentiates deep ecologists from environmental justice activists in American radical environmentalism. A section on the German Greens, "the finest achievement of the second wave of environmentalism" (p. 97), completes this chapter. Guha cites Gandhian influences in all of these branches of modern environmentalism, but still sees a strong polarization between this environmentalism of the affluent and the environmentalism of the poor of the next chapter. He rejects the hypothesis of Inglehart and others that environmental concern belongs to the wealthy, but notes a change in its concerns. When peasants and indigenous peoples of Malaysia, India, Thailand, and Brazil mobilize on environmental issues, they link environmentalism to social justice and livelihood concerns. Sections comparing Brazil to India and Chico Mendes's rubber tappers to the Chipko movement offer some rare extended concrete examples of environmental thought in action. Finally, a brief chapter on environmentalism (or the lack thereof) in the Soviet Union and in China serves mostly to underline that the strongest debate of the second wave is that between North and South.

A concluding chapter argues that a shared global common future would have to be based on a genuinely equitable and participatory global democracy. In the absence of that democracy, concrete environmental debates will be conflict-ridden. Yet Guha's final word is that two ideas unite all the kinds of environmentalists he has discussed: restraint, in the sense of limits on behavior toward both the environment and other humans, and farsightedness, looking toward "a common future" and the multiple paths to get to it (p. 145).

As should be clear from this summary, this global environmental history synthesizes a very broad array of environmental ideas, across both time and space. As Guha himself says, this requires him to be "savagely selective" (p. 7). Fitting the introductory nature of this book, the selection criteria favor the better-known thinkers and movements, but there are plenty of lesser-known stories to send the more experienced reader to the bibliographic essay at the end. (This is especially useful since there are few citations in the text, and no conventional bibliography.)

The first part of the book, on the first wave of environmentalism, best achieves Guha's two aims: to present a "trans-national perspective on the environmental debate" and "to document the flow of ideas across cultures" (p. 8). In this section, we see clear linkages across cultures as travel, reading, and colonial institutions moved ideas around the world both freely and by force. These chapters show at once the global relevance of certain environmental ideas, such as wilderness, and their very different local meanings depending on where, how, and by whom they are put into practice.

In the second section, on the second wave, there is much less attention to the transnational flow of

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environmental ideas, despite the fact that global news reports, the internet, and international travel and meetings have shrunk the effective distance between peoples. This is especially noteworthy in the chapter on the southern challenge, where several of the examples Guha uses are commonly cited as classic instances of international advocacy networks (see Keck and Sikkink 1998). Guha stresses their domestic origins, which are certainly also a part of the story, but his references to the "prolific misrepresentations...by the international media" (p. 119) do not do justice to the transnational flow of ideas, perspectives, and activists at work. Similarly, he misses the ways that at least parts of the environmental justice movements of the north were inspired by their southern counterparts. I would have liked to see a fuller analysis of transnational environmentalism as we turn into the 21st century. Is it, as some have argued, a new variant of the 19th century's colonial relations? Could it be, in contrast, a manifestation of the more equitable and participatory global democracy Guha seeks?

Throughout the book, Guha's characteristic post-colonial critiques give the book a consistent perspective, which will challenge the northern students who are likely to be among the book's readers. Because of its focus on environmental thinkers across the globe, it is not the best presentation of the complexities of Guha's own perspective, however. For that, I prefer some of his other works, such as *Ecology and Equity* (with Madhav Gadgil, 1995) and *Varieties of Environmentalism: Essays North and South* (with Juan Martinez Alier, 1997).

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Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries, edited by Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2000), xxvi, 362 pp.

Reviewed by David S. Meyer, Department of Sociology, University of California-Irvine

"It appears that democracy is always in crisis," Ralf Dahrendorf writes in his too-brief afterword (p. 311) to this volume. Read Dahrendorf's four pages first, then again after working through this compelling, frustrating, provocative, and sometimes inspiring volume. Dahrendorf wrote the afterword to this book's ancestor some 25 years earlier. Commissioned by the Trilateral Commission, like this successor volume, *The Crisis of Democracy*, saw serious threats to democracy everywhere. Michel Crozier, Samuel Huntington, and Joji Watanuki identified external threats (most notably security challenges from the Soviet Union and communism generally), internal threats (particularly citizen movements and political mobilization), and discussed the intrinsic characteristics of democracies that made them vulnerable to instability (an argument developed by Socrates many years earlier).

Of course, much has changed since that report, most visibly, the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ironically, the editors note, at a time when the external threats to the Trilateral democracies have been substantially circumscribed, the democracies are vulnerable to disaffection from within. To be fair, the editors (with Russell J. Dalton) use the term, "troubled," rather than threatened, in their introduction. The problem is that citizens of these democracies have lost confidence in the performance of their governments, and indeed, in their politicians, political parties, and many other secular organizations. Declining trust, they posit, leads to weakening institutional capacity, which leads to weaker government performance, which leads to, unsurprisingly, further losses of public trust.

If you hear the crash of bowling pins in the background of this argument, it's entirely appropriate. Robert Putnam's ideas about social capital, that is, the trust, organizations, norms, and networks that help society function, animate all of the discussions in this book. As expressed in "Bowling Alone," civil society is deteriorating in modern democracies, such that the prospects for effective organization for all sorts of public purposes have declined. Putnam has been admirably effective in inspiring public intellectuals and scholars to speak to the decline in social

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organization he sees, and all of the authors here – an accomplished, international, and intellectually diverse team – have put on bowling shoes. This is not to say, however, that they agree with Putnam about either the causes or consequences of the decline of social capital – or even that it is declining, but they are speaking to the same sorts of questions, with informed reference to each other’s work, in this volume and elsewhere. As a result, the book presents a coherent whole, rather than just an odd collection of essays, even if the ultimate arguments that come from it include contradictions and qualifications.

The first team of essays addresses the decline in public confidence in government. Russell Hardin wonders, accurately in my view, if the editors may have posed the question of declining faith in government backward. It is hardly surprising that the public would lose faith in governments that preside over failed wars (in the United States, on poverty, Vietnam, and drugs, to mention a few), growing economic inequality, and relatively high unemployment. Indeed, one would be foolish to continue to trust institutions that continue to under perform, and Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris note that confidence in numerous public institutions (police, courts, armed forces, civil service), and even most private institutions, has declined in the past twenty years.

Not exactly, Anthony King writes; in Europe, existing distrust is of particular governments. Only in America, he argues (with less explicit reference to systematic opinion data than in most of the chapters) is the entire enterprise of government suspect. Distrust of government has a long history in the United States, but goes beyond the old American exceptionalism argument. For government to build trust, it needs to perform useful tasks for constituencies. In contrast to European states, the United States government does much less: it provides no national health care; makes extremely limited contributions to art and culture; and offers mostly low status and salaries in public service. Government action can build support for government, and indeed, can contribute to building social capital and democracy (see Ingram and Smith 1993). Limited government is coupled, however, with essentially unlimited expectations. In a peculiarly American way, King argues, citizens grow up idealizing their government, and expect everything from it, while candidates for office, particularly the presidency, campaign as if in a moral crusade, emphasizing on “character” or “values,” and demonizing their opponents, all in hopes of mobilizing enough voters or contributors to compete effectively. Of course, in office they can’t deliver on such promises (the structure of American institutions makes this impossible); disappointment and alienation then are virtually inevitable.

The second team of authors looks at the declining capacity of the trilateral governments. Legitimation of government, Fritz Scharpf argues, is generally a function of government delivering good and services, a point echoed by Alberto Alesina and Romain Wacziarg, who focus on the fiscal and political constraints that growing internationalization places on governments. As public education and mobilization has increased, governments face increased demands, even as they can provide less. Increasingly, what governments do provide is less public goods and more transfer payments. This sort of policy, essentially brokerage, undermines support for public purposes, and heightens fears about government withdrawal at the same time that it breeds suspicion of other claimants for government goods, and government itself.

Peter Katzenstein disputes macro-trilateral understandings of falling levels of social capital and political confidence. In fact, he argues, using public opinion data, distrust of government in small states is not increasing, partly because those states may be better able to limit promises and improve services at the same time. In other words, smaller states may provide more effective governance, and therefore engender confidence. Besides, Katzenstein notes, even if trust in government is declining, trust in social organizations independent of government is increasing. The new social movements, a point echoed by Sidney Tarrow in a later essay, may provide civic outlets and social ties, even if promoting a, perhaps well-deserved, distrust of government.

The third team of authors step to the line to discuss the causes of declining confidence in government. Susan Pharr, in writing about Japan, and Donatella della Porta, writing about Europe with a focus on Italy, point to political corruption as both a proximate cause of the decline in confidence, and a source of building “bad” social organizations that seek to exploit government resources without serving larger public purposes, undermining faith in government. Pharr tracks coverage of corruption and confidence in government in Japan and finds a strong correlation.

(In the final section, Hideo Otake traces how distrust in government in Japan may have issued in the era of a more responsive and competitive democracy.) Della Porta contends that slow or poor government performance breeds corruption by creating a space and demand for expeditors. This undermines faith in government, drives up costs, weakens performance, and contributes to a cycle of declining confidence and alienation. In looking at the “troubles” facing contemporary democracies, they say, the fault lies not in ourselves (social capital) but in our states.

The final team of authors look at broad changes in society and assess their relationship to declining trust. Pippa Norris examines the notion that television is the cause of the erosion of social life, a claim Putnam has made. Although this argument makes intuitive sense (watching television makes democracy a spectator, rather than

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participant sport), Norris finds the empirical support for it wanting. Self-reported television watching varies across countries, with the largest percentage of heavy television viewers in Japan, Finland, US, and Australia. Heavy viewers (more than three hours daily) are, in fact, less likely to participate in politics; light viewers of television are more engaged in politics, other civic institutions, and have more confidence in social institutions. But television effects disappear when the analysis controls for more conventional predictors of political engagement (particularly race, class, and gender). It looks like the alienated turn on the TV, rather than TV turning off the engaged.

Russell Dalton looks at value changes in the advanced democracies, and finds that wealth has bred a different kind of social capital. "Post-materialists," he argues, that is, people who act on concerns beyond day to day survival, are more common in the wealthy democracies, and they are more likely to distrust some governmental institutions, but this doesn't mean they have checked out on political life. Rather, they want government to do more on certain fronts: promoting human rights, protecting the environment, and providing broad public support for education and the arts.

It is these "post-materialists," apparently, who animate the social movements Sidney Tarrow examines in his contribution. While trust in government has declined, Tarrow notes, voluntarism has not; while conventional political participation has declined, participation in movement activities has increased. There has been a diffusion of social movement forms and tactics across the advanced industrialized countries, which suggests that some citizens have found more effective ways to make claims on government, and to create a responsive and vital political life. He concludes provocatively, that there may be "[L]ess trust about government and more activism interacting with government: these may be the ingredients of a less comfortable but more robust democracy."

As a whole, the volume addresses critical issues about the future of democracy. It's hard to gripe about the thoughtful, spirited, informed, and important debate presented here. Taken all at once, broad generalizations about distrust and confidence don't stand up when subjected to empirical examination, but something is happening. My frustration in reading through the essays is hearing a suggested, but untold, story, harkening back to earlier ways of analyzing politics. While some people are tuning out on political and social life, others are mobilizing in new social movements for collective goods. It appears that social capital has been increasingly concentrated, most generously distributed among those who have the most of everything else. "Post-materialism" may predict the divide between the do's and the do-not's, but it also tracks class. It is laudable that the well-heeled and well-educated can now agitate for clean air or human rights; but who speaks for those on the bottom half of the economic ladder? Who worries about minimum wages, employment security for less-skilled workers, or access to high quality public education for poor people? As governments respond to the squeakiest wheels, they actually may be exacerbating social and political inequality. If this is the case, sponsoring bowling leagues seems an exceptionally tepid response to a very serious problem.

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The Process of Business/Environmental Collaborations: Partnering for Sustainability, by Alissa J. Stern with Tim Hicks. Westport, CT: Quorum Books, (2000), 204 pp.

Reviewed by Jill M. Purdy, School of Business Administration, University of Washington-Tacoma.

The Process of Business/Environmental Collaborations accomplishes the purposes outlined by its authors: to help business and environmental leaders decide whether to collaborate and how to collaborate. Collaboration's goal is simple: to create partnerships between organizations and environmental groups who have traditionally been adversaries. The notion of collaboration has been written about extensively, but many of books on the subject are now more than a decade old [1]. This book successfully builds upon these earlier works to provide a comprehensive guide that is aimed at the people who may engage in collaboration. In writing for an audience of business people and environmentalists, the authors offer practical information and relevant examples that illuminate when and how collaboration might be done. Overall, the book is well written, clear and readable, although printing errors provide numerous distractions from the book's content (one 25-page section contains five typographical errors). Some confusion is created by the haphazard insertion of case examples throughout the text, but the practical advice that can be gleaned from the book make it worthwhile reading.

Although most of the book focuses on how to engage in collaboration, the book is more than a how-to guide. A drawback to many process guides is that the authors assume that one can and should engage in the process described in the book. This is of particular concern in the field of collaboration where most of the books about mediation, win-win negotiating, and other forms of collaboration assume without comment that collaboration is better than the alternatives. In contrast, Stern and Hicks do not paint collaboration as a panacea for business / environmental disputes. They encourage deliberation about whether to collaborate and they provide tools to assist the reader in making an informed decision. Chapter Two provides a very useful framework to help organizations determine whether or not to participate in collaboration based on their organization's values, the costs, the demands of the process, and the possible outcomes. The book presents an even-handed look at collaboration's costs and problems as well as its benefits and opportunities.

The collaborative process serves as the organizing scheme for Chapters Three through Nine, which comprise the bulk of the book's 204 pages. In these chapters, the authors provide advice on five major tasks of collaborating: gaining internal support, convening the parties, developing ground rules and strategy, negotiating agreements, and documenting and monitoring. The authors' experience with collaboration is evident in the thorough discussion of each task. Real world issues that might cause a first-time collaborator concern are addressed matter-of-factly. For example, a section on confidentiality acknowledges that environmental organizations may be reluctant to agree to confidentiality because they value public scrutiny, while businesses may be reluctant to share information regardless of confidentiality agreements. Rather than suggesting simple solutions to complex concerns such as these, the book makes readers aware of the issues and encourages them to devise solutions appropriate for their situations.

Following their discussion of the collaboration process, Stern and Hicks provide practical advice for when and how to involve outside parties such as the government, the media, and the public. In addition, they describe how mediators, technical experts, and trainers can aid the collaboration process and suggest criteria for selecting them. Given that no universal standards exist for private mediators, advice on how to locate a qualified mediator would have been a welcome addition to this book. Chapter Twelve considers both philosophical and practical questions of how to evaluate progress in collaboration. The authors encourage readers to think about what success means and consider both outcomes and processes in evaluating whether a collaboration has been successful. The chapter goes on to discuss evaluation procedures in some depth, addressing who should conduct the evaluation, who should participate in the evaluation, and when to conduct evaluation. This authors make a convincing argument that evaluation is crucial to fostering learning for all parties involved in collaboration. Useful back matter rounds out the book, with a glossary, a bibliography and an appendix listing recent environmental collaborations.

The book's strength is its practical narrative that walks the reader through the collaboration process step by step. Regrettably, the flow of this narrative is interrupted, sometimes jarringly, by five case studies that aim to provide richer examples of collaboration. The content of the case studies is interesting and relevant, but their placement in the text serves to confuse more than to illuminate. Cases appear at the ends of Chapters Two, Four, Six, Seven and Ten, but the content of a case isn't always easily matched to the chapter in which it appears. The cases would seem to be nothing more than storytelling if not for the points at the end of each case that summarize

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the lessons to be learned from it.

A further problem with the case studies is that in the earlier parts of the book, the authors frequently refer to the cases the reader has not yet read. In an apparent attempt to solve this problem, short synopses of all five cases are provided at the end of Chapter One, although no explanation is offered as to why these synopses appear in the text at this point. The synopses aid the reader in recognizing case references, but they don't provide sufficient detail to truly understand the examples presented. For example, one synopsis fails to mention the name of a key party to the collaboration. Without an adequate understanding of the cases, readers are left to page through the book for more information if they wish to understand an example used in the narrative. One might be well advised to read all five detailed case studies prior to reading the book in its entirety.

A final concern with the way that case studies are presented in the book is the order in which they appear. The first case presented, a description of the Rainforest Action Network's efforts to influence the forest practices of Mitsubishi Corporation, had the positive outcomes of ending a boycott and sponsoring research on improving sustainability. However, it also had the consequence of damaging relations between two U.S. subsidiaries of Mitsubishi and their parent company. Furthermore, the Rainforest Action Network failed to achieve its goal of changing Mitsubishi's forest practices. This mixed outcome collaboration is followed by a case involving Scott Paper Company in which collaboration efforts failed outright. Although these cases are important to presenting a complete picture of collaboration outcomes, one must read nearly one hundred pages before encountering an example of a collaboration success. The business person or environmentalist who picks up the book to explore the possibility of collaboration may be unduly discouraged by the first two examples offered.

Although environmental collaborations have existed for a quarter-century, relatively little has been written about them in the past ten years and few texts address private-sector environmental collaboration. *The Process of Business/Environmental Collaborations* responds to the field's need for an updated text that may serve both academics and practitioners. Its focus on private-sector collaboration creates a useful new source of information and examples. For those who wish to travel the path of collaboration, *The Process of Business/Environmental Collaborations* provides a concise, yet comprehensive guide that may enable new partnerships between business and environmentalists.

FOOTNOTE:

[1] Classic books in the area of environmental collaboration include *Environmental Dispute Resolution* by Lawrence Bacow and Michael Wheeler (New York: Plenum Press, 1984), *Resolving Environmental Disputes: A Decade of Experience* by Gail Bingham (Washington, D.C.: The Conservation Foundation, 1986) and *Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems* by Barbara Gray (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989).

Connection on the Ice, by Patti H. Clayton. Philadelphia: Temple University Press (1998), xxiv, 303 pp.

Reviewed by Holmes Rolston III, Department of Philosophy, Colorado State University.

Clayton uses the rescue in October 1988 of two whales at Barrow, Alaska, "one of the most remarkable animal rescues in history," as a window into the human relation to nature, our "connection" as she puts it, as "a microcosm of the human-environment interaction" [pp. xviii-xix]. She sets her window against a generally modern worldview in which, she thinks, humans have too much "detached" themselves from nature.

Clayton enjoys a story-telling environmental ethics. Her ethics is one that is lived--a pragmatic one (to use a word now much in vogue); but she steadily pursues what theory can justify the actions practiced in the story she recounts. The whale rescue was a quite public event, involving governments, even U.S./Soviet cooperation, and worldwide media coverage for three weeks. It caught up hundreds of individuals in the rescue effort and millions with a concern for animals. There is ample "connection" here between ethics and policy.

Clayton explores various ways of making sense of the whale rescue, as this might fit into a larger framework making sense of humans on the planet. She worries about "the possibility and the difficulty of building a more generalized concern from such localized concern" [p. 145]. The two schools of thought ("conceptual lenses") that

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help her most are that of the ecofeminists, with their sense of caring, and that of Martin Heidegger, a phenomenologist.

She sets these alternatives over against what she calls the dominant view, although, since she sketches a number of such views, there is no single dominant view. Still, she finds that these dominants all contain family resemblances: too much reason and not enough emotion, too much dualism and abstraction, too much universality, impartiality, too much conflict and resolution seeking justice and fairness [pp. 66-74].

A repeated problem, however, is that the “dominant view” is, on the whole, more pluralist than Clayton can contain. She finds within it for example simultaneously the conviction that the rescue “was grounded in respect for inherent value” in the whales [p. 76] and that “anthropocentrism is still the dominant mindset guiding our interactions with nonhumans” [p. 85]. The former certainly sounds close to some form of “caring,” as espoused by the ecofeminists, and the rescuers were almost entirely men, maybe trying to show off what they could do, but many seemingly genuinely concerned for the suffering whales. So the format of two alternatives against a dominant view gets somewhat forced at times.

Clayton’s study has the advantage of being concrete, particular, relevant, real-life, or “existential,” as the phenomenologists she favors sometimes like to put it. (Accompanying photographs take you there.) Her approach also has, as she can recognize, all the disadvantages of moving from the particular to the general, troublesome “connections.”

One worry is that such events soon become dated--history. If used in class now the main event happened when the students were in diapers. This introduces, right at the start, another “connection” problem. One has to ask whether this episode is a timeless window into some larger truths, like some Biblical parable or historic legal case. Or maybe this once-upon-a-time story is an isolated particular that cannot be extrapolated too far, a partial truth, which becomes untrue if we try to abstract out some whole truth. The “connections” could be weaker than that. A single event is seldom rich enough to reveal the full story. Maybe it is almost the other way round: whales live too rich a life; one cannot generalize from a charismatic species to an ecosystemic ethics.

Clayton is steadily concerned to find “connections” between humans and nature, as our concern for these whales shows. So far so good; every environmentalist seeks more harmony between humans and nature than we now have. We can phrase that as sustainability, or conservation, or environmental protection, or stewardship, or respect for nature. But this search is also going to involve recognizing the human uniqueness; we are both part of and apart from nature. The “disconnections” need to be distinguished, often couched as differences between “nature” and “culture.”

Probably most of us think that there is not much “politics” or “ethics” in wild spontaneous nature, little of either one and certainly of both combined. These appear in human culture, where ethics and policy can be debated, as Clayton is here doing. It is true, of course, that behavioral studies in animals, and especially in whales, reveal that they are social animals, more so than we previously knew. But the cumulative transmissible culture that has given us a deliberated environmental policy (“The Marine Mammals Protection Act”) or a debated environmental ethics (“biocentrism,” “ecofeminism,” “anthropocentrism,” “intrinsic value,” “environmental justice”) does seem to be distinctive to the human genius.

There are some, myself included, who worry that an ethic of “caring,” too disjointed from rational, “principled” analysis, may in fact lead us to do the wrong thing--to rescue the whales, when in fact, the better course (following “principle”) might have been to let nature take its course. Perhaps the thing to do is to draw ourselves back and remain “detached,” to observe and admire this struggle for life in which the fittest survive. (We chased off polar bears that came in to try to eat the dying whales; more “caring”?) With such drawing back, we might then realize that nature is not culture; we do rescue humans fallen into the ice; we do not rescue wild animals in distress. The human ethic is disconnected from the animal ethic.

The whale episode is set in wild nature; we act on that principle in those kinds of environments. We care enough to leave them alone, in their own integrity, death included, not enriched by our rescue, meddling in nature. But little if anything of principle transfers to how we ought behave on most of our inhabited, domesticated landscapes, hybrids of nature and culture. The “connections” are different. None of the main issues on our millennium agenda: escalating populations, development, environmental justice, global warming, sustainability, are much affected by decisions to save the whales. The focus here is on what to make of wild nature.

“For almost everyone involved, leaving the whales to die painfully was never an option” [p. 77]. Clayton too seems throughout to assume that rescuing the whales was the right thing to do; the open questions are why. But maybe a let-nature-take-its-course ethic should have been the number one option. It would have been not an option but the enforced policy had the story been bison drowning in freezing ice in Yellowstone--as shown in a celebrated case there (reported in *Natural History*, January 1984). This option is never adequately considered; all the ethicists

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surveyed can only glance at it [cf. pp. 85-86; pp. 143-144].

One might have thought that Heidegger's emphasis on "letting be" [pp. 181-183] would commend non-interference, but not so. Through this "lens," we want an ethic, a policy "allowing beings to unfold in their own Being without interfering," but that gets overwhelmed with "actively promoting their Being themselves by acting concernfully on their behalf, by preserving and protecting them" [p. 182]. Well, maybe part of the being of whales in their niche is to serve as winterkill food for the bears; the ecology that supports both forms of being is what we ought to preserve and protect.

Clayton is right; the whale rescue is an intriguing and revealing story. Her thorough analysis of it can help us in a "paradigm shift: toward an ecological world view" [p. 255]. She is wide-ranging; we get summaries (quite pithy and competent ones) of most of the principal positions, alternatives she canvasses en route in the search for a framework within which to make the best sense of the whale rescue. The story of a developing environmental ethics and policy is advanced by her work; her tale is well told, and she is amply reflective and self-conscious about it. The analysis deserving its place in the growing environmental literature. I put it down concluding, as she must surely agree, that this on-going story is still unfinished

Agency, Democracy and Nature by Robert J. Brulle, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2000), x, 347 pp.

Reviewed by Kelly D. Alley, Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Social Work, Auburn University.

The environmental movement in the United States is a pluralistic and polyphonic one. The intention of Robert J. Brulle's new book, *Agency, Democracy and Nature* is to bring to light the multiplicity of discourses and organizational structures at play in American environmentalism. Using Habermas's ideal of a purely open and rational public sphere, Brulle aims to analyze the discursive frames and historical and structural components of American environmental organizations to suggest ways that American environmentalism can be transformed in the future. Although the book does not achieve the goal of tying Habermas to the analysis of the data in a heuristic way, it does present the reader with a series of interesting historical and analytical discussions that appreciate the varied legacies and expressions of contemporary environmentalism(s).

The author opens the book with an outline of our current ecological crisis. He states that a "quantum increase in the rate of social change" is required to avert the worst of the projected ecological consequences of the modern age (p. 12). Resurrecting critical theory from what he calls a "deadening scholasticism" (p. 10), Brulle aims to build a basis for using it to examine the social causes of ecological degradation. Yet without fully defining what ecological goals are possible in an ideal public sphere, he assumes that readers see the environmental crisis in the same way. This ends up working against the very idea his data reveal that the public sphere is occupied by a multiplicity of perspectives on what nature and the environment mean.

Brulle reviews scientific approaches advanced in the 1980s that have explained the causes of ecological degradation. He appears to do this as a way to find a new model for understanding the social origins of ecological degradation and a new model for using theory to create a movement for social and ecological change. For this, he turns to Jurgen Habermas and reviews his model of communicative action, pointing to his movement from the everyday use of language to the formation of discourse and institutional organization (p. 23).

But not long into the text Habermas's model begins to look a bit simplistic in view of the task at hand. First, Habermas considers that communicative action should ideally move toward a situation in which "participants harmonize their individual plans of action." Mutual agreement based in communication forms the basis for joint action. By adopting Habermas's neat prescription, Brulle closes himself off to the possibility that action to halt ecological degradation might proceed without "harmonized plans of action" or without agreement between parties "based on reasoned argument" (p. 24).

Brulle aims to analyze discourses in relation to data on the size and wealth of their corresponding organizations. Unfortunately, Brulle begins with a rather neat definition of discourse (p. 25-26). For him, discourse occurs when cumulative languages form a stable definition of the situation. Citing Teymur, he adds that discourse is "a formation constituted by all that is said, written or thought in a determinate field" (p. 25). Discourse is a commonly held stock of practical social know-how and using its pre-given image of social reality, members have a basis for acting together in an organized manner (p. 25). Organizations result from the development and instantiation of a discourse as a legitimate reality in a bounded network of action. For Brulle, a discourse provides the cultural basis from which stable behavioral expectations originate, joint action is undertaken and organizations are formed. This is just too neat.

Brulle also warns, following Habermas, that institutionalized communicative action reduces the burden on communicative action, creates stable organizational routines, and leads to the development of specialized knowledges over time. This communicative action ensures the reproduction of knowledge needed for social legitimation and for the socialization of adult personalities. This is Brulle's way of saying that his analysis will be used to identify strengths to enhance and weaknesses to avoid in the building of a new public sphere of communicative action.

It is here that Brulle's discussion of Habermas becomes long winded. He spends too much time reviewing Habermas's model and not enough explaining how a new model can be constructed from the bedrock of Habermas. Although it is clear where the author is taking the discussion, he takes too long to get there. There is not yet a clear relation of Habermas to the problematic ahead. Moreover, Habermas is overplayed when Brulle writes that his model of communicative ethics can provide a model of justice, a standard for the creation of a moral and rational society, and a model from which a coherent worldview of current western society can be constructed (p. 42).

Again in Chapter 3, Brulle takes the reader through a rather long discussion of other approaches to human-environment interactions before beginning his sketch of a model. While this discussion is interesting it really belongs in a review article, not in a place where the author means to move decisively toward a model for analyzing his own collection of data. Again, he advocates for communicative action theory in order to counter the failure of market and state decision makers to take ecological knowledge into account. While many would agree that this is the case, there is a huge gap between the analyzed condition and the ideal way an eco ethics develops in public spheres outside domination by the market and state. What is required, he claims, is a fundamental restructuring of social order with democracy as the key component, civil society and voluntary associations at the seat of change, and alternative discourses flourishing. The ideal to bring about the social movement needed to prevent further ecological degradation is a long way away from the analysis at hand.

In Chapter 4, Brulle hones in on the need to study environmental organizations to understand social learning conditions and identify capabilities that can be enhanced to achieve the goals he has set out. He proposes to use discursive frame analysis, resource mobilization, and historical analysis to look at many environmental organizations. Unfortunately Brulle fails to connect these theoretical tools to the greater goal of using Habermas. In fact, he mixes the soup by introducing another definition of discourse, called the discursive frame, and taking the reader into another set of approaches. Finally at the end of the chapter, Brulle arrives at his tasks: first, to measure the environmental movement's resource-mobilization capacity; second, to identify the discourses on which the components of the environmental movement are based; and third, to analyze the organizational practices that each discourse enables. This will shed light on the conditions that either foster or inhibit a movement organization's ability to communicate the concerns of its members to the public sphere (p. 99).

In Chapter 5, Brulle uses tax data to describe various national environmental organizations by membership and staff size, income and income sources. In this way, a "movement" is measured in terms of membership size and income. But Brulle is fair to add that membership size does not mean strength in the field of communicative action. Members are permitted various levels of control and expression vis-à-vis the interests of their Boards. In Chapter 6, Brulle scrolls through several American cultural discourses since Manifest Destiny, outlining their main principles and proponents. Beginning with the creation of national forests, he makes a series of historical traverses through national forest construction and protests over federal land and grazing policy and links these discourses to the expansion of government environmental programs in the western United States. The historical review is interesting. However, it does not flesh out these movement discourses in terms of the voices of those involved and thus makes for a rather weak reading of what a discourse is (in terms of "all that is said, written, or thought in a determinate field"). Save a few quotes and statements conveying organizational principles and objectives and a handful of poems, the analysis is based on events and other organizational data. It does not elaborate the terms and expressions used by group members or the way they become the everyday language of discourses that instantiate organizational structures.

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In Chapter 7, Brulle turns to the early development of the environmental movement, discussing game protection, hunting and wildlife groups. This important historical discussion traces how environmentalism as an ideology derives from managerial interests. The discussion then rolls into the development of wildlife management organizations before returning to the historical account of conservation and preservation organizations. This chapter includes a great deal of interesting information but it is presented to the reader in a series of historical traverses through what the author is calling discursive frames. This means that one goes back and forth through time in several rounds, tracing out a few components of the discourse's principles and key objectives, and linking them to institutional growth and change. This leaves the reader with a rather schizophrenic perspective, not with a clear way to understand these discourses in relation to each other or to their own organizational structures.

Chapter 8 looks at reform environmentalism, what the author calls the most dominant environmental discourse today. Again there is an interesting discussion of the origins of reform environmentalism in the miasma theory of nineteenth century Britain, in Malthus's writings, in the Sanitary movement and in other moments in time. But when the discussion ends with an outline of the current income sources for reform environmental organizations as an aggregate, it fails to make the connections between the legacies of the past and the task of assessing the composition and agendas of contemporary organizations. Brulle finds that reform environmentalism fosters the development of oligarchic organizations that in turn keep them isolated from the members they represent. But, unfortunately he does not work out the way in which the discourses he has outlined are substantiated to create these organizational structures. Rather, discourses are extrapolated from data on membership, income sources and historical reviews.

Chapter 9 reviews the alternate discourses of deep ecology, environmental justice, eco-feminism, and eco-theology. Again the historical discussions of these trajectories are interesting but the author ends up using structural data to make an argument about discourse. The author uses chapter ten to sum up the environmental movement, confusing further what this collectivity means. His substantive chapters summarized separate but often cross-cutting discourses over time, but this chapter assumes a contemporary movement, divides various environmental organizations, and looks at organizational categories (net worth, membership, political structure, and accountability to the membership and the wider public).

In the final chapter, Brulle brings the discussion back to his starting point in critical theory but only to conclude with an ideal. The ideal is to democratize environmental organizations, make them more responsive to member participation and increase the range of voices that are considered legitimate players in the public sphere. While the reader may agree with the goal, there is no clear path for getting there set out in this book, and though inclusive in focus and insightful in parts, no clear way to understand how it is that communicative action can halt ecological degradation.

Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another, by Spencer Weart, New Haven: Yale University Press (1998), 424 pp.

Reviewed by Juliann Emmons Allison, Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside

...this absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations. (Levy 1989:88)

The empirical observation that democracies, though no less belligerent than non-democracies, do not fight one another has remained a focal point for conflict and peace studies for more than 25 years. Spencer Weart's reaction to the consequently voluminous literature on this topic, in *Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another*, is to play the skeptic, asking "Do democracies really tend to maintain a mutual peace?" In response, he develops a distinctive political culture argument to explain his finding that republics—i.e., both democracies and oligarchies—have historically avoided war with other regimes "basically like their own." According to Weart, the

key characteristic of republican political culture is the tolerance of important societal groups by those who hold power. He supports his argument by analyzing select historical cases of conflict from Ancient Greece to the Middle East at the end of the twentieth century, drawing on relevant literatures in anthropology, psychology, political science, and sociology to clarify the theoretical foundations for the democratic peace thesis. Weart concludes his analysis by cautioning that any naïve export of the republican culture that underlies the “democratic peace” would be foolhardy. That is, coerced democratization is likely to compromise the very ideals that define a well-established republican regime.

Weart begins his study with a brief review of the reigning “domestic structure” and “democratic culture” arguments derived from Kant’s prescription for a perpetual peace among democratic nations (Reis 1970). According to the structural argument, it is representative government, together with the legal equality of all citizens and a private property, market-oriented economy, that supports citizens’ opposition to the costs of war as a domestic constraint on the use of force. A common variation on this argument asserts that “open” domestic institutions make it difficult for the leaders of democracies to gain the widespread support necessary for war. The democratic culture argument suggests, alternatively, that the leaders of democracies share a set of decision-making norms that facilitate the mutual accommodation needed to avert war should a conflict of interest arise between them. Unlike many recent reviews of this literature, though, Weart’s does not address “international” impediments to war between democracies, such as their membership in a community of nations with common interests that include nonviolent dispute resolution, or their tendency to maintain lower trade barriers and trade more with other democratic nations than they do with non-democratic nations.

Having thus established the domestic political focus of his book, Weart explains that in contrast to the major statistical studies that characterize much of the current research on the democratic peace, his domain of cases includes only borderline cases—“crises in which regimes resembling democracies confronted one another with military force” (p. 7). The foundation of his analytical approach is to ask with respect to each of these cases: “How far did they proceed toward war?” and “What particular features of each regime were or were not fully democratic?” (p. 7). Weart’s use of this method at the outset of the study accounts for his definitions of the key concepts “democracy” and “war.” He defines “democracy” as a form of “republican” regime in which more than two-thirds of the adult males are citizens with an equal right to vote, and thereby influence political decisions. The alternative republican form is “oligarchy,” which Weart defines as elite rule over a large societal group that is part of the core life of a given regime. He defines “war” as violence organized by political units against one another across their boundaries, and responsible for at least 200 battle deaths.

Weart’s central proposition that a common political culture prevents well-established republics of the same kind from fighting one another is akin to Antholis and Russett’s conclusions regarding Ancient Greece, history’s first system composed of democratic regimes:

Ties of common democratic culture therefore offered some restraint on wars between Greek democracies. That restraint, certainly rooted in self-interest, also exhibited elements of normative restraint. For the restraints to operate, however, it was necessary for states and peoples actually to perceive each other as democratic. If, because of motivated misperception, or poor or outdated information, one did not perceive the other as democratic, those restraints could not apply. Furthermore, it may have been important to perceive the other as in some degree stably democratic, with reasonable prospects that the democratic faction could retain power (Antholis and Russett 1993:61).

It differs significantly from this among the few studies that include cases drawn from the pre-modern period, though, because Weart finds that “peace has prevailed among only the same kinds of republics, oligarchies or democracies, as the case may be” (p. 14). He accounts for this binary pattern of peace in terms of regime-specific beliefs about how people should deal with one another, and how they do deal with people when groups are in conflict. Yet, according to Weart, the political ideals of equal rights, public contestation and the toleration of political dissent, and allegiance to the political process itself, are inherent in well-established republics of both kinds. Hence disputes between like republican regimes are settled as they would be between any citizens of those regimes—by negotiation and mutual accommodation in the interest of the common good.

Weart privileges the ideal of tolerance, or a principled recognition of equal rights (cf. Walzer 1997), in particular, and argues that republican societies do not establish boundaries between “us” and “them” geographically, but rather in terms of the degree to which crucial societal groups are tolerated. That is, throughout history, the citizens of republican regimes, have been willing to believe that all people of a given type should be treated as equals:

In a republic sufficiently established so that blatant inconsistencies between ideology and practice have been smoothed out, principles such as equal rights and reciprocal concessions permeate not only politics but daily social

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relations and economic life. If you are accustomed to such thinking, a regime built on principles of hierarchical domination and coercion will strike you as wrong-headed or even immoral. You would not see anyone who adheres to such a system as a member of your republican in-group... anyone who agrees that someone like yourself should be treated as an equal is more than halfway to belonging in your in-group (p. 105).

According to Weart, if the leaders of a democracy or oligarchy engaged in an international conflict are able to see their rivals as good republicans—i.e., like a member of their own in-group—they will expect them to negotiate mutually acceptable solutions.

Weart substantiates his “republican culture” argument by using a series of his borderline cases to: (1) distinguish between democratic and oligarchic republics; (2) show that each type of republic sees others like itself as part of its in-group, and other regime types as members of an enemy out-group; and (3) demonstrate that both democracies and oligarchies are liable to fight adversaries of their own kind that are not well-established. More specifically, Weart first suggests that the repression of any domestic group that plays a central role in the nation’s domestic economy, society and politics distinguishes oligarchies from democracies. By this definition, Ancient Athens, where disenfranchised men were distributed throughout most of society, and held a political status comparable, until recently, to that of women, who were considered sufficiently represented by their fathers and husbands in most democracies prior to the twentieth century would be a democracy. The American South before the Civil War, where blacks were regarded as subhuman, and the difference between blacks and whites was regarded as central to the region’s politics, would be an oligarchy.

Having made this critical distinction, Weart next establishes that democracies and oligarchies alike are willing to fight with governments that clearly are not republican—e.g., autocracies in which leaders hold an uncontested veto over military and foreign policy decisions—or not obviously enough a republic of the same kind. Here, in a manner consistent with constructivist explanations of the democratic peace (Peceny and Parish 1999), Weart determines whether a nation is republican in a given historical case in terms of how leaders at the time would have characterized it. Thus he argues that although Britain in 1812 might be considered an oligarchy on the basis of its political ideals, which were common among elite Americans, few among the United States’ leadership would have called that nation a republic. He likewise argues that Britain’s leaders widely regarded Americans as an “uncouth mob led astray by firebrand democrats” (p. 138). It would, therefore, be unreasonable to expect the United States and Britain to resolve their dispute short of war.

Weart then explains that it is ultimately the mutual recognition of well-established republican political culture that guarantees peace between democracies or between oligarchies.¹ Drawing on cases that include France’s 1923 seizure of mines and factories in the German Ruhr in response to disputed war reparations, Weart argues that a well-established republic is one in which leaders customarily tolerate full public contestation among its citizens. In this case, similarities between the parliamentary domestic structures and universal suffrage that would classify both Germany and France as democracies notwithstanding, Germany’s sustained reluctance to pay war reparations convinced France and its allies that Germany was not negotiating in good faith. According to Weart, this contrary behavior constituted evidence that “Germany was not led by men sympathetic to their own ideals” (p. 169). On the basis of such cases, Weart concludes that the toleration of dissent that characterizes republican regimes must exist for a minimum of three years before a given democracy or oligarchy may be considered “well-established.” He admits that this period may not be long enough to develop a fully republican political culture; yet history suggests that three years is sufficiently long for republics of the same kind to manage maintaining a mutual peace.

With his theory complete, Weart presents illustrative case histories to detail how leaders of republics behave in international encounters with those they perceive to share their own political culture with the same tolerance practiced domestically. He uses the 1972 Codfish War between Britain and Iceland, for instance, to argue that domestic political habit explains the tendency of republican nations toward negotiation or arbitration rather than war to resolve conflicts between them. In this case, which Weart regards as the only twentieth-century war between “genuine democracies,” Britain’s opposition to Iceland’s decision to extend its territorial waters to first 50 and then 200 miles in the interest of protecting its cod fishery resulted in warning shots and accidental deaths from ships ramming into one another. These incidents prompted other democracies to intercede with appeals to “democratic solidarity,” “respect for law,” and “fair play,” which aroused sympathy on the part of the British people. Their leaders were consequently persuaded to give way.

1. Weart does admit to a loophole in this generalization. Although extremely rare, war between oligarchies is possible if the nations in question share a reciprocal intolerance of incompatible political systems, as was true for some Swiss republics during the nineteenth century.

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Wear's argument to this point would suffice to deepen what we already know about the theoretical and practical mechanics of the democratic peace. Still, much to his credit, Wear goes on to suggest that peace is more than the avoidance of war; it must be defined in terms of the ways in which republican nations generally relate to one another. On this point, he emphasizes that since the time of the Greek city-states, "republics and only republics have tended to form durable, peaceful leagues."²² He attributes this finding to the extension of republican political culture, institutions, and dispute-resolution practices from domestic to international society. Naturally, Wear thus favors the adoption of the ideals of equal rights, toleration, and allegiance to political rules by the international community as well as by individual nations. He stops short, though, of advocating republicanism by force. With reference to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's facile promotion of self-determination (a policy which should have freed peoples from both internal domination and coercion by external powers to select their own leaders), Wear argues that we cannot guarantee international peace by forcefully creating republican regimes—particularly democracies—because to do so would undermine the more immediate and important goal of fostering republican political culture, and the peaceful resolution of international conflicts.

That said, Wear's conclusion remains overall optimistic. Wear suggests that the observed democratic peace is likely to survive and expand, so long as people continue to devote their lives to achieving that goal. This subtle shift from a purely historical to a veiled personal perspective implies that, for Wear, any definitive explanation of the democratic peace must include the many non-quantifiable particulars of societies and individual leaders that he so fluently incorporates into his case studies. I applaud Wear for so extending himself. *Never at War* should be read by anyone who studies or practices international conflict resolution and peace.

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Worlds Apart: Why Poverty Persists in Rural America. By Cynthia M. Duncan. New Haven and London: Yale University Press (1999), xvii, 235 pp.

Reviewed by William W. Dressler, Department of Anthropology and Social Work, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL.

There are many good things about this book. Foremost among them is that it is a real pleasure to read. Duncan has a writing style that is simple and straightforward, but does not simplify the complexity of the issue she

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2. Wear defines a league as an "association of among several political units with approximately equal privileges and shared institutions" (p. 267).

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is addressing. The primary method employed in the research is the use of open-ended interviews and qualitative analyses of those interviews, but Duncan avoids the analytic pretension that can accompany some studies based on "narrative." She lets people speak for themselves, points out commonalities in the interviews, and places her respondents in a wider context by drawing on census data (discreetly tucked into an appendix).

Her aim in the book is to try to understand, as is made explicit in the subtitle to the book, why poverty persists in rural America. To do so, she compares three rural areas in different regions of the country: the coal mining country of Kentucky; the Mississippi Delta; and rural Maine. She presents the areas in that order, starting with little in the way of explanation for what she is doing. At the outset the tone of the book is descriptive, and she both tastefully and economically sketches pictures of what these places look and feel like, along with portraits of individual respondents who can best exemplify what she regards as the essential social processes related to poverty in each area. But even in the book's beginning section, describing the coal country of Kentucky, an analytic and explanatory framework begins to emerge within the description, a framework that she sustains and develops throughout.

Her analysis of rural Kentucky is rooted in the historic distribution of power in what is, in essence, a system made up of two social classes: the owners of the coal mines and their workers. Although the fortunes of the mine owners have waxed and waned, and although unionization helped to improve the wage structure for those miners who are working (when they are working), little has occurred to alter in any substantial way that power structure. The distribution of power - both economic and political - creates an enduring state of dependency of the workers on the owners. This dependency was once more explicit, such as when workers had to deal only with company stores, but it continues in terms of who gets hired, even outside of the coal mines. Employment is a function of who you know, not what you know.

Critical to the maintenance of this system of social relationships is the school system. Funds are diverted and concentrated in a "city" school that serves the owners and their lieutenants, the small set of white collar professionals (mainly human service providers who receive their positions through patronage with the owners calling the shots) and store owners. It is a cozy little world for this local power elite, while out in the hollows the world is characterized by underemployment, welfare dependency, drug and alcohol use, and a general sense of hopelessness.

But Duncan does not focus exclusively on social structure. She is also concerned with how social class is culturally constructed. There are two main components to this construction. First, there are the clear cultural criteria that define people as "belonging" to the broad American middle class, including such things as having all your teeth, being able to speak in standard American English, knowing how to dress for work or a job interview, knowing the demeanor that is appropriate to a job, and having the literacy skills necessary to know about things beyond your own hollow. At first glance these may not seem cultural at all, but indeed they are behaviors that derive from the knowledge of how to be a middle class person. They represent what the British social policy analyst Peter Townsend refers to as a "conventional" (in the strict sense of being defined by shared social conventions) lifestyle. One of the not-so-hidden injuries of class is that (among other things) speaking in a certain way, wearing certain clothes, and driving a certain kind of vehicle signal who you are in a social sense. In the Kentucky community studied by Duncan, the next pertinent bit of information is your surname, and it all can quickly add up to throwing you into the category of "end-of-the-monthers," those who are welfare dependent and are rarely seen in town except to cash their welfare payments.

The second component to the cultural dimension of this process is the ideology that enables the power elite to maintain its control. While the elite of course recognizes that there are some people down on their luck, and indeed many stories can be told of how they help such people, by-and-large the end-of-the-monthers are the way they are because they don't want to work, according to the owners and their lieutenants. Therefore, when they do get hired, the owners are justified in their exploitation (low wages, few benefits), because otherwise they would be taken advantage of.

This analysis slowly and subtly reveals itself in the description of Kentucky, and then is expanded upon in the description of the Mississippi Delta. Replace the mine owners with large landowners/farmers, replace the coal miners with field hands, replace the "city" school with private "academies," and the structural conditions of poverty are replicated. In the Delta, there is the insidious issue of race added on to the process. But the patron-client relationships, the corruption, and the sense of despair are much the same.

Duncan is far from hopeless herself, however, and in both of these areas she describes people who are agents of change. There are two common themes to the stories of these change agents. First, they got out, and then came back. Essential to being different is being exposed to the wider world, whether it involves joining the military or attending school someplace else. Duncan argues that this enables people to expand their pool of cultural knowledge, to become more proficient in that conventional middle class model. Second, what is also common to change agents

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is their ability to establish a certain degree, however precarious, of economic independence, to be able to function outside the political economy that is firmly in the hands of the power elite.

Finally, Duncan turns to rural New England, only to find a place where poverty is less severe, the exploitive class system of patron-client relationships is missing, and the prospect for getting out of poverty for individuals is real. (This is the part of the book that is going to have diehard Southerners grinding their teeth.) The families that started the paper mills that served as the foundation of the economy in this area were interested in having a well-educated and well-paid workforce, so they supported the establishment of good schools and unions early on. The social differentiation that occurred never solidified into the two-class system of the other areas. "Everybody" went to the same school and participated in the same social system. No one was made to feel inferior because, perhaps, their clothes were not quite as nice or their car was not of the era.

Furthermore, and because of the greater equality, there developed within the town the kind of positive social sentiments and interlocking social networks that Robert Putnam calls "social capital." Upkeep and improvement of the school, the development of programs for young people, and a grass-roots anti-poverty initiative all emerged within the civic society that Putnam argues is a function of high levels of social capital.

In the final section, Duncan makes her theoretical orientation explicit, placing herself in a theoretical space defined by the intersection of a classic British view of social class, melded with the cultural sociology of Ann Swidler. And she goes on to suggest policy initiatives to deal with persistent rural poverty. She has two major recommendations. First, she is positively disposed toward those policy analysts who call for new public works projects to provide employment where the private sector will not, along with a fortified income safety net for families. She is also appropriately skeptical about such a thing occurring. Second, she favors a strong federal role in schools, one that will enforce standards and turn schools from human warehouses to true socialization agents and providers of opportunity.

I will leave the readers of her work to decide on the appropriateness of her policy recommendations. As a way of concluding, I want to emphasize the subtlety and insight of her analyses. In contemporary debates about structure and agency, in many respects attributing a thoroughgoing agency is in vogue. To some readers, then, her desire to bring broad social norms regarding middle class life in America into the explanation will be too old-fashioned, too "modernist." But the ability, or lack thereof, to approximate these expectations of a "decent" (in Veblen's sense of the term) life the lived experience of poverty for people. Their lives are a combination of exploited dependency and the impossibility of being just "ordinary." Examining how this works in the broad context of economic history and social class processes in rural areas is a singular accomplishment of Duncan's work. I highly recommend the book.

At the Interface: The Household and Beyond. Monographs in Economic Anthropology Series, No. 15. Edited by David B Small and Nicola Tannenbaum. Lanham, NY: University Press of America (1999), 240 pp.

Reviewed by Michael P. Freedman, Department of Anthropology, The Maxwell School of Syracuse University.

The "interface," used variably and understood intuitively in this volume, is the connection between units of sociological interest, such as households and sodalities, the village and the state, individuals and the market. Originally prepared for the 1996 meeting of the Society of Economic Anthropology and for a session of the AAA annual conference, most of the dozen papers comprising this volume share a focus on the household, emphasizing one or another of its connections within the community and beyond.

Four papers treating intracommunity interfaces examine producer cooperatives in Sri Lanka and Mexico, age sets among the Samburu, and the culture of labor exchange among Andean peasants.

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A second unit, on single communities and their connections with state government and the market, includes a study of a Shan village in Thailand that has become increasingly market oriented, cash dependent, and Thai-integrated; a paper that traces the shift from self-sufficient, albeit market-oriented seal hunting in an East Greenlandic village to a reliance on state subsidies following the European Union's ban on seal skins; and an article that considers how inter-household sharing among the Kalahari Basarwa, rather than territory or formal kinship, defines for them the community.

Two papers on household-based businesses in northern Ghana and Java explore what the editors style "Extracommunity Interfaces." In the case of Ghana, the commercial production of shea butter (from oil seed) follows a familiar trajectory - one in which small operators are marginalized and ultimately squeezed out of the market. Furniture production in Java, on the other hand, offers an interesting example of specialized niche survival and indeed success that entails the contractual coupling of disparate specialists in the making of a final product that is bought up by international furniture dealers.

Perhaps the most theoretically explicit papers are the two that apply the interface concept to archaeological site data. One examines the effects of population growth, land-disenfranchisement, and access to credit upon levels of household productivity in a Yucatecan hacienda, rancho, and pueblo between 1750 and 1847. Production intensified on the first two, but the pueblo successfully limited population size and retained ample household land so that it was unnecessary to raise productivity per acre (and presumably the intensity of the labor effort). The second article considers the effects of human population growth and livestock growth on Navajo multi-household settlement. Population growth encouraged dispersed settlements, while growth in herd size promoted settlements that were more clustered but smaller.

In the closing essay, the editors offer "some conclusions." The interface concept, they write, obliges us "to re-think our standard analytic units." "The cases presented a wide range of household and community structures, and it is clear there is no single definition that can encompass all the examples." While households are often nuclear family units of production, consumption, and sharing, among the Basarwa "sharing networks and the production and consumption that they assume are so broad as to encompass whole camps, which expands 'household' to contain the whole community." (But of course, the Basarwa and we are clear that the household or hearth group is conceptually distinct from the sharing network, however much the latter is implicated in the distribution of goods.) By contrast, the sharing motif is muted if not missing from the Javanese furniture makers and the Ghanaian shea producers, where separate budgets for husband and wife are common, and little pooling of resources is evident.

The editors urge that household and community should be seen, not as organizational forms, but as "clusters of interactions." Said interactions are ways of behaving that are "defined by local context" and "history." Indeed, the interactions in question are "structured" by household and community interfaces, yielding different orientations to production -- the "peasant" type, "production for international markets," and "responses to international markets."

It will be apparent to the reader that these are, of course, not conclusions of real substance. Nor are these observations about household variability news to students of Anthropology 101. To this reader, they are lifelessly abstract and rhetorically platitudinous. I think this unfortunate result obtains in large measure because the concept "interface" is ill defined, weakly conceived, and under-theorized. Granted, there is much that is useful in looking at relations, linkages, connections between identifiable entities, and in viewing them within the context of access to resources. But notwithstanding the novel nomenclature, there is nothing present, theoretically or methodologically, in "interfaces" that has not been intrinsic to established social science inquiry for years.

The editors write, "Our theoretical perspective in looking at the interface is one that images clusters of people [households] and clusters of clusters of people [communities] in the context of larger political and economic structures which impinge on, structure and limit people's ability to act and interact." Conceivably, the clustering concept could be applied ad infinitum. But on balance, what would we gain in conceiving of an abstract third-order cluster rather than in conceptualizing, say, a nation-state, a trans-national corporation, an organized church, or an international revolutionary movement?

This abstract nomenclature is not a necessary entailment of a formal theory. Employing abstract terminology so pervasively impedes grasping in a vivid, "filmable" way what in fact is going on. Is the "interface" a place -- where the rubber hits the road, a coupling structure, a process?

Ordinarily, we might speak of an "interface" to denote a shared surface or boundary between two bodies, as the wall between adjoining rooms, or the subset of knowledge and intellectual pursuits common to physics and chemistry. In the present volume, however, "interface" often is unbounded on one side (interfaces beyond the local level). Or, if bounded on both sides (the interface between the household and the market), the interface is less something shared by both sides than an imbalanced force field.

The culture and sociology of academia appears to influence scholars to develop a jargon whether or not it is needed to enable technical communication. These papers could just as well have appeared in a volume entitled

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“Social Influences upon the Household” or “Households and the Political Economy.” The metaphor of “frontier” or “bonding” or “co-participation” could as well have served as “interface.”

The ethnographic and archaeological papers in *At the Interface* are sturdy, mostly descriptive reports that can be read and utilized apart from the theoretical “spin.” Regrettably, the volume lacks an index. To a considerable extent, the cases document the globalizing spread of world trade into exotic, backwater localities, and with it, the growth or accentuation of class differences, a raised standard of living, consumerism, and tendencies toward individualism. But the accounts also detail some of the limitless ways in which people adapt and accommodate; negotiate the obstacles and opportunities presented by the market and the state; and preserve or reconfigure their communities and their identities.

Spirit Wars: Native North American Religions in the Age of Nation Building, by Ronald Niezen, London and Los Angeles: University of California Press (2000), 256 pp.

Reviewed by Stephen Greymorning, Departments of Anthropology and Native American Studies, University of Montana.

In *Spirit Wars*, Ronald Niezen has masterfully researched the impact colonization has had on the religious practices of Indigenous North Americans. If influenced by initial appearances the book would appear overly ambitious, by its effort to address a multitude of events from a variety of geographic regions and time periods through subjects ranging from missionary and government intrusions to that of New Age mentalities. Solid research and scholarship, however, ground the book and give readers insight into a world of cultural domination and religious suppression rarely seen and most often misunderstood. Readers further benefit from several essays by Native contributors writing on how individual Native people and communities have been affected both historically and contemporarily by activities aimed at alienating Indigenous North Americans from their cultural ways of being.

Following his introductory chapter, Niezen sets about introducing readers to the rationale underlying early Spanish assaults on Native rituals and ceremonies; part of which included “making them amenable to White economic exploitation” (p. 39). Whether at the hands of missionaries or politicians, educating the “Indian” was a constant theme.

By the later part of the 1800s the marriage of evangelism and education became the *modus operandi* of the new Indian solution. In Chapter Three, Niezen exposes how the works of some of Europe’s and America’s greatest thinkers helped shape the world view of Anglo-Americans, which in turn yielded cultural forces that led a nation to believe it held a God-given right to shape a people in its own image. In one discussion Niezen holds the writings of Lewis Henry Morgan up as a mirror, reflecting the beliefs of a nation that perceived the best strategy for transforming Indian people’s lives was through education and Christianity. The medium for this social experiment became the Indian residential schools, and the individual credited with bringing the needed structure to those schools was Lieutenant Richard Pratt.

From the onset the objective of the residential school was to convert Indians to White values. Niezen informs readers that Pratt believed the first step in this transformation was to physically change their appearance. While this had a devastating impact on many Indians, some also saw it as ludicrous.

When it was announced though [sic] an interpreter that their braids were to be shorn... Robert American Horse, made a speech... in which he concluded, “If I am to learn the ways of the White people, I can do it just as well with my hair on” (p. 62).

Most others, like Luther Standing Bear, were left feeling distraught. “After having my hair cut a new thought came into my head. I felt that I was no more Indian, but would be an imitation of a whiteman” (p. 63).

Thus after 200 years of failed missionary efforts to educate and assimilate Indians, Pratt’s Indian residential school set the new standard. Niezen relates, however, that those standards brought with them the implementation of a level of punishment and control that became sadistic and often crossed over into the pathological. While it is common knowledge that Indians were punished for speaking their Native language, at the Alberni Indian residential school in Canada one individual revealed he was “punished for speaking Tseshalt by having sewing needles pushed

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through his tongue. From then on he rejected his Native tongue and refused to teach it to his children" (p. 77). In almost all cases throughout North America, "the risk of excessive punishment, torture, or sexual abuse for Indian students... in residential schools was extremely high and had devastating and lasting consequences" (p. 77).

Niezen has made *Spirit Wars* significantly relevant by going beyond mere reporting. *Spirit Wars* probes some very difficult issues and brings with it a meaningful discussion of how, at least for Indians, the devaluing of self-worth, self-image or self-esteem, along with physical and substance abuse, can be linked to what is at times labeled as the "residential school syndrome." Certainly in my work I have repeatedly observed this residential school syndrome to be a significant factor in curtailing the progress of contemporary efforts to revitalize language in many Native American communities.

For most people, the idea that a war on Native spiritualism could continue in a contemporary and technologically advanced world would be quickly dismissed. In Niezen's chapter on medical evangelism, however, this idea receives persuasive support. Christianity and biomedicine, having long been wed, have also long been at war with shamans and native spirituality. This marriage, as warring companions, continues globally, impairing successful Native health practices such as ethnobotany and treating mental health afflictions. Niezen shows how this persistence, with its false sense of superiority, has failed Native communities. "If there is one major failing of biomedicine among Native Americans, it is in its delivery of mental health services" (p. 115). Drawing upon a 1990 report to Congress, Niezen relates that Native adolescents face 26.3 deaths per 100,000 population, when compared to 10.0 per 100,000 in the US general population. While for children between the ages of ten and fourteen, suicide deaths are four times higher than all races in America, in Canada "Indians are four to five times more likely to die from accidents or violence, and two to three times more likely to commit suicide" (p. 115).

Where missionaries were historically quick to point out the failings of Native medicinal knowledge, through *Spirit Wars* readers learn that Native people were not necessarily ignorant of Western medicine's limitations. To this regard Niezen draws on a collection of radio interviews conducted between 1992 and 1994 that dealt with the topic of healing. Through radio narratives and interviews, differences between Native and White perspectives and approaches in dealing with health issues are revealed. A common theme in these narratives is the inability of clinical doctors to bring about cures of chronic illnesses, and how when faced with such illnesses Native people tend to view the situation much differently. Niezen documented such a perspective from a Canadian radio narrative, in which the person interviewed reported, "She was alive, not dying like the doctor said... modern medicine failed, so I wasn't going to use anything modern" (p. 105).

A nice addition to this chapter is Phyllis Fast's article on "Gwich'in Athabascan Perceptions of Spirit Invasions and Recovery." Phyllis writes about two cases. In the first, a Gwich'in man was tormented by voices he heard in the house in which he lived. After running to his grandmother for help, she brought him to a minister to be exorcised. The man's mother, who owned the house, and who had also experienced supernatural occurrences while living in the house, burned it with all its contents to the ground so no one could ever be tormented again. Afterwards, the man was referred to a psychiatrist and was put on medication presumably for the remainder of his life. Phyllis goes on to discuss the differences between the medical, which looks at a psychological imbalance, a Christian, which looks at the devil as the cause, and the Gwich'in perspectives, which saw spirits in a specific locale as the cause.

The second case also dealt with a man hearing voices. With this one, however, his mother sought the guidance of Native health practitioners most commonly referred to as medicine men. In their diagnosis, one sees the sharp divergence in what Native and Western medicine would perceive and subsequently offer as a treatment. Native health practitioners diagnosed that he was hearing voices-thoughts of shamanic spirits because he himself was a latent shaman. His cure, or treatment, required him to be trained as a shaman. Here readers should not mistakenly believe that when individuals heard voices they were counseled to become a shaman. There was greater understanding and cultural flexibility than that.

What this chapter actually reveals is a cultural continuity that has persisted to present times. One disappointing aspect about this chapter comes from Niezen's use of the term biomedicine. By contrasting Native health practices with "biomedicine" as two distinct and separate systems, Niezen undermines huge contributions that medicine has received from the ethnobotanical knowledge of Indigenous peoples and fails to recognize that ethnobotany by its application is a form of biomedicine.

In the end, the chapter's message is fairly straightforward. Where Western medicine systematically seeks to alienate or isolate afflicted individuals, due to a perceived potential threat to the community, Native practices operate in such a way as to reincorporate the afflicted back into the community. As a result, Western medicine has failed Native people, when addressing certain Native health issues because the two approaches are culturally in conflict.

In Chapter Five, "The Politics of Repression," Niezen directly discusses government reaction to Indian

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spiritualism and religious ceremonies. On this same subject, Rupert Ross has observed that:

One of our first acts after contact was to outlaw the very mechanisms which permitted them [Indians] to cope with the traumas of life... Such practices as the pipe ceremonies, sweat-lodge ceremonies, shaking-tent ceremonies, sundances... we declared as heathen... The result was that a people about to face the most overwhelming social disintegration imaginable were left virtually defenceless against the anger, grief and sorrow that inevitably followed (Ross 1992: 143).

While Niezen's chapter agrees with Ross' claim, regarding the level of intolerance and contempt that government officials held for Native ceremonies, his section on the Ghost Dance runs into interpretive problems. By Niezen focussing primarily on how the Sioux interpreted Wavoka's message, readers are not made aware that the majority of tribes did not have the same interpretation. Niezen writes,

The Ghost Dance movement of 1890, which prophesied... an age when the dead would return, the whites would be eliminated in a cataclysm of selective destructiveness and the lives of all Indians would be returned to a state of bounty and pristine purity (p. 131).

What Niezen overlooked is that the destructiveness was to be selective for Indian and White alike. According to Porcupine, a Cheyenne emissary who heard Wavoka's teachings and witnessed his last miracle, Wavoka stated fighting was bad, "and we must all be friends with one another. He said the youth of all good people would be renewed... He told us not to quarrel or fight or strike each other, or shoot one another; that whites and Indians were to be all one people" (Peterson 1990: 108). For Wavoka, the all meant both Indian and Whites and anyone not following his teachings would perish. The Sioux, however, chose to bring away a different message. Another element overlooked is the fact that had Wavoka been preaching a message that all whites would be eliminated from the face of the earth, it is hardly likely that Bill Wilson, Wavoka's adopted white brother, would have helped Wavoka stage all his miracles.

At the time of Wavoka's messianic message, the Sioux, having been told they no longer possessed Paha Sapa and having been forced onto reservations, were experiencing significant hardship under United States government rule. They were desperate to put these insolent peoples in their place and restore balance to their lives. Though Wavoka had performed a number of seemingly miraculous feats, it was his last miracle that most impressed the Sioux and gave rise to the Ghost Dance Shirt and how the Sioux in particular interpreted the underlying message of the Ghost Dance religion.

Wavoka's Ghost Dance religion brought together Paiute, Christian, Shaker and Mormon religious elements. From the latter, Wavoka made use of the Mormon Endowment Robe, a robe "emblazoned with sacred symbols... reputed to protect the wearer from Satan and physical harm" (Peterson 1990: 110), and Sioux and Cheyenne emissaries were the first to see its power. In a staged miracle Bill Wilson, shot Wavoka at close range;

Many gasped in terror... Wavoka bent over as if struck by the blast, and buckshot spilled onto the blanket. But there was no blood. Screams and then excitement swept through the crowd as the prophet stood upright for all to see he was unharmed... Wavoka did not anticipate that the shirt would soon gain a reputation as a powerful protective shield (Peterson 1990: 110-111).

Sioux emissaries viewing this, saw in it their chance to reclaim what was rightfully theirs and possibly exact revenge in the process.

Niezen goes on in the chapter to offer solid analysis and discussion of Canada's repression of the potlatch, and America's attack on peyotism. With the latter Niezen further reveals the impact of Christianity's colonization of Native Americans with his disclosure of how peyote came under the assault of Christian Indians and purveyors of Indian religious traditions. There are many good aspects to this section, some of which discuss legal cases and how development issues have kept Native peoples under the influence of colonization. The chapter concludes with an enlightening essay from Valerie Long Lambert on the complexities of "Native Spiritual Traditions and the Tribal State." In this essay Lambert offers a critical analysis of Hollis Roberts' success in being elected, and several times reelected as Tribal Chair, on a political platform that exhibited strong hostility toward Native spirituality.

In *Spirit War's* last two chapters, Niezen addresses the role anthropology and museums has had on Native cultures in "The Collectors," and examines the paradoxical embrace of native spiritualism by followers of New Age philosophies in "Apostles of the New Age."

Since the time of initial contact Native religion and spirituality has been assaulted by the colonization efforts of Christian bearing cultures. In Chapter Seven, "Apostles of the New Age," Niezen provides detailed descriptions and analyses of the New Age movement. The chapter unfortunately can leave readers a bit confused as one easily sees a message that the New Age movement has shifted the battle on Native spirituality from assault to acclaim as a symbol of world salvation. Though Niezen's discussion attempts to move readers through the issues, with regard to this new phenomenon, there is concern that in the end readers are left confused. What is missing is a clear discussion

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of why the Native community reacts toward charlatans, and that the surmounting level of appropriation that occurs by New Age activists only ensures that the spirit wars on Native North American religions will continue in the twenty-first century.

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Global Ethnography: Forces, Connections, and Imaginations in a Postmodern World. By Michael Burawoy, Joseph Blum, Sheba George, Zauzaa Gill, Teresa Gowan, Lynne Haney, Maren Klawiter, Steven Lopez, Sean O’Riain, Mille Thayer, eds. Berkeley: University of California Press (2000), 329 pp.

Reviewed by Mary E. Hancock, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Santa Barbara.

Global Ethnography, a volume that evolved from a graduate seminar at the University of California, Berkeley, is polished, smart, and energetic. The seminar-cum-working group was led by Burawoy, and sought to take on the thorny problem of how one might best engage globalization through ethnography without losing sight of either the sometimes concealed global forces and institutions that shape localities and the experiences of their inhabitants, or the individual experiences, narratives and situated knowledges that make up everyday lived experience. The result is a collection of individually authored articles that explore the articulations and disarticulations of global and local institutions, practices and ideas. In addition to providing historically and ethnographically rich descriptions, the articles serve as methodological examples of how one might study specific instances of the conditions and processes of globalization, along with its material and ideological effects.

The papers the volume comprises are clustered into three sections "Global Forces," "Global Connections," and "Global Imaginations," topics corresponding to the major heuristic categories developed by the group to analyze the varied encounters with globalization. Each major section is introduced with a brief discussion authored by those whose individual papers are included in that section. The articles are compelling and well-written - each one is based on serious and often prolonged ethnographic engagement. Four of the articles (those by Blum, George, Gilles, and Klawiter) are revised versions of papers that won national awards. All contributors write with an intensity that suggests deep intellectual and political commitment to their subjects.

The collection has both an "Introduction" and "Conclusion" by Burawoy. These chapters situate the volume in the larger trajectory of historically-informed ethnography influenced by the Chicago school of urban sociology and the Manchester school of extended case method. Burawoy charts his own intellectual/political genealogy in order to underscore how the boundaries of the nation-state, which implicitly framed most ethnographic endeavors of the twentieth century, are being challenged by the institutions and processes that are considered hallmarks of globalization. He does not, however, advocate the jettisoning of earlier approaches, rather he argues that their methods and theories can be mined and re-worked to yield new questions and explanatory paradigms. This ambitious goal is what Global Ethnography aims to accomplish and its contributions are significant and instructive.

Part One deals with the effects of global economic forces (global trade and governance measures administered by organizations such as WTO, World Bank as well as multinational economic ventures) on individuals and communities, charting the experience of downward mobility for working people in urban US (San Francisco) and Europe (Hungary). The three articles discuss welfare reform in post-socialist Hungary (Haney), the work of homeless recyclers in San Francisco (Gowan), and the fates of skilled shipyard laborers, also in San Francisco

(Blum).

Haney documents the material effects of shifting discourses on poverty in Hungary, following its embrace of World Bank directed structural adjustment after the break-up of the Soviet bloc. She describes the breakdown of the socialist welfare state and its replacement by capitalist economic institutions and a new bureaucratic infrastructure for the delivery of social welfare. Following the directives of First World funders, the latter agencies make decisions on the basis of quantifiable poverty indicators and offer welfare that is primarily financial in contrast to the broader social assessments and interventions that had existed under the prior system. Gowan also focuses on the lived experiences of globalization with an article about the work of San Francisco's homeless recyclers, many of whom are displaced shipyard workers and/or discharged military personnel. She privileges their own accounts of becoming homeless and of struggling for subsistence as well as dignity. Embedded in their stories are references, deemed nostalgic by Gowan, to the kinds of work and life prior to homelessness. Gowan finds a political edge in their nostalgia, arguing that the memory of their earlier working lives frames their efforts to invest recycling with moral and material value. Blum, himself a skilled, longtime shipyard worker, writes about the downward mobility experienced by skilled laborers as a result of corporate restructuring. Departing from Braverman's influential work, Blum finds that labor, itself, (the skills required to perform specific tasks) is not simplified or diminished, but a new regime of "flexible discipline," reflecting changes in union and managerial decision making processes, has been inaugurated. The outcome is that, although skilled labor continues to be a necessity for shipyard production, the craft labor system of work and training that had prevailed in the post-WWII period of military-industrial mobilization and expansion has been undermined.

Part Two explores the character of new global connections that function within, define, and reorganize transnational social space. Contributors point out that globalization has fostered greater interconnectedness among diverse places and groups, especially across national boundaries, and their focus is on the transnational publics that have emerged in the spaces between institutionalized power structures - in domestic and religious realms, in sociality fostered through occupational roles, and in transnational social movements. They suggest that some persons and communities are positioned to take advantage of cross-border flows and to forge new identities, follow new opportunities and pursue social transformations.

Sheba George shows how migration to the US by Indian nurses has opened up new economic opportunities to these women but has initiated a struggle over class and gender ideologies within the immigrant community, a struggle that appropriates and re-draws gendered norms of the homeland and the adopted country. Sean O'Riain describes how Irish software developers take advantage of increasing opportunities in an emerging industry and use their social networks and job-hopping strategies to negotiate their place in local and global labor markets. The software developers are better able to maintain their autonomy within the transnational social sphere than the Indian nurses because they have, in effect, cut themselves loose from the Irish transnational community and formed an uneasy alliance with transnational corporations. Millie Thayer analyzes how feminist activists in Brazil draw on feminist discourses authored in the First World, translating and adapting them for local realities. Brazilian feminists moved from a focus on women's health and reproduction that had been inspired by the work of the Boston Women's Health Collective, to an explicitly political focus on gender and citizenship articulated through engagement with the Brazilian state and with international funding agencies. She describes the complex linking of critique and engagement that connect the Brazilian groups to transnational feminist social spaces, on the one hand, and to the state and international agencies that seek to define and administer women's needs, on the other.

Part Three examines how the construction and deployment of global imaginations have become central to new political projects and controversies. Like the contributions to Part One, these articles chart the deleterious effects of global capitalism on working conditions; but the writers also show, as do contributors to Part Two, how other global discourses and institutions can be deployed to challenge global capitalism. Lopez discusses the threats to public service worker unions introduced by municipal government's drive to make Pittsburgh more attractive to global investment through tax cuts and the privatization of public services. Though unions held off some privatization measures by appealing to universal principles of justice (arguing that weakening their unions would result in substandard care for vulnerable groups, notably nursing home residents), they continue to grapple with the profound challenges to union organization, recruitment and decision-making that economic globalization poses. Gilles studied Hungarian villages and environmental activists who, under socialism, had been marginalized because of the state's protection of industry, which shielded industrial hazards from public view. While the dismantling of the socialist state has not allowed villagers to escape the effects of decades of industrial pollution, it has allowed them to maneuver by both reaching out to the global environmental movement and bargaining with the global industries that dispose of hazardous wastes. Finally, Klawiter shows how American breast cancer patients, once marginalized, individualized and stigmatized by American medicine, politicized their disease by a combined strategy of reversing

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its stigma, questioning medical authority and globalizing their cause by linking breast cancer to global pollution. She argues that it was not actual reductions in the disease's incidence that politicized patients, but that the efforts to make breast cancer and treatment into public issues produced new subjects, solidarities, and sensibilities and in so doing laid the groundwork for the development of social movements.

The individual case studies are amply documented and tightly argued. There are, however, implicit contentions among the arguments posed. Though these are alluded to in the Preface, I was surprised by the dearth of intertextual references in the articles themselves. This is especially noteworthy given the gestation of the project and the close working relations among contributors. Several, for example, deal with the ways that unions' organizational structures, representational effectiveness, and societal goals have changed and are presently subject to contentious re-evaluation in light of the globalizing political economy. None, however, refer to the others in the body of their discussions. I also noted that the only contributors who specifically problematized the gendered conditions and outcomes of globalization were those who focused on women's engagement with global economic and social processes. That is, as is typical in much social science, it is women to whom "gender" is attributed. By contrast, the analyses of male sociality and economic displacement treated men as workers, corporate managers, and union actors - that is, as representatives of class alignments - with little attention to the ways that masculinities are formed through contentious interactions and discourses among men and between men and women. For example, in Gowan's trenchant and evocative account of homeless men's struggle to recall and discursively claim an identity tied to their past lives as workers, is not their "nostalgia" also a way to name and appropriate the normative masculinity that underwrote Fordist and nationalist economic institutions?

Lastly, individual articles do not consistently take on the theoretical accounts of globalization to which the volume, as a whole, is oriented. All are concerned with the "new" global order, but define its components differently, emphasizing forces (Part One), connections (Part Two) and imaginations (Part Three) and use these framing ideas to untangle the specificities of particular cases. None take on directly the master narratives of globalization described by Burawoy in his Conclusion as "radical" (Giddens, Castells) "skeptical" (Harvey, Jameson), and "perspectival" (Clifford, Marcus, Fisher). Burawoy, however, does outline the contours of this larger project by discussing the relations between the historicization of the ideology of "globalism" on the one hand, and the situated, historically specific, accounts of global-local articulations on the other. In this light, Burawoy positions the volume as a project that extends, empirically and theoretically, Stuart Hall's notion of the "global postmodern." This multivalent term refers, in economic terms, to the tendency of flexible accumulation to exploit and recreate difference; in political terms, to the emergence of processes and institutions that operate both above and below the nation-state, and, in cultural terms, to the proliferation of hybrid, recombinant, and often fragile identities. The volume's case studies are likened to archaeological sites scattered across world that, together, yield a picture of the displacement of global imperialism and the emergence of global postmodernity.

While readers of the collection can appreciate the broader theoretical claims about globalization that Burawoy makes, the thinness of intertextual references means that readers are denied access to what was surely a lively and productive part of the working collaboration that produced the volume.

My queries and criticisms should not be read as diminishing the value of what is, overall, a persuasive and powerful document about the ways that globalization is materialized in specific ways of living and working in different, but always connected locales. Global Ethnography provides a model for engaged ethnographic work as well as for pedagogy and I look forward to using it in both graduate and upper-division undergraduate classes.

Making Better Environmental Decisions: An Alternative to Risk Assessment by Mary O'Brien, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (published with Environmental Research Foundation), 2000, 283 pp.

Reviewed by Branden B. Johnson, Research Scientist, Division of Science, Research and Technology, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection³

Dr. O'Brien, a botanist and environmental activist, has written a brief for changing the basis for environmental decisions that is impressively written and argued but still disappointingly flawed. Implementation of her proposed "alternatives analysis" could well improve such decisions, but less than she expects. Despite her refreshing candor about the limits of environmental management, she ignores many political and logical constraints on alternatives analysis (AA) and unduly demonizes risk assessment (RA).

Her main point is that we should examine two or more alternatives for a given decision, and choose the option that is least damaging. She believes most current environmental decisions focus only on whether a single option poses an acceptable risk or is "safe," findings that she sees as scientifically impossible, immoral, and damaging to democracy.

It is impossible to undertake most business or government without posing some hazard to workers, the community, wildlife, or the environment. . . .

Within this necessarily compromised context, moral decision making would appear to require giving priority to least-harm alternatives that are most beneficial for the environment and for the public interest. (p. 80)

O'Brien devotes a chapter to reviewing less-than-perfect current examples of AA, ranging from environmental impact statements to Consumer Reports® evaluations of consumer products. A secondary theme of the book is that "risk" or biological outcomes are unduly narrow criteria for environmental decisions; a wider look at the adverse impacts and benefits of alternatives would provide society with a better sense of the tradeoffs entailed in any choice, "[b]ecause the differing benefits of the various alternatives remind us of divergent considerations [and] we will ask a broader range of questions about the alternatives" (p. 135). She ends with barriers to adoption of AA (e.g., fear of "changes in business as usual" and of "a public process"; concern about "having to consider an infinite number of outlandish alternatives"), and proposes solutions.

There is quite a bit to be said for these theses, and O'Brien says most of it, eloquently, passionately, and with selective evidence. I agree with her that much environmental decision-making focuses on how much harm can be endured rather than avoided; opportunities for avoiding many harms are plentiful, if at certain costs; "risk" is only one of many attributes of decision alternatives, and only one of their consequences that people care about. While AA might sound potentially chaotic, I believe she is correct that "risk-based decision making is just as socially messy as decision making based on [AA]. It's just that [AA] helps make visible the non-scientific elements that are always behind risk-influenced decisions regarding who will be allowed to do what to the environment" (p. 243). O'Brien also acknowledges that "permitting of hazardous activities is unavoidable to some degree" (p. 79), and that some hazards, such as those from nuclear wastes and persistent chemicals such as PCBs, cannot be removed (pp. 110, 116). For such inevitably damaging, irreparable situations, O'Brien suggests that society analyze options that allow "for the greatest possible cleanup or restoration," even if the action chosen "will finally be based on economic and social costs, ethics, and political will," and identify "related production, technologies, or behaviors that could cause the same problems in the future" (pp. 210-211).

Although I endorse O'Brien's call for more AA, I am much less sanguine that it will greatly improve environmental decision-making, based on what I see as undue assumptions or illogic in some of her discussions of AA, RA, and environmental policy.

The first half of her book concerns "What Is Wrong with Risk Assessment?" The scope of this term is

3. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.

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somewhat ambiguous, making it a bit difficult to evaluate the accuracy of her criticisms. Although she says RA includes any estimate, however informal or non-quantitative, of “the safety of a hazardous activity or substance without considering the benefits and drawbacks of a decent range of options” (p. 39), her discussion focuses mostly on quantitative risk assessment for toxic chemicals (particularly the probabilistic variety, although she does not use this term), with a few ecological examples thrown in. O’Brien says RA is invalid because it omits or analyzes inadequately diverse adverse effects, cumulative effects of multiple exposures, differing exposures and vulnerabilities across people, and “all indirect and interrelated consequences within our complex environment” (pp. 67-72). Safety is impossible to determine, “because all consequences cannot have been considered” (p. 69). (Oddly, O’Brien says that “[m]ost risk assessments are unscientific because they cannot estimate how much of a damaging activity poses no risks or ‘insignificant’ risks” [p. 59, emphasis added], although she correctly notes elsewhere that defining the “insignificance” of risk is a political, not a scientific, finding.) The uncertain quantification of RA helps “timid regulatory agencies” gain psychological distance from their decisions’ meaning (e.g., some people will die) and increase their discretion, while reducing disproof given the method’s uncertainty, manipulability and demand for rare expertise (pp. 106-108). Businesses welcome the chance “to fight for years over the exact details of risks of each toxic chemical” while they continue to pollute and profit (p. 242). RA’s esoteric nature means agencies work mostly with business and thus “avoid dealing with many other groups who know about alternatives to the proposed activity and about unquantifiable benefits and hazards of the activity and of the alternatives” (p. 107), while “[a]ll sectors of the society can participate and can reinforce the efforts of other sectors” (p. 202) in AA. The AA method also frees analysis from the abstractions of numerical risk estimates:

Numbers do not and cannot address what is whole, ineffable, priceless, or just. They cannot address hope, discouragement, respect, anger, aesthetics, sense of place, longing, or the waste of unnecessary illness or dying young. The numbers of risk assessment are abstractions of degradation; alternatives assessment incorporates the concreteness of caring.” (pp. 233-234)

I have worked with risk assessors for several years, including detailed discussions of the limitations of their craft. Despite the ambiguity in how well particular criticisms apply to the very diverse approaches she has grouped as RA, I largely agree with O’Brien’s points about RA. I am a bit more optimistic about the safety margins in their estimates than is O’Brien, although perhaps I’m biased by seeing more competent and honest analyses than the examples she cites. However, my main problem with her arguments about technical, moral and practical flaws is that she limits these to RA, when they apply equally to any effort—including AA—to predict the likely positive and negative outcomes of future events that might or might not occur. Uncertainty is inherent in such prediction, and numerical estimates of uncertainty are one tool (neither the only nor always the best) to help us make decisions in the face of ignorance, not merely ploys to serve self-interest. Although O’Brien says for AA “the existence of uncertainty about any one option [is] a valuable piece of information,” she only mentions the undesirability of options whose damages are quite uncertain (pp. 217-218, 220). She offers no discussion about uncertainty that risks might be over- rather than under-estimated, uncertainty of benefits, or uncertainty in the preferability of “alternatives” to “business as usual.” Perhaps this gap in her argument is explained—but not, in my view, justified—by her view that “all our efforts to allow ecosystems and organisms to retain or regain integrity are reversible. Only adverse consequences of our activities seem to have the potential for being essentially irreversible, at least short of geologic time” (pp. 194-195). And attempts by business, government, activist and other analysts to achieve desired results are not only also likely with AA, they are almost guaranteed, since compared to RA there are more variables to manipulate and more parties participating. She mentions at great length the ability of business to use arguments over RA details to delay changing their behavior (e.g., pp. 103-104), but does not notice that the benefits of protective actions could be delayed similarly until an AA is completed. Oddly, except for a criticism of NRDC’s use of risk assessment to attack Alar (p. 242), O’Brien seems unaware that contending parties can shift their views of risk assessment depending on whether they like the answers (for example, business seems uneasy about quantitative analysis of “disparate adverse impacts” on minorities, as part of “environmental justice” initiatives). Only two of the defects O’Brien lists for RA might not occur, or occur as often, for AA: (1) the declaration that a given action will be “safe,” and (2) the public inaccessibility of the debate over alternatives. But I disagree that a safety determination is inherent to RA: reputable risk assessors would argue that risk assessment’s greatest strength, and its best use, is to determine relative, not absolute risk, and risk communication researchers have long urged institutions to abandon such usually faulty claims. Furthermore, the nature of policy debates almost guarantees that participants in AA will make the same erroneous claim about their preferred option. As for accessibility, she is probably correct, but this is hardly an unmixed blessing, as I discuss below. In short, AA will be fraught with the same technical flaws and strategic use of data and analytic techniques that O’Brien accuses RA of having or promoting. Curiously, she acknowledges several times in the book that RA—supposedly fatally flawed, technically and morally—is in fact a part of the analysis required for AA (pp. 129, 172, 177-178, 236), as long as multiple rather than single options are

covered. (Her book would be a lot more convincing to otherwise skeptical audiences if she had dropped this false notion that RA can only be used to analyze the risks of one option at a time.) That AA shares RA's drawbacks is not critical, because I believe reviewing more than one option will, on balance, be an improvement; but these drawbacks do reduce AA's benefits.

Overall, O'Brien's implicit thesis is that more information is better, a semi-delusion nearly universal among analysts and policy actors ("if they only had the facts citizens would agree with our position" is a mantra I've heard from all sides). For example, she says that "[AA], like cost-benefit analysis, 'clarifies choices among alternatives by evaluating consequences in a systematic manner' (Ashford and Caldart 1991)... What constitutes 'systematic evaluation' of these consequences, of course, is a judgment call" (p. 143). As a researcher, in self-interest and ideologically, I must agree to a point that more information is better. Strategically, she also is probably correct, since the dimensions she seeks to add to analysis will most likely favor activist over institutional positions. For example, discussing recombinant bovine growth hormone for increasing milk production, she mentions among other factors to consider "farmers' personal relationship to and enjoyment of farming, ...pesticide use, ...use of public money, ... long-term condition of agricultural soils, and...water quality" (p. 135). But the "more is better" thesis has been attacked by decision theorists, political scientists, and others for decades, since people neither can nor will use all available information beyond a certain limit, nor use it in a "rational" manner (e.g., Lindblom 1959, Nisbett and Ross 1980, Kahneman and Tversky 1984). RA's results, as limited as O'Brien thinks the method to be, have been criticized by decision-makers as being difficult to use (CRARM, 1997:85-92); AA will be more challenging. She also argues that "[AA] forces the decision maker to assume responsibility for choosing among various explicit political and value tradeoffs" (p. 145). I agree that this is technically easier with AA than RA, but both policymakers and ordinary citizens will resist making any but the most banal tradeoffs explicit. Too many tradeoffs are "taboo," and yet at some point (exactly which point is controversial) society needs to make them, without paying much attention to the nasty details (Fiske and Tetlock 1997).

O'Brien also seems somewhat naive about the obviousness of choices under the rubric of AA. Choices to stop practices that are really obviously bad do not require the detailed analysis of RA or AA (as argued about quantitative RA for many situations in developing or "in transition" countries, by authors otherwise supportive of the method--Bell and Wilson 2000). But most choices are not so obvious: that is why some kind of analysis is helpful. Stopping chemical production or use is not the straightforward solution in all cases that O'Brien seems to believe it to be, as shown by the vexing debate over how to reduce disinfection byproduct risks in drinking water without unleashing microbial epidemics. Asbestos removal and steam cleaning of beaches after an oil spill are only two of the many examples of cures that have often been worse than the disease. Many environmental problems are not dominated by the "industry or government action" (see my first quotation from her book, above) she stresses as cause; other organizations and individuals also play roles (as in non-point source pollution, for example) that do not allow simple solutions. She seems to assume that a multiple-option, multi-dimensional alternatives analysis will result in decisions that she would fully support. Given the diversity of values, I suspect that even if "the public" made all decisions and its members fully considered all salient benefits and drawbacks of alternatives, they might often make choices that would appall both O'Brien and myself. O'Brien believes that "[w]hen we decided to place a human on the moon, we did it. Likewise, we can set equally clear goals to restore the environment, [etc.]. Once goals are set and policies are developed that provide incentives to meet the goals, creative people will develop and implement alternatives" (p. 167). Creativity can certainly wreak wonders, but this view shared across otherwise antagonistic ideologies (urged by Simon [1981] in his claim that we not worry about resource depletion, for example) is a misconception. Rational analysis, whether RA or AA, will not offset relative political powers, remove constraints of nature (human or otherwise), or overcome the narrow values and assumptions of particular analytic traditions. Getting to the moon was an absurdly simple task compared to most societal challenges, and is an invalid analogy for environmental management (Nelson 1977). O'Brien sees such "problematic behaviors" as overpopulation, over-consumption, poverty, legal protection of corporate "persons," and "production of inessential products" as important to address; she argues that their exclusion from policy analyses suggests "an exercise in communal denial of fundamental environmental problems" (p. 118). I don't disagree that these factors are problematic, but they are by no means obvious causes even to environmentalists, as shown by the Ehrlich-Commoner debates on population versus technology versus consumption.

The biggest problem raised by O'Brien's thesis is one still unresolved by the environmental and policy communities at large: what are proper decision-making roles for organizations and individuals in a republican democracy? The "safety" decisions that O'Brien attributes to risk assessors and their organizational superiors are largely determined by legislation and the conflict designed into the American political system, just as the single-option analysis often is. Demand for a simple "yes-no" decision partly reflects pressure from interest groups, as she

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argues, but also reflects public wishes. Many citizens simply want to know whether something is safe, and assume that any amount of a chemical will cause harm (e.g., Kraus et al. 1992; Johnson and Slovic 1998); claims that a given action is “least damaging” of the available alternatives will not be acceptable to these citizens. As a long-time proponent of a greater public voice in environmental decision-making, I am sympathetic to O’Brien’s concern that government and business officials decide that certain risks are acceptable on behalf of “victims” who disagree and do not believe they have delegated that decision to institutions (p. 79). She makes some good arguments for more citizen involvement in this book, and does even better in an exchange of views on the Citizen Nature Project in two Oregon cities, of which she is a volunteer coordinator (O’Brien 2000). However, the apparently easy choice in favor of democracy and self-determination is not that simple. For example, O’Brien claims that

We will always need many citizens who refuse to remain passive when some bureaucrat tells them that their local contaminated wetland is clean because national technical standards devised by some distant cadre say it is clean. (p. 87)

She notes elsewhere that “[t]hose who reap the monetary benefits are not necessarily those who pay the monetary costs” (p. 142), but does not recognize the subsidy imposed without consent on taxpayers and consumers elsewhere implied by local activists’ success in getting extra wetlands cleanup. Implementing their own judgments of acceptable risk means that non-locals might have to forego reducing their own high-priority risks. Shifting burdens in this way is not by itself illegitimate, but should entail at least implicit citizen consent through votes for legislators who enact such policies. From whence does this consent arise in the wetlands case? Without it, locals should tax themselves for the extra desired cleanup, but this rarely happens. This problem of consent and representation has challenged political science and practice for decades; rhetorical assertions about democracy do not help. Certainly agencies should limit themselves to claiming that an impact is “acceptable” for public policy; I agree with O’Brien that agencies should not claim that the individuals who suffer that impact should believe that it is acceptable to them. But that step will not resolve the deeper conundrum of who deserves to choose the alternative that becomes public policy.

Dr. O’Brien acknowledges that:

It is true that assessing alternatives is not enough. One of the underlying principles of this book, however, is that one of the most essential and powerful steps to change is understanding that there are alternatives.... Alternatives assessment allows citizens, politicians, agency bureaucrats, and some business people to see the potential in the concept that no risk is acceptable if there are better alternatives. (p. 213)

I agree with this potential, even if I disagree with her on its magnitude or the obviousness of what counts as “better.” I look forward to seeing the fruits of this campaign to widen our consideration of alternatives for maintaining and improving environmental quality.

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Cultural Encounters with the Environment: Enduring and Evolving Geographic Themes. By Murphy, Alexander B. and Douglas L. Johnson, eds. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers (2001), 337 pp.

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Four decades ago, Philip Wagner and Marvin Mikesell compiled *Readings in Cultural Geography*, arguably the founding text in modern cultural geography. In it, they outlined the primary subsets of the discipline, and defined as well the role geographers play in exploring relationships between cultures and their environments. "For [...] cultural geographers, any sign of human action in a landscape implies a culture, recalls a history, and demands an ecological interpretation—the history of any people evokes its setting in a landscape, its ecological problems, and its cultural concomitants; and the recognition of a culture calls for the discovery of traces it has left on the earth" (p. 23). Mikesell himself explored many of these themes in his own work; his research interests ranged from exploring ecological relations in North Africa to presenting ideas on how we should conceptualize nationhood. His scholarship in the field, and in cultural ecology in particular, is the inspiration behind *Cultural Encounters with the Environment*.

Alexander Murphy and Douglas Johnson have brought together fifteen of Mikesell's colleagues and former students in this festschrift to the University of Chicago geographer. The result is a well-written, well-ordered addition to the recent array of literature in cultural geography. The contributors in this volume fuse the major themes emphasized in the 1962 compilation, such as cultural ecology, settlement and diffusion, and cultural adaptation, with discursive interpretation, place perception, and other contemporary approaches and perspectives. At the same time, they engage in what Chris Philo (2000) refers to as "rematerializing", or rather, putting the "field" back into the field work of cultural geography.

Murphy and Johnson divide the volume into three sections: "constructing cultural spaces", "remaking the environment", and "claiming spaces", a schematic that demonstrates the degree to which traditional themes have been reinterpreted. No one essay is easily classified within this breakdown, however, as each addresses the changing nature of how space and place are organized within cultural systems and in relation to the immediate environment. The subject matter is diverse, yet complementary, in both focus and approach. Chad Emmett's paper on the division of religious spaces in Israel and Palestine illustrates how fragile is the peace attained among competing actors in contested spaces of worship. Segregation of worship spaces in some situations provides for a "form of scattered sovereignty" (p. 279). Such sovereignty is begrudgingly ceded in the West Bank, the focus of Shaul Cohen's essay on the "absence of place" among Palestinians. The scattered zones of varying authority in which Palestinians live, coupled with shifting social constructions of place through literature and nationalist sentiment, mean that place is a construct which is as much "circumscribed or dictated" (p. 299) from above as from within. These constructions and meanings are derived from Israeli authorities and international conventions, rather than from a singular, internally driven, Palestinian self-image.

Charles Good, James Wescoat, and Karl and Elizabeth Butzer, also present case studies on understanding cultural practices and adaptations of non-Western societies. Good's historical examination of western vs. non-western understandings of the traditional practice of female circumcision demonstrates the need to combine cultural with medical geographies, and for deconstructing the discourse surrounding those cultural practices seen as

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controversial and inconsistent with western values. The latter is particularly important in recognizing long-held cultural beliefs. (Indeed, female circumcision has been renamed female genital mutilation in most western literature, notes Good, without regard to the type or severity of the practice.) Both Wescoat's and Butzer and Butzer's essays provide comparative studies of cultural adaptations in old world and new. Wescoat reexamines the development of ideas on irrigation leading to Wittfogel's hydraulic utilization hypothesis, which was the basis in part for Donald Worster's *Rivers of Empire*. He further illustrates networks of information sharing and technical innovation (or sometimes the lack thereof) in irrigation infrastructure developed in the United States and India. In the same vein, Butzer and Butzer question existing ideas of the diffusion of Spanish housing styles and building technologies in the colonies. Indigenous cultures not only continued to use traditional building techniques after colonization, they also rejected or dramatically altered many of the housing styles that the Spanish attempted to import.

Other pieces address issues involved in the human-nature relationship. John Kirchner and James Schmid examine the evolving legal and regulatory mechanisms surrounding the navigability of American rivers and wetlands protection in the United States. Schmid's contribution provides a clear understanding of how wetlands have traditionally been dealt with in law and politics. His essay reads less like a piece of academic literature and more like a government report. As a result, it often misses the larger cultural context. David Lowenthal's essay on the major assumptions of modern environmental philosophies provides both a concise and readable history of environmental thought, and a call to question some of the inherent problems in how we frame the environment or nature. Lowenthal's interpretation shares much in common with the William Cronon line of environmental thinking, and he provides what might be considered optimistic suggestions on how to reposition ourselves in nature. The essay's readability makes it a good candidate for any environmental studies course syllabus, as his suggestions, which resemble those put forth by the sustainable development school, could spark a lively round of debate regarding the feasibility of suggestions on how we should improve our relationship with the natural world.

Even Anne Buttner's piece on Ernest Hemingway ties nicely into the discussion of perceptions of nature. Hemingway's characters, and, indeed, Hemingway himself, found not only solitude, but home in wild places when fishing (as was so eloquently evoked in *The Big Two-Hearted River*). Buttner's analysis of place in Hemingway begins nicely with her own reflections on Mikesell and ends with some on the great fisherman.

Cultural Encounters provides a strong collection of readings on critical themes within environmental history and cultural geography. Carville Earle revisits one of American history's most contentious debates, that surrounding Turner's frontier thesis. Earle's analysis falls short, however, as he fails to address key elements endemic to the West that lay between the Mississippi River and the Pacific Coast. Earle demonstrates that the frontier process was a dynamic and cyclical one tied to economic expansion. His assertion that the frontier closed in the 1840s, rather than in 1890, however, is problematic, as it is based on evidence illustrating a decrease in the rate of settlement expansion to below 2% per annum once the movement of people reached the harsh conditions of the Great Plains and Far West. While the later date could legitimately be called into question (the Census Bureau in 1890 merely announced that a continuous line of unsettled land no longer existed), slow growth does not equate to a lack of a frontiering process. Earle's treatment also ignores the important role San Francisco and other urban places in the West played in regional development, opting to draw instead from the Heartland-Hinterland thesis. The Great Plains and Far West constituted a slowly expanding periphery of marginal interest relative to the dynamic concentrations of population and economy then under way in the Northeast (p. 102). Earle's decision to study rates of economic expansion coincident with settlement rates is undoubtedly valuable. Yet, these figures alone cannot demonstrate the complex and varied nature of frontier settlement in the trans-Mississippi West as compared to the trans-Allegheny frontier.

On the whole, *Cultural Encounters* flows nicely from one work to the next. Even the essays that cannot be easily packaged with those mentioned above seem well-placed in the context of the larger compilation. Michael Conzen's piece on the German utopian societies of the 19th century Texas Hill Country (which seems almost unimaginable in Texas today) shares the same section as Peter Goheen's discussion of the public's right and ability to determine the future of the Toronto waterfront in the 1800s. The two essays share more than just a historical perspective. Both demonstrate the role of particular groups to shape their surroundings according to their own ideas. Chauncy Harris demonstrates the link between ethnicity, language, and urban-rural settlement differences in the Russian homelands. His emphasis on language and ethnicity serves as a fitting tribute to Mikesell's interests. The final piece, by Philip Wagner, along with many of the other pieces in the book, serves as a tribute not only to Mikesell, but also to the long-past glory days of the Berkeley School of Sauer-inspired cultural geography. Many of the writers included in *Cultural Encounters* did not themselves work west of the Sierras; the legacy of the program, and of Mikesell, however, is readily apparent in the collection's emphasis on cultural ecology, field work, and the role of place in culture.

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Beneath the Surface: Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology. Edited by Eric Katz, Andrew Light, and David Rothenberg. Cambridge, MA & London, UK: The MIT Press (2000), viii, 328 pp.

Reviewed by J. Stan Rowe, emeritus Professor (Ecology), University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon.

Ecology is the "skin-out" study of what envelops and influences things, as compared to physiology with its focus on "skin-in" functions--which leads to the thought that the appropriate title for those primarily concerned with their inner soul/selves is "Deep Physiologists." In contrast, the name Deep Ecology (DE) suggests exploration of human ecology to its outer limits, asking what is the reality of people's relationship to the world that envelops them, and what ethical actions flow from that relationship? Over the last quarter century Arne Naess has been the most influential voice of eco/philosophy and eco/sophy (ecological wisdom) in the Western world.

Naess's thoughts and actions have been motivated by what he sees as the appalling deterioration of planet Earth, overpopulated and under attack by a consumer society. From this came his founding of the Deep Ecology Movement (DEM) for social-political change, centered on a Platform of eight Principles (composed with George Sessions) that, in summary, calls for valuing and respecting all forms of life, for an attitude of non-interference with natural processes and systems, for de-emphasizing the primary significance of people and their institutions, for restructuring society in harmony with natural processes, and for a reexamination of the ends of human life, replacing the pursuit of material abundance with a heightened quality of life experience.

The introductory chapter of *Beneath the Surface* states that the book's primary goal is "to examine the philosophy of DE," a difficult task without a philosophical interpretation of the DEM Platform. The editors propose six points as essential to the philosophy of DE. In abbreviated form they are: (1) Rejection of strong anthropocentrism, (2) Replacing anthropocentrism with ecocentrism (the ecosphere and ecological systems central), (3) Identification with all forms of life, (4) The sense that caring for the environment is part of individual human self-realization, (5) A critique of instrumental rationality and an emphasis on alternative modes of thinking, (6) Personal development of a total worldview prior to social action.

Naess values the diversity of philosophical/cultural faiths and is willing to recognize many as underpinnings of the DEM. He conceived it as four linked levels, illustrated with the "Apron Diagram" so-called because it flares out generously above and below the Platform-Principles "waist." Level 1, the bust of the apron, encompasses a broad spectrum of religions and philosophies willing to subscribe to Level 2, where the "Platform Principles" cinch all together. Level 3 and Level 4 comprise the hips and hem of the garment, the former expressing general consequences (such as choice of lifestyle) in harmony with the Platform, and the latter specifying concrete situations and practical decisions of a political nature. In Naess's words, "The DEM thus can manifest both plurality and unity: unity at Level 2, and plurality at the other levels."

Midway through the book editor/essayist Andrew Light examines ethicist Callicott's arguments for a singular foundational ecophilosophy based on Aldo Leopold's concept of people's duties to the larger biotic communities of which they are members. Light concludes that environmental philosophy is too young to settle on one right path, and

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so he too endorses a pluralism of ecophilosophies at Level 1.

Obviously Naess does not consider his personal philosophy, "Ecosophy T," as the only valid one, but the editors justify particular attention to his thinking not only because he is the founding father but also because many of the essays that the book comprises were initially slated for publication in the journal *Inquiry* as a special issue titled, "Arne Naess's Environmental Thought." Thus many of the essays are understandable in the light of Naess's Ecosophy T, which shows the influence of Eastern philosophies. In my view his three outstanding ideas are:

(1) Self-realization for all Beings. This is the belief that the route to an ecological worldview begins with individuals surmounting their little egos by sympathetically extending the boundaries of their identities, wider and wider, through the intuition and ecological knowledge that each is embedded in and supported by a network of relationships—to the human community, to animals and plants, to the world. The enlarged consciousness that experiences identity with Nature and desires the same happiness for all beings is described as "the Self" (also known as "ecological self" or "universal self") as opposed to the little egoistic skin-bounded "self."

(2) Ontology before ethics. Naess insists that ethics or right action flows from prior beliefs about the fundamental nature of things, about what is real and valuable. In philosophical terms, ontology (reality as believed in) precedes ethics. Hence the most important task is to understand one's ecological relationships to the world for then ethical choices and "beautiful actions" will be obvious and spontaneous. Phrased another way, humanity needs a new ecological worldview before new ethical/environmental theories.

(3) Spontaneous Experience. Naess is suspicious of reason as the unassisted guide toward the dual realization of the ecological worldview and the extended Self. He places his faith in apprehending Nature by direct experiences whose holistic "gestalt" patterns reveal the reality obscured by culture's abstract language and social constructions. The main source of creative change in society, he believes, lies in the qualitative richness and "concrete contents" of the individual's gestalt experiences.

According to editor/essayist Eric Katz, the pillars of Ecosophy T (which he lists as Identification with Nature, Self-realization, and Ontology as the basis of normative values) suffer from the fault of anthropocentrism (homocentrism). Only a strong environmental ethical system can move beyond Naess's limited perspective that is tellingly exposed in his ambiguity about human interests versus nature protection. Katz approves the Deep Green Theory of Richard Sylvan who, disagreeing with Naess's idea of "Self," argued for an ethic based on eco-impartiality. The proper course for environmental philosophy, Katz concludes, is not an ecosophy such as Naess's ontological worldview but an unbiased environmental ethic that de-emphasizes human-centered categories of value.

Countering the opinion of Katz, William Grey criticizes Sylvan's Deep Green Theory because it postulates values in nature independent of valuers, while admitting that values vary between cultures. Grey points to other inconsistencies, exemplified by the wording of the Deep Green "obligation principles," such as "Do not jeopardize the well-being of natural objects or systems without good reason." Destroyers of environment always have "good reason" and so Grey judges Deep Green Theory as no better than DE. Whether Katz, Grey, and several other contributors draw a distinction between homo/morphic and homo/centric is unclear. All human thoughts and actions are homo/morphic (shaped by humans) but they are not necessarily homo/centric (centered on humans), and insofar as Naess and Sylvan center their values on other-than-human things, they should not be accused of homocentrism.

Naess's foundational ideas draw the fire of Mathew Humphrey for privileging the intuitive over the rational. To be human is to reason, he argues, and therefore the rational-moral should be privileged over the beautiful. The only defensible basis for action is provided by reasoned ethical codes, not from the intuitive realization of Self-identity through gestalt experiences. The Humphrey/Naess difference echoes the old Plato/Sophist controversy, unresolved after 2500 years. The question is, which of "truth" and "beauty" should be trusted to guide the other? Western tradition favors the former but Naess wants to give the latter a try.

Humphrey is targeted in turn by ecofeminist Ariel Salleh who is suspicious of current ethical systems. Everyone, not just Naess, acts from a sense of self-identity, she argues. Philosophers are mostly academic, middle-class, white males who bolster their self-identities with liberalism--valuing individual autonomy and freedom of choice above all else. But liberalism is a discredited source of ethics because it is anthropocentric, Eurocentric, class-based, and gendered. It is a failed political formula, socially unjust and environmentally destructive. DE is on the right track but it needs to embrace a theory of labor, of embodied materialism, working (as do women in production and reproduction) at the interface of Humanity and Nature.

Like Humphrey, ethicist Val Plumwood is critical of Naess's "ontology before ethics" and of his thesis that treats "ethics as unnecessary" (a fairer assessment might be that Naess treats ethics as derivative). She sides with Katz in skepticism of Naess's stress on consciousness change and on "Self-realization" through unity (identity) with nature. What is needed, she believes, is an ethic of solidarity, enabling strong connections to human liberation movements as well as to nature. The DEM should not neglect institutional change, and a good start would be reforming the institution of property/land which, in the Lockean formula, is valueless until "developed" by human

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labor. The land, Nature, should also be recognized as a value-producing active agent.

Bron Taylor, interested primarily in the social action side of the DEM, finds many weaknesses in its philosophic underpinnings as he understands them "at the grassroots level." The problem is a set of dualisms--inherited from such thinkers as Paul Shepard, Gary Snyder, George Sessions, and Bill Devall--that he identifies as "the main conceptual tendencies found in North America's deep ecology movements." He lists a number of "good/bad" twosomes, for example:

Foraging societies (good)	Agricultural societies (bad)
Animistic religions	Sky-God religions
Biocentrism	Anthropocentrism
Intuition	Reason
Regional self sufficiency	Globalization

etc., to which he might have added:

Deep Ecology	Reform environmentalism
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Taylor argues that such dualistic thinking is simplistic and counterproductive when the goal is to marshal resistance to environmental deterioration from every culture in the world. Emphasizing his empirical research, he reports the unsurprising discovery that people are motivated to action by immediate threats to their well-being, not by bioregional ideology or calls for consciousness transformation. He plumps for a new Green social philosophy, something like the Earth Charter that sets out principles of reverence for Earth acceptable to all religious faiths. Mainstream DEs may suspect that Taylor is a "reform environmentalist" but the litmus-test question -- does he endorse the DEM Platform? -- is not answered. Had all contributors opened with a "yea" or a "nay" on this question, their orientations would have been clarified for the benefit of readers.

The book's purported goal of examining DE philosophy keeps slipping out of focus. John Clark's "How Wide is Deep Ecology?" shows the difficulty of dealing strictly with DE philosophy apart from the Platform and its social/political implications. Clark would prefer a more specific Platform to welcome in social ecologists and ecofeminists by giving practical content to the DEM's call for sweeping social change. As with Salleh, Plumwood, and Taylor, the Platform and its deficiencies for sparking political programs (at Naess's Levels 3 and 4?) are the center of attention.

Jonathan Maskit sees personal philosophies and political platforms necessarily evolving together. Changes in the individual and in culture/politics go hand in hand, and either alone is a no-go. Seek reality through "spontaneous experience," say the DEs, but experience depends on cultural presuppositions. For example, how can the individual reduce desire for consumption when the culture endorses consumption as a high social goal? In Kantian terms the role of the State is to make people act as they would voluntarily if they really were rational beings, curbing desires by reasonable laws. The new sympathetic worldview that the DEM urges on its members necessitates co-evolution of the cultural-ideational medium in which all are immersed.

On the supportive side, editor/essayist David Rothenberg explains Naess's relational thinking as "phenomenology minus the subject," meaning that Naess's aim is to apprehend directly nature's qualities or "concrete contents," not as (minus) an observer but merging the subjective and objective, the human and the natural, in spontaneous experience. Through Rothenberg's eyes, DE is viewed as an entirely new philosophy, a new horizon, a direction for progress in ontology, a poetic way of being in the world.

Arran Gare is also sympathetic to the DEM, which he believes is marginalized through lack of a Grand Narrative. DE needs a persuasive cultural myth that saves what is good in modernism (the emancipatory agenda for the disadvantaged) and extends it to the world of nature so that living creatures and ecosystems as well as cultural diversity may flourish. In effect he repeats Maskit's theme that the development of "self," in whatever form, is shaped by the stories by which each culture defines itself--and the appearance of a compelling ecological saga is overdue. Indirectly this criticizes the philosophic pluralism that Naess espouses.

Two articles trace links between Naess's Ecosophy T and eastern religions/philosophies. Knut Jacobson points out Naess's debt to Gandhi who believed that the way to self-realization was not only through knowledge and meditation but also through political action. He notes ironically that DE reverses the Hindu aim of freeing the self from bondage to the material world, seeking instead to integrate humans into the natural Earth cycles of birth, growth, and death.

Dean Curtin explains Naess's ties to Buddhism through the philosophy of Dogen, whose thought goes beyond DE from Self-realization to Cosmic Co-realization. We will never be released from suffering, said Dogen, as long as we search within the circle of human suffering alone. Thus the advice to Naess to advance beyond

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biocentrism with its focus on living things, and be released into the “coming and going of all things.” This appears to be a call for ecocentrism as Earth-centeredness. Paradoxically, the sympathetic glue that “binds together all things,” amoebas and crystals, humans and mountains, aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems, is their impermanency.

Finally, and farthest off the mark, Michael Zimmerman’s essay -- “Possible Political Problems of Earth-based Religiosity” -- expresses fears that a theology of Earth linked with the DEM might be coopted and used as the Nazis used their nationalistic “blood and soil” motif to justify totalitarian programs of suppression and extermination. In view of the known history of humanity in the West over the last several thousand years, with its frequent “ethnic cleansings” under the aegis of a transcendental male God, the thought that belief in a supra-national divine mother Earth would do worse seems a long shot. Zimmerman devotes much of his article to the philosophy of Ken Wilber, who initially explained humanity’s assault on nature as due to “death anxiety” but now as a second guess locates the fault in “retro-romantics” (including followers of Earth-based religions). Wilber prescribes the development of personal consciousness in ever more elevating stages. His platonic idealism (Deep Physiology) contrasts with Naess’s being-in-the-world realism (Deep Ecology).

Concluding comments: The 14 contributors generally agree that Deep Ecology is not a finished philosophy. It is still finding its roots below and expanding its “greenness” above. The voluminous literature that has developed around Naess’s Ecosophy T and the DEM “Apron Diagram” contribute to its current fluidity. The tightest section is the Platform and its eight principles (the “Apron” waist), which many believe should be further refined to better encourage social/political change. Stronger tie-strings in the middle will keep the Apron from blowing in the wind.

Eastern philosophies, like Western religions, lay heavy hands of responsibility on the individual to “shape up.” This idea is apparent in Naess’s philosophy. But few can bootstrap their own conversion from “self” to “Self” without cultural assistance. On this important point Bowers (1995, see especially p. 169 for note on Naess’s individualism) has criticized Naess for accenting the authority of individual judgment while ignoring culture as the primary source of influence on thought and behavior. The needed “ecological worldview” is unlikely to result from everyone concentrating on developing her/his own ecosophy.

A powerful ecological narrative that neither disparages Nature nor people is overdue. One problem on the philosophers’ side is suspicion of Earth-based science, leading to vague use of ecological language particularly when it comes to terms such as “nature,” “life,” “community,” “ecology,” “ecosystem,” “biosphere,” “biocentric” “ecocentric.” An example is pinning the adjective “ecocentric” indiscriminately on social ecology, ecofeminism, bioregionalism, and deep ecology (e.g., McLaughlin (1995) uses “ecocentrism” broadly and indefinitely for all viewpoints that are not anthropocentric, when a correct usage of the word according to its etymology is “home-centered,” i.e. ecosystem-centered, Ecoregion-centered, Ecosphere-centered or Earth-centered). Ecological terminology, freely used but imperfectly understood, needs to be sorted out and defined in Earthly terms if people are to accept a narrative that identifies humans as dependent Earthlings. Such a compelling story/myth is a necessary counterpart of and support for the experiential ways of knowing championed, for example, by Naess and Rothenberg.

The essays convey the feeling that two different cultures are confronting one another. Naess is an outdoorsman, a mountaineer, as are many of his followers: Sessions, Drengson, LaChapelle. These people, like naturalists of the ilk of Muir and Thoreau, have been “touched” by oceanic nature-experiences, intuitions of unity with Earth. They are impelled to formulate a philosophical rationale for their Wordsworthian epiphanies, borrowing eclectically from the scriptures of Lao Tsu, Protagoras, Dogen, Spinoza, Bergson, Husserl. Facing them somewhat incredulously is a majority of rationalist academics, city-born and bred, who have never been touched by Earth, never climbed mountains, never wandered in a wilderness, never hugged a tree. Ethical rules are their meat, not spontaneous experiences. The mind-sets of two such different groups of people are far apart, and the Ecological Narrative that pulls them together will richly deserve the title “Grand.”

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Domestic Sources of International Environmental Policy: Industry, Environmentalists, and U.S. Power, by Elizabeth DeSombre, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press (2000), xvi and 300 pp.

Reviewed by Dimitris Stevis, Department of Political Science, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO.

Since the late 1980s international relations scholars have increasingly sought to apply theoretical insights to the empirical study of various aspects of international environmental politics. Elizabeth DeSombre's volume is a welcome and valuable addition to this growing literature contributing, primarily, to understanding the domestic sources of international environmental policy, as the title of her book suggests. After presenting her major arguments and findings I identify some future or relevant avenues of research that this project suggests, either implicitly or explicitly. Every researcher chooses her areas of interests and research and, in any event, there is only so much that any one of us can do. In that sense, these latter comments do not detract from DeSombre's solid theoretical and empirical work. But because the theoretical and substantive issues that she raises are contested issues I find it appropriate to situate her volume within a broader context.

In her words, "one important way that regulations in general appear on the international scene is through the internationalization of regulations that one or more states have undertaken domestically" (p. 2). She proceeds to examine this proposition through the practice of the U.S. in the areas of endangered species, air pollution and ocean fisheries. She recognizes, however, that trying to internationalize a domestic policy is not the same thing as having it accepted by other countries. For this reason she divides the overall process into two "stages". Stage I deals with the politics of attempting to internationalize a domestic policy; Stage II deals with the question of the success of such an attempt. The first part of the book (Chapters 3 - 5) "argues that we should expect to find attempts at internationalization when domestic economic and environmental interests combine to benefit from adoption by other states of the environmental regulations in question" (p. 14). The second section (Chapters 6 and 7) "argues that target states will adopt the regulations pushed by internationalizing states that make a credible threat to impose sanctions in an area in which it [sic] has dominant market powers" (p. 14). On the basis of her research, DeSombre identifies some key implications or, perhaps, possible lines of additional research. One key implication is that of alliances between industry and environmentalists in promoting the internationalization of domestic regulations. A second implication is that crosscutting alliances may also be present in other issue areas. A third implication relates to the effectiveness of sanctions. According to the author, sanctions may actually work well under specific conditions. A final implication is "that domestic politics and international relations are not distinct entities" (p. 17). Moving between the author's "Introduction and Overview" and the relevant chapters of the book I will deal with the two stages in their temporal order.

Stage I involves "the conditions under which the United States will attempt to internationalize domestic environmental regulations" (p. 9). Professor DeSombre identifies two general explanations. The environmental explanation posits that "environmental externalities will drive attempts to encourage other states to adopt environmental regulations similar to those of the United States" (p. 9). The economic explanation "looks to the economic harm suffered by the regulated domestic industries and the potential for economic gain offered by internationalization" (p. 9). Her answer is that the U.S. "... typically pushes to internationalize those domestic environmental policies that would be advantageous on the international level for both economic and environmental reasons" (p. 10). In fact, she finds that "in no case ... is one set of actors able to push forward an attempt at internationalizing without engaging the interests of the other group" (p. 10).

Chapter 2 provides the research questions and research design for Stage I. After reviewing the alternative environmental and economic explanations. DeSombre states her argument more clearly and evocatively. She argues that attempts at internationalization are more likely to take place when 'Baptists' (environmentalists) and 'bootleggers' (industry) ally with each other. In particular "we should expect a push for internationalisation most frequently when domestic regulation causes trade externalities for the regulated industry within the United States"

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(p. 45). Even though 'competitiveness' arguments carry the day, however, "it is important that there be an environmental reason to internationalize regulation" (p. 46). The three sets of cases (endangered species, air pollution and ocean fisheries) she examines in Chapters 3 - 5 uphold the basic parameters of this argument. The author, however, is careful to point out variations and modifying conditions.

Stage II deals with the question of whether the U.S. is successful in internationalizing domestic policies, and also offers explanations for such success. The "legitimacy" explanation posits that "a state will adopt regulations because it thinks doing so is the "right" thing to do regardless of self-interest or fear of consequences." The "self-interest" explanation posits "... that a state will adopt a regulation pushed by another state," if it is in its interest to do so. The "threat" explanation posits that a state will adopt a policy if it "fears that it will be harmed by the other state if it does not do so" (p. 12). DeSombre's argument "... relies most heavily on the variant of the realist hypothesis, but also relies on the credibility gained from the involvement of the coalition of environmental and economic interests observed at Stage I" (p. 12). In particular, "the most important aspect in predicting success is the market power that the internationalizing state has over the states it is trying to persuade, relative to the costliness to the target state of adopting the regulation" (p. 13).

In Chapter 6, the author discusses the various explanations in more depth. As noted above and restated at the end of this chapter, the cases demonstrate that the U.S. has its greatest success in cases when "the sending state has a high degree of relative market power in the threatened resource, with that resource inherently related to the environmental issue over which the regulation is sought" (p. 171). Chapter 7 presents a detailed examination of evidence relevant to this proposition. In this chapter DeSombre discusses specific cases within each one of the three issue areas and the responses of the various target states. The author recognizes that there is variation across issues and countries (p. 225), with the ozone case being the most successful and efforts at persuading others to regulate tuna fishing within their EEZs being a failure (pp. 225-226).

On the basis of her detailed examination of these cases the author proceeds to evaluate the merits of each explanation. She finds that the "legitimacy" explanation does not seem persuasive because there seems to be no relationship between high legitimacy policies (for instance those adopted through multilateral means) and positive response to U.S. efforts (p. 229). The second explanation that the author examines is that of "environmental self-interest," i.e., that a target state may choose to comply because compliance will confer some environmental benefits. As the author suggests, her study seems to pick-up those instances where the internationalization of environmental regulation is contentious (p. 231). As a result, this explanation may carry more weight than is apparent. In the case of the contentious cases, however, environmental self-interest does not seem to play a dominant role (p. 234). The third explanation, "threats," does seem to play a more important role. According to the author, the impact of threats varies depending on "the power of those making the threat, the credibility of that threat, and the cost to the target state of suffering the consequences of refusing to change behavior" (p. 237). She concludes that the most successful internationalization attempts are found in cases where the sending state stands to gain the most from imposing sanctions (p. 238) such as prohibiting a major competitor's access to its markets. This leads to the last explanation, market power. The author's view is that the combination of credible threats with market power (in the specific issue area involved) is the best predictor of internationalization success. Moreover, the credibility of the threat increases if there is a strong Baptist-bootlegger alliance in Stage II, as well. Such an alliance will push for sanctions and will ensure that the state actually pursues them.

Central to the author's project is the necessity of an industry-environmentalist alliance (bootleggers and Baptists) before an internationalization attempt (operationalized as Congressional legislation) can get off the ground and, also, in making threats credible. In her discussion of "lessons for environmentalists," and elsewhere, the author points out that "Baptists create bootleggers and should be advised to consider what types of concerned actors will contribute most in the long run to international environmental regulation" (p. 251). The author would agree that bootleggers also create Baptists. But neither Baptists nor bootleggers are unitary categories, whether at the beginning of such a mutually engendering process or during the course of it. As a result, the potential for alliances involving particular Baptists and bootleggers is ever present and clearly evident in the U.S. foreign policy record (Audley 1997). The kinds of alliances that are formed and their reasons, justifications, and longevity are central to the study of the "greening of industry" and the "marketization of environmentalists" so prominent in our days.

This convergence is particularly important because, as DeSombre observes, industry does have a preponderant role. Throughout the book, it is apparent that industry does not simply bring its concerns about competitiveness to the table but, also, its "structural power". On the other hand, environmentalists bring not only environmental sensitivity, but also legitimacy. The final fusion is an uneven synthesis. From one point of view, this synthesis may be seen as the introduction of environmental sensitivity into the behavior of industry (Vogel 1995, Hawken et al. 2000). From another point of view it can be seen as the subjugation of environmentalists to the hegemony of capital ("weak ecological modernization") (Christoff 1996, Mol and Spaargaren 2000). Whoever has

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the upper hand shapes, in my view, not only particular policies but, also, second order rules, i.e., the rules that delineate which policies are legitimate and feasible. To illuminate this point, the examination of the various disputes brought to the WTO is important in its own terms and adds to our understanding of world politics. Yet, there is a good case to be made that the WTO represents a certain order of things that makes some issues important and relevant while it delegitimizes others.

The above is important because, as DeSombre is right in pointing out, such alliances may occur in other issue areas. A prime example of that would be U.S. labor policies during the 1940s and, again, the use of domestic trade policies to enforce international labor standards since the late 1970s. As with the environmentalist-industry case, the labor-industry case worked on various levels and, also, differently across time. On one level, during the 1940s elites within industry and the unions did find common ground and, thus, marginalized recalcitrant business leaders and radical unions; on another level, this accommodation cast unions in a subordinate role with long term implications. Labor's junior role is also evident in the various attempts at using trade laws to enforce labor standards abroad.

A related issue I would like to raise here is that the role of the state, other than as a recipient and processor of societal pressures, is not examined even though it is ever present. The author can well argue that she has shown that alliances between environmentalists and industry are sufficient explanations. Such an approach, legitimate as it may be, carries with it important substantive and theoretical implications and ought to be discussed. Alternatively, we can be left with the impression that the state simply responds to the instrumental interests of particular social forces regardless of the implications for broader state or societal priorities. The author's argument would have been strengthened if this issue was addressed, both theoretically and through one of these or some other, more appropriate, case. This is particularly important because during critical points in U.S. history, such as the formation of the post-WWII economic order and its reorganization in the 1980s and with respect to critical issue areas, such as climate change and nuclear power, state agencies take a leading role. It is quite possible, for instance, that states may not want sanctions to succeed if the broader edifice is likely to be compromised.

A third issue that DeSombre raises is that her study does contribute to the understanding of the domestic-international divide. There is no denying that her study does contribute well to the study of that divide. Here I would like to point out, however, that the arguments regarding the fuzziness of this divide are much earlier than the late 1980s, as exemplified by works from the whole spectrum of international politics, including historical materialists, dependency theorists and liberal institutionalists. The issue, therefore, is how that divide is conceptualized and treated. The increasing vertical and horizontal integration of firms and the internationalization of the state may, in fact, militate in favor of a more historical and sociological view of the constitution of social agents and of their preferences (e.g., Cox 1987, Ruggie 1995) than the "game theoretic" discourse can accommodate.

A final issue is whether one can generalize from the United States experience to the rest of the world. I agree with DeSombre that there is evidence that similar cases do obtain in other countries. Yet, it would seem to me that the experiences of dominant countries or dominant state-society alliances (whether domestic or transnational) are different from those of subordinate ones. Is it the case, perhaps, that what is interesting with the former is the process of attempting to internationalize domestic policies while with the latter, the process of trying to adjust to such efforts? The author's evidence in Chapter 7 raises some intriguing ideas in this direction.

In my view, DeSombre's volume would have been well served by the allocation of a chapter to the discussion of broader structural issues - whether with respect to the Baptist-bootlegger alliance, the role of the state, or the different experiences of dominant and subordinate social forces. Yet, this may well be outside of the author's interests and she cannot be faulted for that, nor is the value of this fine book diminished as a result. My goal in commenting on some of the contextual issues above has been to situate the volume while asserting its positive contribution to the growing literature on international environmental politics.

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Brave New Seeds: The Threat of GM Crops to Farmers, by Robert Ali Brac de la Perriere, and Franck Seuret. London: Zed Books (2000), 160 pp.

Reviewed by Glenn Davis Stone, Department of Anthropology, Washington University, St. Louis MO 63130.

This little book, with a bold title and backed by an aggressive marketing campaign by Zed Books, is the latest entry into the turbulent debate on genetically modified (GM) crops. The preface introduces it as one of a series of “short, accessible think pieces” on global issues. That’s true in the sense that the book tells what some people think about GM crops. It’s not true in the sense of “thinking through” an issue, or even offering new thoughts.

The authors are an “international consultant” and a journalist, and the people whose thoughts they report on were 39 conferees who met in India in December of 1998. Most are from India or western Europe, with a few Africans, North Americans, and Latin Americans. It is unclear how the group was selected, but it was not on the basis of contributions to the scientific or social science literature on GM crops. Their meeting is claimed to have been a “multicultural debate” on GM agriculture (p. 3) but there is no sign of debate in the book; it’s pure green polemic, beginning and ending with the conviction that GM agriculture “threatens to carry away all that remains of the fabulous vegetal heritage gathered down the ages” by farmers in India and elsewhere in the developing world (pp. 1-2).

The anti-GM arguments are presented in 7 chapters such as “Terminator, Out!” and “About Ethics: Tampering With the Foundations of Life.” The claims will be familiar to most readers: GM crops are likely dangerous to human health and the environment, they threaten farmer independence (in fact, are part of the “programmed elimination of small farmers”), they will endanger southern countries’ control over their agricultural germplasm, and they aren’t needed anyway because hunger results from inequalities rather than shortages.

The book exemplifies the regrettably polarized character of the debate on GM crops. This has turned into a spin war that pushes both sides to devious positions (Stone 2000): corporate media touts a disingenuous malthusianism and inflated claims on the humanitarian benefits of their products, while green critics obstinately deny that GM crops have any promise whatsoever. A case in point from this book is the issue of apomixis -- the property of asexual reproduction, occurring naturally in some plants and apparently transferrable to new plants. While GM today is widely associated with “Terminator” technology which would remove farmer control over seed reproduction, the development of apomictic plants through genetic modification would allow increased farmer control. All hybrid seeds are “terminator” seeds in that heterosis (hybrid vigor) is lost in the second generation. But apomixis could lock the benefits of heterosis into a replantable pure line. Progress has been slow using conventional breeding techniques, and genetic modification promises to greatly expedite research. It is not yet known how this apomixis technology will affect farming in the south (Bicknell and Bicknell 1999), but clearly the potential is enormous. Remaining true to the polarized debate, *Brave New Seeds* claims apomixis to be no more than a means for seed companies to reduce production costs, while reducing plants’ capacity to adapt to changes in the environment (p. 35). Another example: researchers in non-commercial labs have developed cassava resistant to the mosaic virus that ruins part of the African harvest each year; this is a vegetatively reproduced crop that could remain outside of corporate control. How these technologies are deployed, and how we are to weigh their risks and benefits, are crucial issues for agriculture in the south, certainly deserving of a more open-minded airing than they receive

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here.

However sympathetic one may be to the book's stance, the fact is that it is more diatribe than scholarship. In fact, there is only the feeblest of scholarly support offered for the barrage of accusations. Much of the book consists of verbatim opinions aired at the 1998 conference, often backed only by references to tracts from other anti-GM activists such as GRAIN, Greenpeace, Gaia Foundation, RAFI, or Vandana Shiva. Such activist tracts even serve as sources on empirical aspects of agriculture: e.g., RAFI is credited with the fact that 70% of GM seeds contain herbicide resistance [p. 13; this figure has been nudged up to 71% by p. 57]. Some points are supported by quotes from activists quoting other activists: the key point that hunger stems from poverty rather than shortages is referenced by a quote from Neil Ritchie of the Inst. of Agricultural and Trade Policy, quoting Peter Rossett of Food First (p. 62). There are pseudocitations (like to the unnamed "specialists [who] estimate that in developing countries about 80% of the seeds used come from farmers' fields") and many totally unsupported statements ("farmers in countries of the South...will be forced to buy genetically modified seeds instead of the 'traditional' seeds they have been using until now" (p. 11)). I happen to believe that some of the book's complaints about potential effects on developing world farming have some merit, but these issues are contentious and complex, and readers should be wary of such strong critiques with such weak documentation.

One concrete effect of the book's neglect of the relevant literature is that the "sustainable" agriculture that it champions throughout is contrasted to "intensive" agriculture. This is an unfortunate contrast, as some of the most widely-read books in the agrarian ecology literature deal precisely with how and why the most productive forms of sustainable indigenous agriculture are intensive (Netting 1993; Tiffen et al. 1994).

At only 145 smallish pages, *Brave New Seeds* can be read in a couple of hours, but in all candor I must report that to be a dubious use of time. For readers who want to explore the anti-GM activist literature, there is no shortage of material that is equally accessible, more current, better informed, and certainly better supported. For instance, on the deleterious effects of corporate agriculture on small farmers, see Magdoff et al. (2000) or Lappé and Bailey (1998); on biotechnology and intellectual property rights, see Kloppenburg (1988) or the numerous RAFI online publications (www.rafi.org); on environmental safety, see the numerous publications available from Union of Concerned Scientists (www.ucsusa.org); on the disingenuous malthusianism, see Lappé et al. (1998) or Ross (1998).

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The Everglades: An Environmental History, by David McCally, Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida (1999), xxii, 215 pp.

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I am one of those few lucky people who lives so close to the Everglades that I am able to visit them at least once a month. Living close to the Everglades makes you appreciate the sheer size of the Everglades, the diversity of habitats, the magnitude of wading birds during the breeding season, and the amazing differences between the wet season and the dry season. As someone who is deeply interested in the Everglades, I not only visit the Glades as often as I can, I also like to read anything that is published about the Everglades, which is probably why I was very excited to review David McCally's book *The Everglades*.

The book starts out in a promising manner, with a description of the pre-drainage Everglades. In this part of his book, David McCally uses a chronological approach to explain the factors that contributed to the formation of the Everglades. The strength of this approach is that it clearly shows that the original Everglades are the product of the subtle interactions between a subtropical water regime, the unique rock substrate and the ever-present fires. McCally illustrates that because of these factors, the Everglades can only exist on a vast scale which provides resilience and minimizes the effects of natural events such as hurricanes, floods, fires and freezes (p. 26). What is probably most interesting in this section is that McCally shows how the Everglades went from being a "aquatic cornucopia to the backwater of a backwater" after Florida's indigenous Indians disappeared in the mid-Eighteenth Century (p. 57). According to McCally, indigenous Indians prospered in south Florida "because they understood the environmental setting and lived within its parameters" (p. 57), while the Spanish and later Americans regarded south Florida as wasteland that had to and could be transformed (p. 56).

After McCally describes the origins of the Everglades in the first three chapters, he discusses the era of transformation that starts in the Nineteenth Century and continues until today. This section discusses successive attempts to drain the Everglades to make it suitable for agriculture:

Ever since Florida came under American control in 1821, the climate of the southern peninsula encourages the Americans who settled the region to believe that it could support tropical agriculture, and the organic soils of the Everglades convinced early observers that the peninsula's interior would support luxuriant growths of such crops (p. 85).

McCally continues to show us that the promise of fertile lands was false and that agriculture in the Everglades was, and is, much more complicated than originally thought. The entire section describes the "political chicanery, fraudulent engineering data, ... financial fast dealings" (p. 115) and the general lack of understanding of the intricacies of the Everglades system during this period. The story is interesting, and shows that until 1948, when the Army Corps of Engineers became involved, most of the drainage effort was not based on scientific research of the region but on speculation and politics. McCally ends this section by describing the ultimate result, a relatively small agricultural area just south of Lake Okeechobee dominated by what is known in south Florida as "Big Sugar".

Finally in the epilogue, McCally discusses the need for restoration of the Everglades. He argues that the engineering plan created by the Army Corps of Engineers "effectively killed the Everglades" (p. 157) and that we need to create a sustainable Everglades. To achieve this, McCally states that three things need to be done: 1) recreate the region's historic hydrologic regime, 2) form a constitutionally mandated state park, and 3) accept an "Islands and Seas" image of the Everglades. McCally makes a good argument for the hydrologic regime and his conclusion that a "sustainable system cannot be created as long as the southerly flow of water is controlled by the interests of the EAA's growers" (p. 179) is right on point. The second conclusion about the creation of a state park comes out of nowhere and, although the idea is interesting, McCally does not give any support for this anywhere in his book. In fact, McCally does not even mention the establishment of Everglades National Park in 1947, or Big Cypress National Preserve in 1974, nor does he discuss the consequences of the protection of these areas for the health of the overall Everglades. Finally, McCally asserts that restoration of the Everglades can only be successful if Floridians, and in fact all Americans, readjust their image of the Everglades from Marjory Stoneman Douglas' "River of Grass" (p. 180) to an "Islands and Sea" image (p. 181) that does more justice to the true nature of the Everglades.

Although the book is very instructive, McCally fails to give the reader a comprehensive view of the Everglades. In fact, it is likely that someone who is not familiar with the region will have a lop-sided perception of both the current Everglades and the reasons for its demise. McCally is absolutely right, the Everglades are much

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more than a River of Grass, but, besides a description in his section on the pre-drainage environment, he does little justice to those areas in the Everglades that are not part of the Everglades Agricultural Area. Just as important is that it is impossible to understand the current problems in the Everglades without at least acknowledging the burgeoning population in South Florida and the urban development that has encroached the Everglades from the east. McCally does not acknowledge that the scientific drainage and flood control of the Everglades that started in 1948 with the Army Corps of Engineers' Central and Southern Florida Project was not just for agriculture. In fact, the goal of the project was to build a water management system that provided flood control and water not only for agricultural users, but for municipal and industrial users along with preventing salt water intrusion and protecting Everglades National Park and other fish and wildlife resources (US Army Corps of Engineers 1999: pp. 1-10).

Obviously, the project has dramatically altered the Everglades, but it was not just the project that "killed" the Everglades. When the project was designed in the 1950s, only about 500,000 people lived in the region, and the population was estimated to grow to 2 million by the year 2000. Today's population of over 6 million people is three times more than the project was ever designed to serve. The remaining Everglades only occupy 50 percent of the original ecosystem, wading bird populations have decreased by almost 90 percent, and fisheries are declining steadily. Besides the problems associated with a decline in land mass of the Everglades and the detrimental effects of agriculture, the protection of urban development from floods and the provision of water for human uses has changed the water regime of south Florida. Increased urban development and the resulting water runoff has made it difficult for the managers of the existing water system to handle the natural fluctuations in rainfall. Lake Okeechobee is increasingly used as a water reservoir and storage basin, and no longer functions as a natural fresh water lake. The end result of providing for the water needs of the people is that the Everglades do not receive historical natural water flows, which has led to flooding of nesting areas and destruction of tree islands. At the same time, other ecosystems - such as the Florida and Biscayne Bays and the St. Lucie and Caloosahatchee estuaries - have been adversely affected by unsuitable freshwater flows (US Army Corps of Engineers 1999: iii).

It is too bad that McCally does not acknowledge the most recent attempts to restore the Everglades and provide water for all stakeholders in the region. In 1992, Congress directed the Army Corps of Engineers to review the Central and Southern Florida Project to determine if modifications in the system were necessary (PL 102-580, Section 309(i)) and in 1996, Congress authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to formulate a Comprehensive Review Study of the original Central and Southern Florida Project (The Restudy) (PL 104-303, Section 528). The purpose of this Restudy was to develop modifications to the Central and Southern Florida Project to restore the Everglades and Florida Bay ecosystems while providing for the other water-related needs of the region (US Army Corps of Engineers 1998). The result of this review was the Central and Southern Florida Project Comprehensive Review Study, better known as the Restudy, which was submitted to Congress on July 1, 1999 and written into the Water Resources Development Act, which was passed by Congress in the Fall of 2000.

Given the publication date of McCally's book (1999) one cannot blame the author for not discussing the Restudy. However, McCally gives some of the information that has been ignored by both residents and policymakers of south Florida, which makes it potentially a very valuable contribution: he explains the complexities of the pre-drainage Everglades. This part of the book really gives the reader a much better understanding of the uniqueness of the system and the delicate balance between water, rock and fire. It made me wonder if the Florida Everglades can survive in the long run, since the current system is about half the size of the original Everglades, and the hydrological conditions have inalterably changed due to the water demands of agriculture and ever encroaching urban development. If, in the next edition of the book, McCally would include a discussion about urban development, population growth and the Restudy, this book might indeed become more central to the Everglades public policy debate as the author indicates is his intention in the preface.

References Cited:

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